University Studies — No. 1.

HISTORY

OF THE

MEDIÆVAL SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC

BY

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Thesis approved for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Calcutta,
1907.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA
No. 194
REGISTRAR'S OFFICE

Calcutta:

PUBLISHED BY THE CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY AND PRINTED AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS.

1909.

BCU 2245
Gs 3333

TO

THE HON'BLE Mr. JUSTICE ASUTOSH MUKHOPADHYAYA,

SARASVATI, M.A., D.L., D.Sc., F.R.A.S., F.R.S.E.,

Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University,

President of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, and Chairman of the Board of Indigenous Sanskrit Education, Bengal,

WHOSE LIFE IS AN UNBROKEN RECORD

OF LOFTY IDEALS

TRANSLATED INTO PRACTICE,

THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED

IN TOKEN OF PROFOUND ESTEEM

BY

HIS HUMBLE ADMIRER,

THE AUTHOR.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

		PAGE
Preface		xiii
Introduction		xvii

BOOK I.

THE JAINA LOGIC.

Chapter I.—The Era of Tradition.

1.	The Jinas and Mahāvīra	1
2.	The Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras	2
3.	Indrabhūti Gautama	2
4.	Canonical Scriptures of the Jainas	3
5.	The Dṛṣṭivāda	3
6.	Logic in the Scriptures	4
7.	Hetu	4
8.	Four types of Inference	5
9.	Bhadra-bāhu	5
10.	His date	5
11.	His works	6
12.	His syllogism	6
13.	Ten parts of the syllogism	7
14.	Syādvāda	8
15.	Seven categories of Syādvāda	8
16.	The Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra	8
17.	Umāsvāti	8
18.	Pramāṇa or valid knowledge	9
19.	Indirect knowledge or Parokṣa	10
20.	Meanings of Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa	10
21.	Naya	11
22.	Naigama	11
23.	Saṁgraha	11
24.	Vyavahāra	11
25.	Ṛju-sūtra	11
26.	Śabda	12

Chapter II.—The Historical Period.

27.	The written records of the Jainas	13
28.	Siddhasena Divākara	13

PAGE

29. His Sammatitarka-sūtra 14
30. He converts Vikramāditya to Jainism 14
31. His date 14
32. The Nyāyāvatāra 15
33. Pramāṇa or valid knowledge 15
34. Verbal Testimony 15
35. Inference 16
36. Inference for one's self 16
37. Inference for the sake of others 16
38. Terms of a syllogism 16
39. Importance of the minor term 17
40. Fallacy of the minor term 17
41. Vyāpti or inseparable connection 18
42. Intrinsic inseparable connection 18
43. Extrinsic inseparable connection 18
44. Superfluity of extrinsic inseparable connection .. 18
45. Fallacy of the middle term 18
46. Fallacy of example 19
47. Fallacies of the homogeneous example 19
48. Fallacies of the heterogeneous example 20
49. Refutation, &c. 21
50. Effect of Pramāṇa 21
51. Naya 21
52. Syādvāda śruta, etc. 22
53. Siddhasena Gaṇi 22
54. Samantabhadra 22
55. His works and date 23
56. The Āptamīmāṁsā 24
57. Non-existence, *abhāva* 24
58. Existence, *bhāva*, and *sapta-bhaṅgī* 25
59. Akalaṅka Deva 25
60. Akalaṅka and his Buddhist antagonist 26
61. Date of Akalaṅka 26
62. Vidyānanda 26
63. Vidyānanda's reference to other philosophers and his date 27
64. Māṇikya Nandi 28
65. The Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra 28
66. Valid knowledge, Pramāṇa 29
67. Kinds of valid knowledge 29
68. Terms of a syllogism 29
69. Different phases of the reason or middle term .. 30
70. Perceptible reason in the affirmative form 30
71. Perceptible reason in the negative form 30
72. Imperceptible reason in the negative form 31

PAGE
73. Imperceptible reason in the affirmative form .. 31
73. Example 31
74. Inference 31
75. Verbal Testimony 32
76. Objects of valid knowledge 32
77. Result of valid knowledge 32
78. Various kinds of fallacies 32
79. Māṇikya Nandi's references to contemporaneous systems of philosophy 33
80. His estimate of the Parīkṣāmukha sūtra 33
81. Prabhā Candra 33
82. Mallavādin 34
83. Dharmottara-tippanaka and Mallavādin's date .. 34
84. Pradyumna Sūri 35
85. His date 36
86. Abhayadeva Sūri 36
87. Laghusamantabhadra 37
88. Anantavīrya 37
89. Deva Sūri 38
90. His triumph over the Digambaras 38
91. His date 39
92. Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra 39
93. Valid knowledge 40
94. Perception (Direct knowledge) 40
95. Indirect knowledge 41
96. Inference 41
97. Parts of a syllogism 42
98. Non-existence (*abhāva*) 42
99. Character of knowledge 43
100. Fallacies of Naya 43
101. *Ātmā* (soul) 43
102. Rules of debate 44
103. Hema Candra Sūri 44
104. His Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā 45
105. His date 45
106. Candraprabha Sūri 45
107. Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti 46
108. Nemicandra Kavi 46
109. Ānanda Sūri and Amaracandra Sūri, nicknamed lion-cub and tiger-cub 47
110. Haribhadra Sūri 48
111. His life 49
112. His date 50
113. Syādvāda-ratnāvatārikā 50
114. Ratnaprabha Sūri 50

PAGE
115. Mallisena Sūri 51
116. Rājaśekhara Sūri 51
117. Jñāna Candra 51
118. Guṇaratna 52
119. His date 52
120. His references to other philosophers 53
121. Dharmabhūṣaṇa 54
122. His Nyāya-dīpikā 54
123. His references to other philosophers 54
124. Yaśovijaya Gaṇi 54
125. His life 55

BOOK II.

THE BUDDHIST LOGIC.

Chapter I.—The Old Buddhist References to Logic.

1. The Buddhas 57
2. Buddha Gautma 57
3. Tripitaka—Pāli Literature 57
4. Heretical Sects of the Buddhists 58
5. Tripitaka carried to Ceylon 58
6. Vijñāna (knowledge) 59
7. Classification of Vijñāna 59
8. Takkika 59
9. Takkika in the Brahma-jāla Sutta 59
10. Takkika in the Udāna.. 60
11. Logic in the Kathā-vatthuppakaraṇa 60
12. Nyāya in the Milinda-pañha 61
13. The Method of debate 62
14. The Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna 62
15. The Council of Kaniṣka 63
16. The Sanskrit Buddhist Literature 63
17. Nava Dharmas 64
18. Hetuvidyā in the Lalitavistara 64
19. Eighteen Sects of the Buddhists 65
20. Four Schools of the Buddhist Philosophy 66
21. The Vaibhāṣika School 66
22. The Sautrāntika School 67
23. Logic in works of the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra Schools 67
24. Ārya Nāgārjuna 68
25. The date of Nāgārjuna 69
26. Nāgārjuna's works 70

PAGE

27. Ārya Deva 70
28. The Yogācāra School 71
29. The Tārkika and Naiyāyika in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra 72
30. Maitreya.. 73
31. His Logic 74
32. Ārya Asaṅga 74
33. His Logic 75
34. Vasubandhu 75
35. His Logic 76

CHAPTER II.—SYSTEMATIC BUDDHIST WRITERS ON LOGIC.

36. Logic distinguished from general philosophy .. 78
37. Ācārya Dignāga—his likeness 78
38. Life of Dignāga.. 80
39. His Date 80
40. References to Dignāga 81
41. History of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya and reference to Īśvara-kṛṣṇa 82
42. Xylograph of the work 84
43. Subjects of the work 85
44. Dignāga's Theory of Perception 85
45. Dignāga criticises Vātsyāyana 86
46. Dignāga's Theory of Inference 87
47. Comparison and Verbal Testimony rejected .. 88
48. Dignāga's Nyāya-praveśa 89
49. Parts of a Syllogism 89
50. Form of a Syllogism 90
51 Thesis 90
52. Fallacies of Thesis 90
53. Three Characteristics of the Middle Term 91
54. Symbols of the Characteristics 91
55. Vyāpti or relative extension of the middle term and the major term 92
56. Fallacies of the Middle Term 93
57. Theory of Example 95
58. Fallacies of Homogeneous Example 96
59. Fallacies of Heterogeneous Example 97
60. Refutation and its Fallacy 98
61. Fallacies of Perception and Inference 99
62. Dignāga's Hetu-cakra 99
63. The Wheel of Reasons 100
64. Analysis of the Wheel.. 100
65. Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti 100
66. Another version of it 100

PAGE
67. Pramāṇa-śāstra-praveśa 100
68. Ālambaṇa-parīkṣā 101
69. Ālambaṇa-parīkṣā-vṛtti 101
70. Trikāla-parīkṣā 101
71. Śaṅkara Svāmin 101
72. Dharmapāla 102
73. His Works 102
74. Ācārya Śīlabhadra 102
75. Ācārya Dharmakīrti 103
76. Dharmakīrti and Kumārila 103
77. Dharmakīrti's Triumphs 104
78. His further triumphs.. 104
79. His Death 104
80. Dharmakīrti and Sroṅ-tsan-gam-po 104
81. Dharmakīrti's Date 105
82. History of the Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā 105
83. Subjects of the work 106
84. Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti 107
85. Pramāṇa-viniścaya 107
86. Nyāya-bindu 109
87. Theory of Perception.. 109
88. Inference for one's self 110
89. Three kinds of Middle Term 110
90. Inference for the sake of others 111
91. Thesis 112
92. Fallacies of Thesis 112
93. Fallacies of the Middle Term 112
94. Dharmakīrti criticises Dignāga 113
95. Dharmakīrti's theory of example 114
96. Fallacies of Homogeneous Example 115
97. Fallacies of Heterogeneous Example 116
98. Refutation and its semblance 116
99. Dharmakīrti the Vanquisher of Tīrthikas 116
100. Hetu-bindu vivaraṇa 117
101. Tarka-nyāya or Vāda-nyāya 117
102. Santānāntara-siddhi 117
103. Sambandha-parīkṣā 118
104. Sambandha-parīkṣā-vṛtti 118
105. Devendra bodhi 118
106. Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā 118
107. Story of composition of the work 118
108. Śākya bodhi 119
109. Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā-ṭīkā 119
110. Vinīta Deva 119
111. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā .. .. 120.

PAGE

112. Hetu-bindu-ṭīkā 120
113. Vāda-nyāya-vyākhyā.. 120
114. Sambandha-parīkṣā-ṭīkā 120
115. Ālambana-parīkṣā-ṭīkā 120
116. Santānāntara-siddhi-ṭīkā 121
117. Candra Gomin.. 121
118. His Wanderings 122
119. His Date 123
120. Nyāyāloka-siddhi 123
121. Ravi Gupta 123
122. Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti 124
123. Viśālāmalavatī 124
124. Jinendra Bodhi 124
125. Śānta Rakṣita 124
126. Vāda-nyāya-vṛtti-vipañcitārtha 125
127. Tattva-saṃgraha-kārikā 125
128. Subject of the work 125
129. Kamala-śīla 129
130. Nyāya-bindu-pūrva-pakṣa-saṃkṣipta 129
131. Tattva-saṃgraha-pañjikā 130
132. Kalyāṇa Rakṣita 130
133. Vāhyārtha-siddhi-kārikā 130
134. Śruti-parīkṣā 130
135. Anyāpoha-vicāra-kārikā 130
136. Īśvara-bhaṅga-kārikā 130
137. Dharmottarācārya 131
138. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā 131
139. Pramāṇa-parīkṣā 132
140. Apoha-nāma-prakaraṇa 132
141. Para-loka-siddhi 132
142. Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi 132
143. Pramāṇa-viniścaya-ṭīkā 132
144. Muktā-kumbha 133
145. Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi-vyākhyā 133
146. Arcaṭa 133
147. Hetu-bindu-vivaraṇa 133
148. Dāna-śīla 134
149. Pustaka-pāṭhopāya 134
150. Jina Mitra 135
151. Nyāya-bindu-piṇḍārtha 135
152. Prajñākara Gupta 135
153. Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra 135
154. Sahāvalambha-niścaya.. 136
155. Ācārya Jetāri 136
156. His date 136

		PAGE
157	Hetu-tattva-upadesa	136
158	Dharma-dharmi-vinicaya	136
159	Bodhavatara-tarka	137
160	Pramaṇa-vartikalankara-tika	137
161	Jina	137
162	Jñana-śri	137
163	Pramana-viniscaya-tika	138
164	Kuvalayamala-kathasamuddeśa	138
165	Tarkadhara	138
166	Ratnavajra	139
167	Vaidyaprayoga	139
168	Ratnakara Santi and Prajñakarmati	140
169	Vyapti-nirnaya-siddhi	140
170	Artha-vyapti	140
171	Vāk-prāṇa	141
172	Yamari	141
173	Pramana-vartikalankara-tika	141
174.	Śaṅkarānanda	142
175	Pramana-vartika-tika	142
176	Santanantara-parikshanavada	142
177	Apoha-siddhi	143
178	Pratibandhasiddhi	144

APPENDIX A.

The University of Nalanda 145

APPENDIX B.

The Pāla Kings 148

APPENDIX C.

The University of Vikramaśilā 150

PREFACE.

With the object of drawing the attention of scholars to the vast literature of the Mediæval school of Indian Logic, I have in the present thesis embodied the results of some of my researches[1] into it. The Mediæval Logic of India is divided into two principal systems, viz., the Jaina and the Buddhist. The materials of the Jaina portion of my thesis were derived from several rare Jaina manuscripts procured from Western India and the Deccan. I have also used the Jaina manuscripts of the Asiatic Society of Bengal and the numerous Jaina works printed in Bombay, Benares and Calcutta. From the footnotes of my thesis it will be evident that I have frequently used Professor Peterson's Reports of Operations in Sanskrit manuscripts in the Bombay Circle. Though the Professor has said nothing in particular about Logic and Logicians, he has given a general index of Jaina authors which has been of the greatest use to me. I have not heard of any scholar who has yet written any special account of the Jaina Logic. Dr. Hermann Jacobi's 'Eine Jaina-Dogmatik' printed in Leipzig is an annotated translation of Umásváti's Tattvárthadhigama Sútra, an ancient Jaina work on general philosophy and not a special treatise on Logic. A short time ago I sent a proof of my account of the Jaina Logic to Dr. Jacobi who very graciously returned it with a few marginal glosses which have been most thankfully accepted and embodied in the foot-notes of this thesis.

To show how generously that most eminent authority on Jainism condescended to help me, I quote here the

[1] Some of these researches were published in the Journal and the Asiatic Society of Bengal during the last two years.

letter which he wrote in [illegible] to me [illegible] his suggestions

Bonn, 21st October, 1907
Nebolbrstrasse 59

Dear Sir,

I have received your kind [illegible] proof of the Jaina Lege and I hereby congratulate [illegible] on [illegible] work. It will prove very useful [illegible] information [illegible] the proofs I have [illegible] I think you might alter your statement [illegible] at your discretion.

I should be glad [illegible] I have never [illegible] Indian Lege [illegible] especially for the integument of an [illegible] which [illegible] nothing about what has been done in this branch of Indian philology. I shall thereto feel obliged if you [illegible] your work.

With kind regards

I am
Yours sincerely,
H. JACOBI

A proof of the Jaina Lege was also sent to two oriental authorities on Jainism—Muni Dharmavijaya and his pupil Sri Indravijaya at Benares. I owe them a great debt of gratitude for the kind assistance which they unerringly rendered to me by going through the proof and offering certain suggestions and observations which have been incorporated in the footnotes of this thesis.

As to the Buddhist Lege, no systematic information is available from Pali texts. There is [illegible] regular treatise on Lege in the Pali language, but [illegible] to the Buddhist Lege can be gleaned from the publications of the Pali Text Society of London and also from other Pali works printed elsewhere. The Buddhist Sanskrit works on Lege of the Middle Age are now almost extinct in India. A few [illegible], which are available in Chinese versions, have been noticed by Dr. Sugiura in his "Hindu Lege as preserved in China and Japan." But almost all the Buddhist Sanskrit works on Lege

are carefully preserved in faithful translations in Tibet. The materials of that portion of my thesis which deals with Buddhist Logic were chiefly derived from the Hodgson Collection of Tibetan xylographs deposited in the India Office, London, and the large number of Tibetan block-prints brought down to Calcutta from Gyantse during the British Mission to Tibet in 1904. I also consulted almost all the Tibetan manuscripts and block-prints bearing on Logic that lie hidden in the Tibetan monasteries of Labrang and Phodang, in Sikkim which I visited during May and June 1907.[1] For the historical account of the Buddhist authors I have chiefly depended on Lama Taranatha's Tibetan history of Indian Buddhism translated into German by A. Schiefner under the designation of "Geschichte des Buddhismus," and the Tibetan historical work called Pag-sam-jon-zang edited in the original Tibetan by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., of Calcutta. Some most important historical facts regarding the Buddhist Logicians and their works have been discovered from the colophons at the end of each of the Tibetan works which I have examined.

It was mainly through the influence of Mr. F. W. Thomas that I was enabled to borrow the Tibetan xylographs of the India Office, London, and I avail myself of this opportunity of acknowledging my humble appreciation of the generosity of that distinguished scholar. My respectful thanks are also due to the Government of India, who kindly lent me several block-prints out of the vast Tibetan collection brought down to Calcutta by the Tibet Mission of 1904. I should be guilty of great ingratitude if I were not to mention my obligations to Mr. A. Earle, I.C.S., Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, Mr. C. H. Bompas, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner,

[1] Subsequently in October 1908 I visited Pemayangtse, which is another very old monastery in Sikkim, where all facilities were kindly afforded to me by His Highness the Maharaja and Maharani of Sikkim as well as by Mr. Crawford, I.C.S., the then Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling.—S. C. V.

Darjeeling and Mr Claude White, C I E Political Resident, Sikkim for the kind help they gave me in getting access to the Tibetan Monasteries of Labrang and Phodang in Sikkim

For a time I was quite bewildered by the enormous store of material on Indian Logic which I had collected, and it took me many a month to select and classify a portion of it for the purpose of this thesis When the compilation of the paper was finished and the work was passing through the press, Mr W W Hornell B A of the Indian Educational Service, kindly undertook to revise it but he was able to revise only the first chapter of the Jaina Logic before leaving India. Accordingly, the rest of the work was at my request, revised by Mr. W C Wordsworth, M A of the Presidency College Calcutta I am deeply indebted to both these gentlemen for their kind courtesy and assistance

Whatever the merits or the utility of the present contribution may be it has had the rare good fortune and privilege of having been looked through by a savant with whom it would be an impertinence to name in the same breath any other living authorities oriental or occidental, on Indian philosophy. This savant, whose learning is equalled by his modesty and willingness to assist beginners in their uphill work, is no other than our revered Dr G Thibaut M A., Ph D , D Sc., C I E , now Registrar of the Calcutta University, which post may he fill long so that our countrymen may continue to derive benefit from his vast erudition.

SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA.

INTRODUCTION.

Logic is generally designated in India as **Nyāya-śāstra**. It is also called Tarka-śāstra, Hetu-vidyā, Pramāṇa-śāstra, Ānvīkṣikī and Phakkika-śāstra.

Three Schools of Indian Logic.

Indian Logic may be divided into three principal schools, viz., the Ancient (600 B.C.—400 A.D.), the Mediæval (400 A.D.—1200 A.D.) and the Modern (1200 A.D.—1850 A.D.). The **Nyāya sūtra** by Akṣapāda Gautama is the foremost, though by no means the first, work on Logic of the Ancient School, the **Pramāṇa samuccaya** by Dignāga is a representative work of the Mediæval School, while the **Tattva cintāmaṇi** by Gangeśa Upādhyāya is the main text book of the Modern School. These three works have since their composition enjoyed a very wide popularity as is evident from the numerous commentaries that have from time to time rolled round them. A few of the commentaries are mentioned below:—

The Ancient School of Logic

Text.

1. **Nyāya sūtra** by Akṣapāda Gautama

Commentaries.

2. Nyāya bhāṣya by Vātsyāyana
3. Nyāya vārtika by Uddyotakara
4. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā by Vācaspati Miśra
5. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā-parimaḍi by Udayanācārya
6. Nyāyālaṅkāra by Śrī Kaṇṭha
7. Nyāya-vṛtti by Abhayatilakopādhyāya
8. Nyāya-vṛtti by Viśvanātha

The Mediæval School of Logic.

Text.

1. **Pramāṇa samuccaya** by Dignāga

Commentaries.

2. Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti by Dignāga.
3. Pramāṇa vārtika kārikā by Dharmakīrti
4. Pramāṇa vārtika vṛtti by Dharmakīrti
5. Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā by Devendrabuddhi
6. Pramāṇa vārtika pañjikā-ṭīkā by Śākyabuddhi
7. Pramāṇa-vārtika vṛtti by Ravigupta, Jñānabuddhi
8. Pramāṇa-samuccaya-ṭīkā (Viṣamapadavivṛti-nāma), by Jinen-

9 Pramāṇa-vārttikālaṃkāra by Prajñākara Gupta
10 Pramāṇa-vārttikālaṃkāra-ṭīkā by Jñāna
11 Pramāṇa-vārttikaṭīkā by Yamāri
12 Pramāṇa-vārttikaṭīkā by Śākyabuddha

The Modern School of Logic.

Text

1 Tattva-cintāmaṇi by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya.

Commentaries

2 Tattva-cintāmaṇi Prakāśa by Rucidatta
3 Tattva-Mīmāṃsā by Jayadeva Miśra
4. Tattva-Didhiti by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi
5. Tattva-Rahasya by Mathurānātha
6 Tattva-Dīpanī by Kṛṣṇamitra
7 Tattva-Ṭīkā by Kāśīnātha Tarkavāgīśa
8 Tattva-Ālokasaṃkramaṇī by Bhavānanda
9 Tattva-Ālokadarpaṇa by Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa
10 Tattva-Ālokaṭīkā-ṭippaṇī by Madhusūdana Tarkakuṭa
11 Tattva-Ālokarahasya by Mathurānātha [illegible]
12 Tattva-Didhiti-vyākhyā-[illegible] by Rudra Nyāyavāgīśa
13 Tattva-Didhiti-ṭippaṇī by [illegible]
14 Tattva-Didhiti-ṭīkā by Gadādhara
15 Tattva-Didhiti-saṃkramaṇī by Bhavānanda
16 Tattva-Bhāvanādīdhiti-ṭīkā by Mahādeva Paṇḍita
17 Tattva-Kalpasārī-paṭṭikā by Kalpanātha
18 Tattva-Candra-paṭṭikā by Candra Nārāyaṇa.
19 Tattva-Rohiṇī-paṭṭikā by Indra Nārāyaṇa

etc etc etc

Besides these there are numerous other texts and commentaries on Logic which belong to one or another of the three schools mentioned above.

The Jaina system of Logic.

I shall say here nothing about the ancient and modern schools of Logic my whole attention will be devoted to the medieval school alone.

It is perhaps known to very few scholars that the Medieval Logic was cultivated entirely by the hands of the Jainas and Buddhists. For one thousand years from 400 B.C. to 600 A.D. the Jainas and Buddhists were fully occupied in questions of metaphysics and religion though there are occasional references to Logic in their works of that period. At about 600 A.D. began an epoch when they seriously took up the problems of Logic and all the text-books on the Jaina and Buddhist systems of Logic date at or after that time. Ujjayinī in Malwa and Valabhī in Gujarat were the scenes of activity of the Jaina Logicians of the Śvetāmbara sect. The Digambaras flourished principally in Pāṭaliputra and Dravida,

including Karnāta) about the 8th century A.D. The Nyāyāvatāra by Siddhasena Divākara, dated about 533 A.D., was the first systematic work on the Jaina Logic.

The real founders of the Mediæval Logic were the Buddhists. The first batch of the Buddhist Logicians came principally from Gandhāra (modern Peshwar) on the Punjab frontier. Ayodhyā (Oudh) was the scene of their activity. Unfortunately we have not before us any of the original Sanskrit works on Logic produced by them. We may, however, form an approximate estimate of their Logic from the works on the Yogācāra philosophy by Maitreya, Asanga and Vasubandhu recovered from the Chinese sources. About 500 A.D.[1] the Huns conquered Gandhāra, and their leaders Mihirakula and others perpetrated terrible atrocities on the Buddhists to the great detriment of Buddhistic studies there. Asanga and Vasubandhu and perhaps Maitreya too passed the best days of their lives in Ayodhyā and wrote most of their works there. King Vikramāditya, who reigned in Ayodhyā about 180 A.D.[2] was at first a patron of the Sankhya philosophy but afterwards greatly supported Buddhism through the influence of Vasubandhu. Bālāditya, who succeeded Vikramāditya to the throne of Ayodhyā, was a pupil of Vasubandhu and a supporter of Buddhism. The Buddhist Logic of the Yogācāra school appears thus to have originated in Ayodhyā and flourished there during 400-500 A.D. under Kings Vikramāditya and Bālāditya.

The Buddhist Logicians flourished in Drāvida (the Deccan) during 600-700 A.D. when the Buddhist kings of the Pallava dynasty were supreme there. Ācārya Dignāga, about 500 A.D., was the oldest logician of Drāvida whose works are still extant, in Tibetan translations. Another logician of eminence of the Drāvida school was Dharmakīrti who lived about 600 A.D. His Nyāyabindu, and a commentary on it by Dharmottara called Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā, are the only systematic works on Buddhist Logic which have come down to us in their Sanskrit originals. They would have certainly disappeared from India like a hundred other works of their kind had it not been that a Jaina logician named Malliṣeṇa had written a gloss on them. Seeing that the gloss would be useless without the text and commentary, the Jainas preserved all three. The Nyāyabindu, together with the commentary, preserved

The Buddhist school of Mediæval Logic.

[1] Vide Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, pp. xxv-lxx.

[2] Vide Takakusu's *Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu*, translated in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, January 1905, p. 30.

among the palm-leaf manuscripts in the Jaina temple of Śānta nātha Cambay has been published by Professor Peterson in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta. With the downfall of the Pallavas Jainism disappeared from Dravida. Vikramāditya of the Western Chālukya dynasty, about 696 A.D., put a check to the power of the Pallavas; and Vikramāditya II. of the same dynasty, about 733 A.D., seized Kanci, their capital.[1] The Chālukyas were Vaishnavas, and their conquest of Kanci was really a triumph of the Brahmanic religion over Buddhism. At about 788 A.D. the great Brahmanic preacher Śankarācārya appeared, and Buddhism became gradually extinct in Dravida.

The third and fourth halves of Bodhisattva Lagamana flourished simultaneously in Kashmīra and Bengal, including Behar. Rasa Gupta, 725 A.D., was the earliest monarch of the Kashmīra school. At this time Kashmīra was governed by the illustrious King Lalitāditya-Muktapīda (about 695–737 A.D.), who built a large vihāra with a stūpa at Huskapura.[2] At the same time there was a great demand for Sanskrit Buddhist books in Tibet, with the thorough opening of our intercourse with India in the 8th century A.D. King Khri-sroi, otherwise known as Khri-srong, in the 9th century A.D. employed numerous Indian Pandits and Tibetan Lamas to translate Sanskrit books into Tibetan. The propagandist translations went on in full force up to about 1001 A.D., when the glorious reign of Sri Harsa Deva (1089–1101 A.D.), who was a patron of learning, both Brahmanic and Buddhistic, came to a close. The Buddhist monasteries and Tibetan Lamas did not altogether disappear from Kāshmīra until the establishment of Muhammadan rule in that country in 1341 A.D., when her intercourse with Tibet ceased. Henceforth we hear no more of Jaina learning flourishing in Kashmīra.

In Bengal and Behar Lagamana flourished extensively during 700–1200 A.D., when the Buddhist kings of the Pala dynasty reigned there. Gaudīya, about 700 A.D., was the first Lagamana of the Bengal school. With the downfall of the Pala kings in 1139 A.D., Buddhist Lagamana disappeared from Bengal. The famed monastery of Vikramaśīla is said to have been destroyed in 1203 A.D. (*vide* Appendix C).

In the Middle Age there were several important universities or centres of Buddhistic learning in India, such as Kāñchipura, Nālanda, Odantapura, Śrī Dhanyakataka, Kashmīra, and

[1] See Swamikannu, "Antiquities of Madras," vol. II., pp. 150–151.

[2] [illegible]

[illegible] was [illegible] Tibetan [illegible] Sri Harsa (*vide* Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, folio 270).

Vikramaśilā. The Buddhist logicians belonged to one or another of these universities or centres of learning. On the extinction of these Buddhistic universities, the Brahmanic universities of Mithilā and Nadia grew up. These last, in their turn, are now declining, being unable to make headway against the more scientific methods of study which are developing under the influence of the Calcutta University, established by the Imperial British Government in 1857, with the object of encouraging Eastern and Western learning side by side. In spite of strenuous efforts made by the British Government to foster study and research in Indigenous Logic, it is still at its lowest ebb, as the degrees of a modern University are held in greater regard than those of the ancient Universities of Mithilā and Nadia, and as it is often alleged that in comparison with the Logic of Europe, Indian Logic, though subtle as ambitious in its method, forbidding in its language, and less profitable in its material results.

SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA.

CALCUTTA
December, 1907

BOOK I.

The Jaina Logic.

CHAPTER I.

THE ERA OF TRADITION (circa 607 B.C. — 453 A.D.)

The Jinas and Mahāvīra

1. The Jainas maintain that their religion is coeval with time. According to their traditions there appeared at various periods in this world's history sages whom they call *Jinas*, conquerors of their passions, or *Tīrthankaras*, that is, founders of a trading place in the sea of existence. These sages provide the religion of the Jainas. The Jainas hold that there is a cycle of time (*kālacakra* or *avasarpiṇī kāla*) 24 sages at a time. The first sage of the last series was Ṛṣabhadeva, the 24th was Mahāvīra or Vardhamāna, who attained Nirvāṇa at Pāvāpurī 527 B.C. The scriptures which the Jainas obey are founded on the teachings of Mahāvīra. No one disputes this, and scholars generally regard Mahāvīra as the founder of Jainism, and hold that the theory of the existence of *Jinas* previous to him, except Pārśvanātha the 23rd Tīrthankara, was a subsequent invention.

पंचहसय वस पंचमास कुडं जिणिंद वीरस्सिदुदही पवरासो। (Tiloyapaṇṇatti of the Digambaras, ...) Mahāvīra ... 605 years 5 months before the ... (that is, in 527 B.C.). ... 7 years ... has been ... 604.

According to Nālāyaṇa of Mānatunga, the Pratiṣṭhā of Bṛhadbalin Śālivāhana promulgates ... of the Śvetāmbaras ... Mahāvīra ... 470 years before Vikrama Saṃvat or in B.C. 527.

Dr. Bühler of Bombay in his letter dated the 21st October 1887 kindly writes to me as follows:—

"There is hardly any ancient tradition which makes the statement as to the interval of Mahāvīra's death. ... B.C. (see Pariśiṣṭa Parvan, Introduction, p. ...). ... Introduction, p. ...). The latter date is correct in fact, because Mahāvīra died some years before the Buddha whose death is now placed between 478-480 B.C.

THE ŚVETAMBARAS AND THE DIGAMBARAS

2. The Jainas are divided into two sects: the *Śvetāmbaras*, those who are clothed in white, and the *Digambaras*, those who are sky-clad or naked. The *Śvetāmbaras* seem to be more ancient than the *Digambaras*, whose existence as a separate sect is said to date from A.D. 82 (*i.e.*, 609 years after the attainment of *nirvāṇa* by Mahāvīra.

INDRABHŪTI GAUTAMA (607 B.C.–515 B.C.)

3. The teachings of Mahāvīra as represented in the scriptures are said to have been collected by a disciple of his called Indrabhūti. Indrabhūti is also known as Gautama or Gotama. He was a *Kṣatriya*, and the first of the twelve chief disciples of the community. His father's name was Śrīmān Vasubhūti and his mother's name was Pṛthivī.[1] He was born in

[1] The Śvetāmbaras say: [illegible] was [illegible] Rāja[illegible] after the attainment of nirvāṇa by Mahāvīra. [illegible] The Digambaras, however, [illegible] say that the Śvetāmbaras [illegible] A.D. [illegible] Bhadra's Bhāṣyacarita IV. 55:

> [illegible]
> [illegible]
> [illegible]
> [illegible]

(Jaina Harivaṃśa Purāṇa.)

Indrabhūti Gautama and Sudharman Swāmī were the joint compilers of the Jaina scriptures. But Indrabhūti [illegible] a Brāhmaṇa of [illegible] Kṛṣṇa and a scholar of no ordinary [illegible] Mahāvīra attained [illegible]. He had [illegible] Mahāvīra. [illegible] Sudharman Swāmī. [illegible] इन्द्रभूतिः प्रमुखो [illegible] (Hemacandra's Mahāvīracarita, chap. v. Mss. kept by Muni Jinavijaya and Jinavijaya.)

[illegible] Pramāṇa of absolute knowledge. For further references to the [illegible] (R. G. Bhandarkar's Report, 1883–84, [illegible])

> [illegible]
> [illegible]
> [illegible]
> [illegible] ॥ ४ ॥

[illegible] (Bhandarkar's Report, App. I, p. 48.)

the village of Gorbara in Magadha and died at Gunava in Rajagrha (Rajgir) at the age of ninety two, 12 years after the attainment of *nirvana* by Mahavira. Assuming that Mahavira attained *nirvana* in 527 B.C., Indrabhuti's birth must be assigned to 607 B.C. and his death to 515 B.C.

THE CANONICAL SCRIPTURES OF THE JAINAS.

4. Those scriptures of the Jainas which are generally regarded as canonical are divided into 45 *siddhantas* or *agamas* classified as 11 Angas, 12 Upangas, etc.[1]. For the benefit of children, women, the old, and the illiterate[2] these were composed in the Ardha-Magadhi or Prakrta language. On the same principle the scriptures of the Buddhistic canon were originally written in Magadhi or Pali. It is maintained that originally the Angas were 12 in number. The 12th Anga, which was called the Dristivada or the presentation of views, was written in Sanskrit.[3]

5. The **Dristivada** is not extant. It consisted apparently of five parts, in the first of which Jainism is said to have been dealt with. The Dristivada is reputed to have existed in its entirety at the time of Sthulabhadra[4] who, according to the Kapadia pattavali, died in the year in which the 9th Nanda was killed by Candra Gupta (i.e., about 327 B.C.). By 474 A.D. the Dristivada

The Dristivada.

[1] चोद्दस पुव्वधरेहिं य दस दस पुव्वीहिं य तहा
एक्कारसंगसुत्तत्थधारिणो चोद्दसपुव्वाविणो ।
आणिसंचयओसन्नायरियपरंपरएहिं आगयं
सव्वोवोसेसुयकेवलिभासियं भव्वसत्तुहिं सुयं ॥

(Gautamasvamin's Jinaprabha Sūri, extracted in Kāvyamālā, 7th Guchchha, p. 110).

[2] For particulars about Indrabhuti Gautama, cf. the J. Klatt's Pattavali of the Kharataragacchha in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, 8 p. 1882, p. 245 and Weber's Die Handschriften-Verzeichnisse der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin, pp. 881 and 1059, in which are noticed Sarvarājagaṇi's Vṛtti on Gandharavāda-sataka of Jinadattasūri, and Śrī pattavali vacana of the Kharatarogacchha.

[3] Haribhadra-sūri, in his Dasavaikalika vṛtti (Chap. III), observes :—

राजाभिरक्षकुलोचो बला चारित्रवाहिकाः ।
चक्रवर्त्यादयो यस्मात् विद्यास्तः पाठकाः क्रमः ॥

[4] Vardhamana sūri, in his Acara-dinakara, quotes the following passage from Agama :—

सुत्तत्थ विहिवायं वाचिय उद्धरिय तह य निज्जूढं ।
थेरावलीचरियं पारद्ध पुरद्ध जिणवरेहिं ॥

[5] Vide Cūrṇika of Nandi Sūtra, page 478, published by Dhanapat Singh, Calcutta, and Peterson's 4th Report on Sanskrit MSS., p. cxxxvi.

of Mahāvīra, that is, up to 365 B.C., and that the second[1] to 51 years from the decease of Mahāvīra, that is up to 12 B.C. They do not state exactly by which of these Bhadrabāhus was the author of the Niryukti in question, but they held the view that the second was the author of several of the existing Jaina works. The Śvetāmbara records do not contain any mention of the second Bhadrabāhu, but in the Bṛhatkathākośa-prabandha-vṛtti[2] a commentary of the Śvetāmbaras, and in the Caturvimśati-prabandha it is stated that Bhadrabāhu travelled in the south in Pratiṣṭhāna and was a brother of Varāhamihira. Now Varāhamihira is popularly believed to have lived in the first century B.C. It is possible therefore, even according to the Śvetāmbaras, that the Daśavaikālikaniryukti was the work of a commentator who, to rely on popular belief, lived about the time of the opening of the Christian era.

11. Whenever he lived, the author of the Daśavaikālikaniryukti (or a commentator on niryukti) on the following Jaina scriptures: Āvaśyaka-sūtra, Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, Ācārāṅga-sūtra, Sūtrakṛtāṅga-sūtra, Daśā-cūtaskandha-sūtra, Kalpa-sūtra, Vyavahāra-sūtra, Sūrya-prajñapti-sūtra and Ṛṣibhāṣita-sūtra.

12. Bhadrabāhu did not set himself to analyse knowledge with the object of evolving a system of logic. His object was to illustrate the truth of certain principles of the Jaina religion. To do this he, in his Daśavaikālikaniryukti,[3] elaborated a syllogism consisting of two parts (*dvi-avayava-vākya*) and then demonstrated how the religious principles of Jainism satisfied the conditions of this formula.

नमस्त्रिभेदः कुनयिप्रमथः
मोक्षकामहृदि वर्द्धतु नित्यं ॥ १ ॥

Gurvāvali by Munisundara-sūri published in the Jaina Yaśovijaya granthamālā of Benares, p. 4.

[1] Vide the Sarasvatī gaccha-pattāvalī in the Indian Antiquary, October 1901 and March 1902.

[2] Vide Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Reports on Sanskrit MSS. during 1883-84, p. 118. Bhadrabāhu must have lived as late as the 6th century A.D. It is worth noting that Varāhamihira, who was one of the nine gems at the court of Vikramāditya. Mahā Dharmavijaya and Jaina-yaśa maintain that Bhadrabāhu's brother was not Varāhamihira but Kālidāsa, who adorned the court of Vikramāditya.

[3] जे च बहुं विभत्ती हेउ-विभत्ती विभक्खणविहीओ ।
दिट्ठंता चासका तमहिगयो निक्खमं च ॥ १६६ ॥

Daśavaikālikaniryukti, p. 74, published under the patronage of Dhanpat Singh by the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press, Bombay, and Dr. E. Leumann's edition of Daśavaikālikaniryukti, p. 649.

13. The following is an example:—

(1) The proposition (*Pratijñâ*), "to refrain from taking life [illegible] is the greatest of virtues."

(2) The limitation of the proposition (*Pratijñâvibhakti*) "to refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues according to the Jaina scriptures."

(3) The reason (*Hetu*) "to refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues because those who so refrain are loved by the gods and to [illegible] meat for men."

(4) The limitation of the reason (*Hetuvibhakti*) "none but those who refrain from taking life are allowed to reside in the highest place of virtue."

(5) The counter-proposition (*Viparyaya*) "but those who despise the Jaina scriptures and take life are said to be loved by the gods and men regard doing so not as an act of merit. Even those who take life in sacrifices are said to be residing in the highest place of virtue. Men, for instance, salute their father-in-law as an act of virtue, even though the latter despise the Jaina scriptures and habitually take life. Moreover, those who perform animal sacrifices are said to be loved by the gods."

(6) The opposition to the counter-proposition (*Viparyayapratiṣedha*) "those who take life as forbidden by the Jaina scriptures do not deserve honour and they are certainly not loved by the gods. It seems does that no will be cold as that they are loved by the gods or that it is regarded by men as an act of merit to do them honour. Buddha Kaśyapa and others, really not fit to be worshipped, were honoured for their [illegible] sayings, but the Jaina *Tīrthaṅkaras* are honoured because they speak absolute truth."

(7) An instance or example (*Dṛṣṭanta*) — "the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* do not cook food [illegible] but [illegible]. They should take [illegible]. They [illegible] householders for their meals."

(8) Questioning the validity of the instance or example (*Ṭīrnika*) — "the food which the householders cook is as much for the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* as for themselves. If, therefore, any insects are destroyed in the fire, the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* are not done in the householders' sin. Thus the instance cited is not convincing."

(9) The meeting of the question (*Ṭīkā-pratiṣedha*) — "the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* go to householders for their food without giving notice and not at fixed hours. How, therefore, can it be said that the householders cooked food for the *Arhats* and *Sādhus*? Thus the sin, if any, is not shared by the *Arhats* and *Sādhus*."

(10) Conclusion (*Nigamana*) — to refrain from taking life is therefore the best of virtues for those who are loved by the gods and to do their work is an act of merit for men.

11. Bhadrabahu in his **Sūtrakṛtāṅganiryukti** mentions another principle of the Jaina logic called *Syādvāda* (*Syāt* — may be) and *Vāda* — assertion — or the assertion or predication of *Saptabhaṅgīnaya* (the sevenfold parameters).

Syādvāda

12. The *Syādvāda*[1] is set forth as follows: (1) May be, it is; (2) may be, it is not; (3) may be, it is and it is not; (4) may be, it is indescribable; (5) may be, it is and yet is indescribable; (6) may be, it is not and it is also indescribable; (7) may be, it is and it is not and it is also indescribable.

UMASVĀTI (1—85 A.D.).

13. Jaina philosophy recognises seven categories, viz.: (1) the soul *Jīva*; (2) the soulless (*Ajīva*); (3) action (*Āsrava*); (4) bondage (*Bandha*); (5) restraint (*Saṃvara*); (6) destruction of the consequences of action (*Nirjarā*) and (7) release or salvation (*Mokṣa*). According to the **Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra** which with a *bhāṣya* or commentary was composed by one Umasvāti these categories can only be comprehended by *Pramāṇa* which in this *sūtra* fluctuates between the two meanings of valid knowledge and the sources of valid knowledge and of *Naya* the method of comprehending things from partial standpoints.

The categories Jīva, Ajīva and Āsrava

14. This Umasvāti is better known as Vācakācārya. He was also called Nagarāja, this title being probably a reference to his Sakha ancestral genealogy. The Hindu philosopher Madhvācārya calls him Umasvāti-vācakācārya. He lived for 48 years, 8 months and 6 days and attained *nirvāṇa* in Samvat

अनियमस्य विनियोग
अविनियोगस्य च कारं चूर्णकारः
अमरविजय गणिः
वैयावृत्यार्थं च कर्तव्या ॥ १२ ॥

(Sūtrakṛtāṅga-niryukti, Śrutaskandha 1, Adhyayana 1, p. 448, edited by Bhim Sinh Manek and published by the Nirnaya Sagara Press, Bombay.)

Cf. Sūtrakṛtāṅga Sūtra, p. 316, published by Dhanapat Singh, Benares edition.

Cf. Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, text and Gunaratna, p. 56. For full particulars see the Syādvādamañjarī, Saptabhaṅgīnaya, *vide* Saptabhaṅgītaraṅgiṇī by Vimala (1884 edition), Bombay.

[1] *Vide* Satyanarendra Sūrivara's chapter on Jaina darśana.

142, i.e. in 85 A.D. In the Tattvarthadhigama-sūtra Umāsvāti gives the following account of himself. He was born in a village called Nyagrodhika, but he wrote the Tattvarthadhigama-sūtra in Pātaliputra or Kusumapura, modern Patna. He belonged to the Kaubhisaṇa gotra. His father was Svāti and he was consequently sometimes called Svātitanaya. He was also known as Vātsīputra because his mother was born of the Vatsa-gotra. In the Tirthakalpa of Jinaprabha Sūri it is stated that Umāsvāti was the author of 500 Sanskrit prakaraṇas (treatises). He is said to have belonged to the *Śvetāmbara* sect though, as stated in article 2 above, it is probable that the schism between that sect and the *Digambaras* had not yet come into existence.

18. It has been observed in article 16 above that in the Tattvarthadhigama-sūtra *Pramāṇa* lies between the meanings of valid knowledge and the sources of valid knowledge. In its former sense

Parokṣa means knowledge, and *Pratyakṣa* direct knowledge.

(Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, Chap. X, p. 233, edited by Mody Keshavlal Premchand in the Bibliotheca Indica Series, Calcutta.)

A similar account is found in the commentary on the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra [illegible] mentioned by Peterson in his 4th Report on Sanskrit Manuscripts, p. xxv.

For further particulars about Umāsvāti see Peterson's 4th Report on Sanskrit Manuscripts, p. xvi. [illegible] Digambara Pattavali published by Dr. Hoernle in the Indian Antiquary XX, p. 41. Umāsvāti is probably the same as Umāsvāmi mentioned as the sixth Digambara Sūri in the Sarasvati-gachchha [illegible] Kundakunda [illegible] Dr. Hoernle [illegible] the Pattavali [illegible] Sarasvati-gachchha by Dr. Hoernle in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XX, October 1891, p. 361, the date of Umāsvāmi's [illegible] 44 A.D. and [illegible] for 84 years. [illegible] Dr. Hoernle adds the Kathākośa [illegible] the time of Umāsvāti.

Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra has been [illegible] together with Pūjyapāda's commentary [illegible] published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, in one volume which ends thus:

इति तिलाचरणार्थेन महाकवेरुमास्वातिवाचकस्य कृतिः ॥

(Jambūdvīpa-samāsa, p. 38, published as Appendix C to the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra in the Bibliotheca Indica Series.)

Pramāṇa according to this Sūtra is of two kinds (1) *Parokṣa*, indirect knowledge which is acquired by the soul through external agencies such as the organs of sense and (2) *Pratyakṣa* direct knowledge which is acquired by the soul without the intervention of external agencies. *Parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) includes *smṛti* and *tarka* (as these are acquired by the soul through the medium of the senses and the mind). Knowledge which is attained by *Yoga* concentration in its three stages (*dhāraṇā*, *dhyānaprayatna* and *kevala*) is an instance of *Pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) because it is acquired by the soul not through the medium of the senses.

19. Umāsvāti contends that inference (*Anumāna*) comparison (*Upamāna*), verbal testimony or reliable authority (*Āgama*), presumption (*Arthāpatti*), probability (*Sambhava*) and tradition (*Aitihya*) are not distinct sources of valid knowledge but are included under *Parokṣa* (indirect knowledge). According to this theory the cognition of the object is the result of the contact of the senses with the objects which they apprehend and some of them are not sources of valid knowledge at all.

20. It is not [illegible] to Umāsvāti and the author [illegible] perception, visual perception, and [illegible] etc. are called apprehensions in as much as the soul gets to the object of sense but through the medium of the senses. Thus words *Parokṣa* and *Pratyakṣa* are classified by [illegible] in accordance with the sense which they have held in Indian [illegible] and in the later Jaina logic.

1. [illegible] the [illegible]
2. [illegible] (the [illegible] and future) acquired through reasoning and study.
3. [illegible] (the [illegible] of perception).
4. [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible].
5. [illegible] Umāsvāti [illegible]

चतुर्भिरपि कारणैः प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागमश्चेति च प्रमाणानीति केचिन्मन्यन्ते तन्न घटते तेषामिति चेन्न । प्रत्यक्षतानि सन्निकर्षकारणत्वेन इन्द्रियाद्यर्थसन्निकर्षनिमित्तत्वात् ॥

(Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, p. 15)

[illegible]

चतुर्विधमित्येके ।

(Tattva [illegible], p. [illegible])

[illegible]

यथा वा प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानाप्तवचनैः प्रमाणैरुपलब्धे प्रमाणे स्वविषयनियमात् न च ता विषयनियमेन भवन्ति तद्वत्त्वाद्वा इति ॥

(Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, p. 16)

21 *Naya*[1] is the method by which things are comprehended from particular standpoints. It is of five kinds:—1 *Naigama*, the non-distinguished; 2 *Sangraha*, the general; (3) *Vyavahāra*, the practical; (4) *Rju-sūtra*, the straight expression; (5) *Śabda*, the verbal.

Naya, the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints.

22 *Naigama*, the non-distinguished, is the method by which an object is regarded as possessing both general and specific properties, no distinction being made between them. For instance, when you use the word "bamboo," you are indicating a number of properties, some of which are peculiar to the bamboo, while others are possessed by it in common with other trees. You do not distinguish between these two classes of properties.

Naigama.

23 *Sangraha*, the collective, is the method which takes into consideration general properties only, ignoring particular properties.

Sangraha.

24 *Vyavahāra*, the practical, is the method which takes into consideration the particular only. The general without the particular is a nonentity. If you ask a person to bring you a pot, he must bring you a particular pot; he can not bring pot in general.

Vyavahāra.

25 *Rju-sūtra*, the straight expression, is the method which considers a thing as it exists at the moment, without any reference to its past or its future. It is vain to ponder over a thing as it was in the past or as it will be in the future. All practical purposes are served by considering the thing itself as it exists at the present moment. For instance, a man who in a previous birth was my son is now born as a prince, but he is of no practical use to me now. The method of *Rju-sūtra* comprises nothing but the entity itself (*dravya*) and does not consider the name (*nāma*), the image (*sthapana*), or the causes which constituted it (*dravya*). The fact that a cowherd is called *Indra* does not make him lord of the heavens. An image of a king can not perform the functions of a king. The causes which exist in me now and will necessitate my being born hereafter with a different body can not enable me to enjoy that body now.

These four kinds of *Pramāṇa* seem to refer to those in the Nyāya Sūtra (of the Hindus) of Gautama Muni (Akṣapāda Gautama). Both the same four kinds are also referred to as well by Umāsvāti in the Sūtra of the Jainas, p. 400, published by Babu Sri Sing and printed in Calcutta.

[1] नैगमसंग्रहव्यवहारर्जुसूत्रशब्दा नयाः । १ । ३४ ।

(Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra, p. 32.)

26 *Sabda* the verbal is the method of correct nomenclature. It is of three kinds, viz. *Sampratta* the substantive, *Samabhirudha*, the subtle and *Evambhuta* the such-like. In Sanskrit a jar is called *ghata*, *kumbha* or *kalasa* and these are synonymous terms. *Sampratta* consists in using a word in its conventional sense, even if that sense is not justified by derivation. For example the word '*satru*' according to its derivation means destroyer but its conventional meaning is enemy. *Samabhirudha* consists in making nice distinctions between synonyms, selecting in each case the word which on etymological grounds is the most appropriate. *Evambhuta* consists in applying to things such names only as when actual condition justifies. Thus a man should not be called *Sakra* (strong) unless he actually possesses the *Sakti* (strength), which the name implies.

[1] Umasvati's Tattvartha-sutra I. 33 ff. says:

अनन्तरोक्तस्य नयस्य । नामादिषु यथासंख्यमर्थवन्तः शब्दसमभिरूढैवंभूताः । तत्रानाकलितसंकेतस्य ग्रहणं नाम । अतदाकारापि तदाकारेव स्थापना । भावप्राधान्यविवक्षया द्रव्यं भावः ।

Tattvartha-sutra-vivecana p. 32

CHAPTER II.

THE HISTORICAL PERIOD (COMMENCING FROM 453 A.D.)

THE WRITTEN RECORDS OF THE JAINAS

27. The teachings of Mahāvīra as contained in the Jaina Āgamas are said to have been handed down by memory for several centuries until in Vīra Saṃvat 980 or A.D. 453 they were edited in writing by Devarddhi Gaṇī, otherwise known as Kṣamāśramaṇa, at a council held at Valabhī. According to this theory the authentic history of the Jaina literature commences from 453 A.D., and all that preceded that period is to be regarded as merely traditional.

SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA (ABOUT 533 A.D.)

28. The first Jaina writer on systematic logic during the historical period appears to be Siddhasena Divākara. Before his time there had not perhaps existed any distinct treatise on Jaina logic, the principles having been included in the works on metaphysics and religion. It was he who for the first time laid the foundation of a separate dialectic (Nyāya) among the Jainas by composing a treatise called **Nyāyāvatāra** in 32 short stanzas.

(Cf. Dr. Bhattacharya's Paper in the Bhandarkar Volume, Sept. 1942, Vol. XI, p. 247, and Dr. Jacobi's Kalpasūtra, Introduction, p. 15. See also Vinaya Vijaya's commentary on the Kalpasūtra, which quotes the following text:

दक्षिणापथे नगरे
रैवतकाद्रि समीप वलभीपुरे
दुष्प्रसह सूरिना लिखित
नवशत चतुर्दशे वीरात् ॥ ६ ॥

Sukhabodhikā Ṭīkā to Kalpasūtra, p. 4.3 (printed in Kathiawar by Hira Lal Hansarāja.)

In Devarddhi Gaṇī's redaction of the Kalpasūtra, of Dr. Jacobi's edition of the Kalpasūtra, p. 5, we read

Sa [illegible] Bhagavato Mahāvīrasya [illegible] dakkhiṇapaḍhamāsa [illegible] Vākkaṇṇaṃ [illegible] vāsāsīyāsu [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] N. 741 [illegible] (Mss. [illegible]) [illegible] A manuscript of the Nyāyāvatāra with Vivṛti was procured for me from Bhavanagara (Bombay) by Muni Dharmavijaya and his pupil Śrī Indravijaya.)

29 Siddhasena Divākara is also the famous author of the **Sammatitarka-sūtra** which is a work in Prākrta on general philosophy containing an elaborate discussion on the principles of logic. His author, who belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect, has been mentioned by Pradyumna Sūri (q.v.) in his Vīrāra-sūra-prakaraṇa and by Jina Sena Sūri in the Adipurāṇa dated 783 A.D.

30 Siddhasena Divākara, who was a pupil of Vṛddha-vādi sūri, received the name of Kumudacandra at the time of ordination. He is said to have spoilt by the efficacy of his prayers, the Liṅga, the Brāhmaṇical symbol of Rudra, in the temple of Mahākāla at Ujjayinī, and to have evoked forth an image of Pārśvanātha by reciting his Kalyāṇamandirastava. He is believed by Jainas to have converted Vikramāditya to Jainism 470 years after the nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra, that is, in 57 B.C.[1]

31 But Vikramāditya of Ujjayinī does not seem to be so old as he has been identified by scholars with Yaśodharman Deva, king of Malwa, who, on the authority of Alberuni, defeated the Huns at Kouar in 533 A.D. This view of scholars agrees well with the statement of the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen-tsang, who coming to India in 629 A.D. says that a very powerful king, presumably Vikramāditya, reigned at Ujjayinī 100 years before his arrival there.[2] Moreover, Vararuci, who was one of the nine Gems at the court of Vikramāditya, is known to have lived between 505 A.D. and 587 A.D.[3] It is therefore very probable that

संवत्सरे च षडशीतिके विक्रमादित्यराज्ये च जयमङ्गले ।
जयश्रीवीरविक्रमे शङ्खपुरे चन्द्रदिवाकरे ॥ १९ ॥

(Vīra-sūra-prasastis, noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, p. 272.)

1 Cf. Prabhāvaka-caritra VIII, v. 67.

2 For other particulars about Siddhasena Divākara see Dr. Klatt's Pattāvali of the Kharataragaccha in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 247. Vide also Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's report on Sanskrit MSS. during 1883-84, pp. 115-140. Also see Introduction to the mutilated text edited by Mr. Tawney in the Bibliotheca Indica series of Calcutta, pp. 10-14.

3 Cf. Beal's Buddhist Records, Vol. II, p. 269.

4 Varāhamihira says Śaka 427 or A.D. 505 as the initial year of his astronomical calculation, showing thereby that he lived also at that time.

पञ्चाशि वर्षसंख्ये शककालमपास्य चैत्रशुक्लादौ ।
अर्धास्तमिते भानौ यवनपुरे सौम्य दिवसाद्ये ॥ ८ ॥

Pañcasiddhāntikā, chap. 1, edited by Dr. G. Thibaut and Sudhākara Dvivedi.

Vide also Dr. Thibaut's Introduction to the Pañcasiddhāntikā, p. xxx.

Vikramāditya and his contemporary Siddhasena Divākara lived at Ujjain about 544 A.D. I am inclined to believe that Siddhasena was no other than *Kṣapaṇaka* (a Jaina sage) who is traditionally known to the Hindus to have been one of the nine Gems[1] that adorned the court of Vikramāditya.

32. His *Nyāyāvatāra* written in Sanskrit verse gives an exposition of the doctrine of *Pramāṇa* (sources of valid knowledge) and *Naya* (the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints).

Pramāṇa or valid knowledge. *Perception*

33. *Pramāṇa* is valid knowledge which dominates itself as well as other forms without any obstruction. It is of two kinds: (1) direct valid knowledge or perception (*Pratyakṣa*) and (2) indirect valid knowledge (*Parokṣa*). Direct valid knowledge (*Pratyakṣa*) is two-fold: (1) sensual (*Indriyaja*) which is the knowledge acquired by the sense-organs, the five senses (the eye, ear, nose, tongue and touch) and the mind (*Manas*) and (2) transcendental (*Paramārthika*) which is the infallible knowledge that comes from the perfect concentration of the soul. It is called *Kevala* or absolute knowledge.

Verbal Testimony

34. Indirect valid knowledge (*Parokṣa*) is also of two kinds: (1) inference (*Anumāna*) and (2) verbal testimony (*Śābda*). Verbal testimony is the knowledge derived from the words of reliable persons in building knowledge from scripture. Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him the river is easily fordable. The word of the old man

[1] The nine Gems are:—

धन्वन्तरिः क्षपणकोऽमरसिंहः शङ्कु
र्वेतालभट्ट घटकर्पर कालिदासाः ।
ख्यातो वराहमिहिरो नृपतेः सभायां
रत्नानि वै वररुचि र्नव विक्रमस्य ॥

(Jyotirvidābharaṇa).

In the Tantras and other Brahmanic Sanskrit works as well as in the *Avadānakalpalatā* and some Buddhist Sanskrit works the Jaina sanctuaries are mentioned as *kṣapaṇaka*:

भगवद्भाषितं तत्र सुभटश्च निरूपितम् ।
कथा कथकाः शिष्यमुद्रं कुंभनिवाकुलः ॥ ९ ॥
तत्र सर्वज्ञतां देशि सुभटो यदि जल्पिता ।
तदेव कथकाः त्यक्ताः शिष्यान् शमवादरात् ॥ १० ॥

(Avadānakalpalatā, Jyotiṣkāvadāna

is to be accepted as a source of valid knowledge called personal testimony or *Laukika sabda*. Scripture is also a source of valid knowledge for it lays down injunctions on matters which baffle perception and inference. For instance it teaches that misery is the consequence of vice. Knowledge derived from this source is called scriptural testimony or *Sastraja sabda*. Scripture is defined as that which was first uttered by a competent person, which is not such as to be passed over by others, which is not incompatible with the truths derived from perception, which imparts true instruction and which is profitable to all men and is preventive of the evil path.

Inference.

35. Inference (*Anumana*) is the cognition of the major term (*Sadhya*) derived through the middle term (*Hetu*) reason or *Linga* sign, which is inseparably connected with it. It is of two kinds: (1) inference for one's own self (*Svarthanumana*) and (2) inference for the sake of others (*Parartthanumana*).

36. The first kind is the inference deduced in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. A man by repeated observations in the kitchen and elsewhere forms the conclusion in his mind that fire must always be an antecedent of smoke. Afterwards he is not certain whether a hill which he sees has fire on it or not. But noticing smoke he at once brings to mind the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, and concludes that there must be fire on the hill. This is the inference for one's own self.

37. If the inference is communicated to others through words it is called an inference for the sake of others. A type of this kind of inference is as follows:—

(1) The *hill* (minor term or *Paksa*) is full of *fire* (major term or *Sadhya*);
(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term or *Hetu*);
(3) whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as e.g. a *kitchen* (example or *Drstanta*);
(4) so is this hill full of smoke (application or *Upanaya*);
(5) therefore this hill is full of fire (conclusion or *Nigamana*).

Terms of a syllogism.

38. In a proposition the subject is the minor term (*Paksa*), and the predicate the major term (*Sadhya*). The minor term is that with which the connection of the major term is to be shown. In the proposition

साध्याभावासम्भवनियमादेवहि हेतुगमकत्वम् ।
नान्यथा पक्षधर्मत्वसपक्षसत्त्वाभ्यां किञ्चित्कस्यचित्कुतश्चित् ॥

(Verse 9, Nyāyāvatāra).

'the hill is full of fire' the *hill* is the minor term and *fire* major term. The middle term (*Hetu*) is defined as that which cannot occur otherwise than in connection with the major term. Thus in the proposition the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke, *smoke* is the middle term which cannot arise from any other thing than fire which is the major term. The example (*Dṛṣṭānta*) is a familiar case which assures the connection between the major term and the middle term. It is of two kinds (1) homogeneous (*Sadharmya*) such as the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke as a *kitchen* and (2) heterogeneous (*Vaidharmya*) which assures the connection between the middle term and major term by contrariety, that is by showing that the absence of the major term is attended by the absence of the middle term such as where there is no fire there is no smoke as in a *lake*.

39. In an inference for the sake of others the minor term (*Pakṣa*) must be explicitly set forth, otherwise the reasoning might be misunderstood by the opponent, *e.g.* This hill has fire because it has smoke.

This instance, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form:—

Having fire. Because having smoke.

Here the opponent might not at once recollect any instance in which fire and smoke exist in union and might mistake a lake for such an instance. In such a case the whole reasoning will be misunderstood.

40. If that of which the major term or predicate is affirmed is opposed by evidence, the public opinion, one's own statement, etc., we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term (*Pakṣābhāsa*) of which there are many varieties.

Fallacy of the minor term.

The semblance or fallacy of the minor term (*Pakṣābhāsa*) arises when one attributes to it as a proved fact that which is yet to be proved or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference or inconsistent with the public opinion or incongruous with one's own statement, thus:—

(1) "The jar is animate (*prāṇyaṇiṣṭa*)"—this is a conclusion which is yet to be proved to the opponent.

(2) "Every thing is momentary"—this is a Sāṅgata conclusion which, according to the Jainas is incapable of being proved.

(3) "The general (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone"—this is opposed to perception.

(4) "There is no omniscient being" — this is according to the Jainas, opposed to inference.

(5) "The sister is to be taken as wife" — this is inconsistent with the public opinion.

(6) "All things are non-existent" — this is inconsistent with one's own statement.

41. Inseparable connection (*Avyāpti*) is the invariable accompaniment of the middle term by the major term. In the inference: "this hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke" the connection between fire and smoke, that is, the invariable presence of fire with smoke, is called *Avyāpti* or Inseparable Connection. It is of two kinds: (1) Intrinsic and (2) Extrinsic.

Inseparable connection.

42. Intrinsic inseparable connection (*Antaraṅga-vyāpti*) occurs when the minor term (*pakṣa*) itself as the common abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and major term (*sādhya*) shows the inseparable connection between them, thus:

(1) This hill (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term),

(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term).

Here the inseparable connection between fire and smoke is shown by the hill (minor term), in which both of them abide.

43. Extrinsic inseparable connection (*Bahiraṅga-vyāpti*) occurs when an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) from the outside is introduced as the common abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and major term (*sādhya*) to assure the inseparable connection between them, thus:

(1) This hill is full of *fire* (major term),

(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term),

(3) as a *kitchen* (example).

Here the reference to the kitchen is no essential part of the inference, but is introduced from without as a commonest instance of a place in which fire and smoke exist together, and as it reaffirms the inseparable connection between them.

44. Some logicians held that, that which is to be proved, that is, the major term (*sādhya*) can be established by intrinsic inseparable connection (*Antaraṅga-vyāpti*), and hence the extrinsic inseparable connection (*Bahiraṅga-vyāpti*) is superfluous.

45. The semblance of reason or fallacy of the middle term (*Hetvābhāsa*) arises from doubt, misconception or misconception about it (the middle term). It is of three kinds:—

Fallacies of the middle term.

(1) The unproved (*Asiddha*). This is fragrant because it is a sky-lotus.

Here the reason (middle term), viz., the sky-lotus, is unreal.

(2) The contradictory (*Viruddha*). This is fiery because it is a body of water.

Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established.

(3) The uncertain (*Anaikantika*) "Sound is eternal because it is always audible."

Here the reason or middle term is uncertain because audibleness may or may not be a proof of eternity.

46. The fallacy of example (*Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) may arise in the homogeneous or heterogeneous form from a defect in the middle term (*hetu*) or major term (*sādhya*) or both, or from doubt about them.

Fallacy of example.

47. Fallacies of the homogeneous example (*Sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) are as follows:—

(1) Inference is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term) like *perception* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in the major term (*sādhya*), for perception is not invalid.

(2) Perception is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of valid knowledge* (middle term) like a *dream* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in the middle term (*hetu*) for the dream is not a source of valid knowledge.

(3) The omniscient being is not *existent* (major term), because he is not *apprehended by the senses* (middle term) like a *jar* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms (*sādhya* and *hetu*), for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses.

(4) This person is *devoid of passions* (major term) because he is *mortal* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(5) This person is *mortal* (major term) because he is *full of passions* (middle term) like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful, whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(6) This person is *non omniscient* (major term), because he is *full of passions* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and non omniscient.

It is stated in the Nyāyāvatāra vivṛti that some more easily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example (*sādharmya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*), viz.:—

(1) Unconnected (*Asamanvaya*), such as "This person is *full of passions*

(major term) because he is a *speaker* (middle term), like a certain man in *Magadha* (example).

Here though a certain man in Magadha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no impossible connection between "being a speaker" and "being full of passions."

(3) Of inverted connection (*viparītavyāpti*) such as:—

Sound is eternal (major term) because it is produced (middle term), as a jar (example).

Here though there is an impossible connection between "produced" and "non-eternal," yet it has not been so by the proper form as:—

Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a jar.

(4) Of inverted connection (*viparītavyāpti*) such as:—

Sound is non-eternal (major term) because it is produced (middle term).

Here the impossible connection is given as shown thus:—

Whatever is non-eternal is produced as a jar, instead of:—

Whatever is produced is non-eternal as a jar; the example would involve the fallacy of inverted connection.

48. Fallacies of the heterogeneous example (*Vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta-ābhāsa*) are of six kinds, thus:—

(1) Inference is invalid (major term) because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term), whatever is not invalid is not a source of knowledge, as a *dream* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term (*sādhya*), for the dream is really invalid though it has been cited as not invalid.

(2) Perception is *non-illusory* or *nirvikalpaka* (major term) because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term), whatever is reflective or *savikalpaka* is not a source of knowledge, as *inference* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the middle term (*sādhana*), for inference is really a source of knowledge though it has been cited as not such.

(3) Sound is eternal and *non-eternal* (major term) because it is an *existence* (middle term), whatever is not eternal and non-eternal is not an existence, as a jar (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in both the major and middle terms (*sādhya* and *sādhana*), for the jar is both "eternal and non-eternal" and "an existence."

(4) Kapila is not *omniscient* (major term) because he is not a *propounder of the four noble truths* (middle term), whoever is omniscient is the propounder of the four noble truths, as *Buddha* (the heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a doubt as to the validity of the major term (*sādhya*), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was omniscient.

(5) This person is *untrustworthy* (major term) because he is *full of passions* (middle term), whoever is trustworthy is not full of passions, as *Buddha* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the

middle term *(hetu)* for it is doubtful whether Buddha is not full of passions.

(b) Kapila is not devoid of *passions* (major term) because he did *not give his own flesh to the hungry* (middle term), whoever is devoid of passions did give his own flesh to the hungry as *Buddha* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms *(sādhya* and *sādhana)* for it is doubtful whether Kapila was devoid of passions and gave his own flesh to the hungry.

[illegible]

(1) [illegible] The major is not *devoid of passions* (major term) [illegible] whoever is devoid of passions [illegible] example.

Here [illegible] invariable separation (*vyatireka vyāpti*) between [illegible] and [illegible] as [illegible]

2. (If [illegible] heterogeneous [illegible] no [illegible] example.

Here [illegible] Whatever is [illegible]

(1) [illegible]

Should [illegible] middle term [illegible] example.

Here the reason has been put in a wrong way; the proper form should have been: Whatever is [illegible] not produced by other.

41. Refutation of *Dharma* as the permanent of infinite of fallacies in the statements of the opponent in a way of the manner stated above. The combination of substratum (*Dharmadharmin*) which contravenes to other details which [illegible] at all.

51. The immediate object of *Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) is the removal of ignorance. For consequence of the transcendental perception (*Parokshaṇa*) for *Pramāṇa*. *Pramāṇa* is this and equivalent to existing in a state of [illegible] which [illegible] of the other [illegible] of *Pramāṇa* direct and indirect knowledge is the faculty which [illegible] us to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable things.

51. [illegible] the method [illegible] things from particular [illegible]

Nayas [illegible] of [illegible] flowers [illegible] a flower possessing the [illegible] particular [illegible] of flowers [illegible] a flower possessing attributes which are peculiar to the rose as distinguished from other flowers. The *Nayas* are of seven kinds: *naigama, saṃgraha, vyavahāra, ṛjusūtra, śabda, samabhirūḍha* and *evambhūta*.

Gs 3333

52. Knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment, in the scriptural method, of one-sided *nayas*, is called *Syādvāda vāda*. It is the perfect knowledge of things taken from all possible standpoints. Thus a thing may be, may not be, both may or may not be, etc., according as we take it from one or other standpoint.

The soul (*Jīva*) is the knower, the illuminator of self and non-self, doer, enjoyer, undergoes changes of condition and is self-conscious, being different from the earth, water, etc.

This system of *Pramāṇa* and *Naya*, with which all of us are familiar, and which serves to perform all practical functions, has no beginning and no end.

SIDDHASENA GAṆI (600 A.D.).

53. Siddhasena Gaṇi, who belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect, was the author of a commentary on Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra called Tattvārthaṭīkā, in which the logical principles of *Pramāṇa* (the sources of knowledge) and *Naya* (the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints) have been fully discussed. He was a pupil of Bhāsvamin[1] who was a spiritual successor of Siṃhasūri, himself a disciple of Dinna Gaṇi. Siddhasena Gaṇi[2] is generally believed to have been a contemporary of Devardhigaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa who flourished 980 years after Mahāvīra, or about 453 A.D. But as he has in his Tattvārthaṭīkā quoted Siddhasena Divākara and was posterior to Siṃhagiri or Siṃhasūri, a contemporary of Vikramāditya I, I am inclined to suppose that he lived after 533 A.D., or about 600 A.D.

SAMANTABHADRA (600 A.D.).

54. Samantabhadra, who belonged to the Digambara sect of Southern India, was the famous author of a well known com-

[1] A palm-leaf manuscript of the Tattvārthaṭīkā in the temple of Śrī Śrutasāgara Coolum, has been noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, pp. 83-86.

[2] नमाद्रव्योऽथवा नयाद्रव्यपर्यायगोचरात् ।
नयार्थेनाल्पकोऽभिन्नो यथात् चिरदीपवत् ॥ ७

(Tattvārthaṭīkā, noticed in Peterson's 3rd Report, p. 85.)

[3] Siṃhasūri is identified by Peterson with Siṃhagiri who was a contemporary of Vikramāditya.

(Peterson's 4th Report, pp. cxxxi and cxxxii.)

Muni Dharmavijaya and his pupil Indravijaya tell us that Siddhasena Gaṇi was a contemporary of Devardhigaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa,

mentary on Umasvati's Tattvarthadhigama-sutra called **Gandhahasti-mahabhasya**. The introductory part of this commentary is called **Devagamastotra** or **Āptamīmāmsa**, and is replete with discussions of logical principles besides a review of the contemporary schools of philosophy including the Advaita Veda.[1] The Aptamimamsa has been cited by the Hindu philosopher Vacaspati Misra in explaining Sankaracarya's criticism of the Syadvada doctrine in the Vedanta-sutra.

55. Samantabhadra was styled a Kavi and whose works were commented on by Vidyānandi[2] and Prabhācandra was also the author of the Yuktyanuśasana, the Ratnakaranda (also called Upasakadhyayana), the Svayambhustotra and the Jinasatakam

who flourished 981 years after the nirvana of Mahavira. See also Uvasagaddasão edited by A. F. R. Hoernle, Appendix III, page 53.

[1] In the Jaina [illegible] text [illegible] as follows:—

समन्तभद्रो भद्रार्थो भातु भारतभूषणः
देवागमस्य देवाय यस्य देवागमः कृतः ॥

(Pāṇḍavapurāṇa, noticed in Peterson's 4th Report, p. 157.)

[illegible] कदेकान्तपक्षेऽपि दृष्टो भेदो विरुध्यते ।
कारकाणां क्रियायाश्च नैकं स्वस्मात् प्रजायते ॥ २४ ॥

(Āptamīmāṁsā, verse 24.)

[2] Vācaspati Misra in his Bhāmatī tīkā on Sankara's exposition of the Vedānta Sūtra — 33 quotes the following verse —

साहाहः सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात् किंवृत्तचिद्विधेः ।
सप्तभङ्गनयापेक्षो हेयादेयविशेषकृत् ॥

(Bhāmatī, Bibliotheca Indica, p. 458.)

The same verse occurs in the Āptamīmāṁsā as follows

साहाहः सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात् किं वृत्तचिद्विधेः ।
सप्तभङ्गनयापेक्षो हेयादेयविशेषकः ॥ १०४ ॥

(MSS. of the Āptamīmāṁsā, verse 104 borrowed from Mr. Jain Vaidya of Jaipur.)

Vidyānandi begins the eleventh part of his commentary on the Āptamīmāṁsā (called Āptamīmāṁsālankāra) [illegible] Samantabhadra thus:—

[illegible]
[illegible]
स त्वमसि [illegible] भद्र [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] Āptamīmāṁsālankāra [illegible] (Calcutta, in the Asiatic Society of Bengal [illegible])

śati-jina-stuti. He is mentioned by Jina Sena in the Ādipurāṇa composed about 838 A.D., and is referred to by the Hindu philosopher Kumārila. Kumārila, a contemporary of the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, is generally held to have lived in the 7th century A.D. Samantabhadra is supposed to have flourished about 600 A.D.

56. The Āptamīmāṁsā consists of 114 stanzas in Sanskrit divided into ten chapters called *Parichchhedas*, in the course of which a full exposition of the seven parts of the *Syādvāda* or *Saptabhanga-naya* has been given. The first and second parts of the doctrine, viz. *Syādasti* ("may be it is") and *Syādnasti* ("may be it is not") have led to most interesting discussions of the relation between *asti*, that is, *bhāva* or existence, and *nasti*, that is, *abhāva* or non-existence.

57. Non-existence (*abhāva*) is divided into four kinds: (1) antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*), *e.g.* a lump of clay becomes non-existent as soon as a jar is made out of it, so the jar is an antecedent non-existence with reference to the lump of clay; (2) subsequent non-existence (*pradhvaṁsābhāva*), *e.g.* the lump of clay is a subsequent non-existence with reference to the jar; (3) mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva* or *anyapoha*), *e.g.* a jar and a post are mutually non-existent with reference to each other; and (4) absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva* or *atyantābhāva*), *e.g.* the unicorn is not a living object. It is observed[1] that on the supposition of mere existence to the entire exclusion of non-existence things become all pervading, beginningless, endless, indistinguishable and inconceivable. For

[1] Prabhācandra in his commentary on the Ratnakaraṇḍaka (or Upāsakadhyayana) observes:

> [illegible]
> [illegible]
> [illegible]
> [illegible]

(Upāsakadhyayana with the commentary of Prabhācandra, published in Pandit's 4th Report, pp. 107-108.)

[1] *Vide* Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report on Sanskrit MSS. during 1883-84, p. 118, and J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, p. 227.

> [illegible]
> [illegible]
> [illegible]
> [illegible]
> [illegible]
> [illegible]

instance, if the antecedent non-existence is denied action and substance are to be supposed as beginningless while on the denial of the subsequent non-existence they become endless and in the absence of mutual non-existence they become one and all pervading. While on absolute non-existence being denied they are to be supposed as existing always and everywhere.

58. In the same way on the supposition of mere non-existence to the entire exclusion of existence it becomes impossible to establish or reject anything (since it is non-existent). If on the other hand existence and non-existence which are incompatible with each other are simultaneously ascribed to a thing it becomes indescribable. Therefore the truth is as follows:

(1) A thing is existent from one point of view.
(2) It is non-existent from another point of view.
(3) It is *both* existent and non-existent in *turn* from a third point of view.
(4) It is *indescribable* that is both existent and non-existent simultaneously from a fourth point of view.
(5) It is existent and *indescribable* from a fifth point of view.
(6) It is non-existent and *indescribable* from a sixth point of view.
(7) It is *both* existent and non-existent and *indescribable* —from a seventh point of view.

AKALAṄKADEVA (ABOUT 750 A.D.)

59. Akalanka otherwise known as Akalankadeva or Akalankacandra was a famous learned man who belonged to the Digambara sect. He was designated as a *Bhaṭṭ*[1] (poet), a title of special honour given to writers of repute. He wrote a commentary on Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā called Aṣṭaśatī[2] which is a

चमाचैकालचक्रेऽपि भावाचन्द्रार्कतारकाम् ।
चक्रीश्वराद्यप्रमाणं च केन वाधनवृत्तयम् ॥ १२ ॥
चिराचार्यैर्मयैकाग्रा चाद्वादस्याय विद्विषाम्
चकाचनैकरक्तस्यक्तिर्नोत्पाचमिति पृच्छते ॥ १० ॥
कथचिन्नं चहेतेहं कथचिदसदेव तत् ।
तथोभयमवाच्यं च कथयोत्राद्य चर्यता ॥ १४ ॥

(Āptamīmāṃsā, MSS., verses 9-14 lent to me by Mr. Jain Vaidya of Jaipur.)

1. For an explanation of the term *Bhaṭṭ* see R. G. Bhandarkar's Report on Sanskrit MSS. during 1883-84, p. 10.

2. A manuscript of the Aṣṭaśatī was kindly supplied to me by Mr. Jain Vaidya of Jaipur early in 1907.

most precious work on the Jaina philosophy dealing mainly with logic. Manikyanandi's Parikshamukha-sutra (q. v.) was based on another work on logic called Nyaya-vinischaya, written by Akalanka, to whom the following works are also attributed: Laghiyastraya, Akalanka-stotra, Svarupasambodhana and Pravachana. Jinasenacharya's Adipurana (in its Aryasamasyavarnapada-tatparya-ka) calls Akalanka as *Sakala-tarkika-chakra-chudamani* or the crest-gem of all dialectics.

60. In the Bhattaka-purana[3] reference is made to a legend according to which Akalanka was embarrassed in a controversy with a Buddhist antagonist. Finding that the antagonist was effectively prompted by Mayadevi concealed in a jar, Akalanka is said to have put an end to that prompting or inspiration by kicking the jar over with his foot.

61. Akalanka, though mentioned along with Dharmakirti[4] as a logician, flourished at a considerably later time. He is held to have been a contemporary of Rashtrakuta king Subhatunga[5] or Krishnaraja I. As Krishnaraja's son Govinda II lived in Saka 705 or 783 A.D., Krishnaraja I and consequently his contemporary Akalanka must have flourished about 750 A.D.

VIDYANANDA (ABOUT 800 A.D.)

62. Vidyananda, mentioned by the Hindu philosopher Madhavacharya,[6] was a Digambara logician of Pataliputra. He was the author of the Apta-mimamsalankarah, otherwise called Astasahasri, an exhaustive subcommentary on the Apta-

1. Cf. Astasahasri-vivarana-tippanakara by Laghusamantabhadra, edited by Peterson in his 5th Report, p. 217.

2. चक्रकङ्कोऽकलङ्कः स कलौ कलयतु क्रमम् ।
यदीयैः प्रकटीक्रियते न्यायः कैश्चिन्नयोद्यतैः ॥

(Bhadravaputra, noticed by Peterson in his 4th Report, p. 157.)

भाषाकलङ्कविरचितानि सकलशास्त्रचूडामणिकृतानि तत्त्वार्थसूत्रादीनि यद्यपि सकलकुवादिकोलाहलम् प्रकटयन्ति किमनया कृत्यकारणाकुल चिन्तया ।

(Tattvartha-tika, by Hemachandra, noticed by Peterson in his 5th Report, p. 148.)

4. *Vide* K. B. Pathak's article "Bhartrihari and Kumarila" in the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. XVIII, 1892.

5. *Vide* R. G. Bhandarkar's "Early History of the Deccan", 2nd edition, p. 78.

6. *Vide* the chapter on the Jaina system in the Sarvadarsana-samgraha translated by Cowell and Gough, p. 50.

mimaṁsā, containing an elaborate exposition of various logical principles. Vidyānanda in the opening and the closing lines of his Aṣṭasahasrī makes an indirect reference to Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka respectively, while in chapter X of the work he distinctly says that he followed the Aṣṭaśatī of Akalaṅka in explaining the Āptamīmāṁsā. Another logical treatise called Pramāṇa-parīkṣā is also attributed to him. He was also the author of the Ślokavārtika and Āpta-parīkṣā.

63. He has in his Aṣṭasahasrī criticised the doctrines of the Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Advaita, Mīmāṁsaka and Saugata-Tathāgata or Bauddha philosophy, and has also mentioned Dignāga, Udyotakara, Dharmakīrti,[1] Prajñākara, Bhartṛhari,[2] Śabaraswāmī, Prabhākara and Kumārila. Vidyānanda was

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[1] The opening lines of the Aṣṭasahasrī are:—

चीरवसामभिनन्द्य चमत्कृतमहामुनीन्द्रविद्यानन्दैः ।
[illegible] ॥ १ ॥

The closing lines of the Aṣṭasahasrī are:—

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

The lines in Chapter X referred to run thus:—

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

(Aṣṭasahasrī MSS., Asiatic Society of Bengal.)

[2] [illegible]:—

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

(Quoted in Aṣṭasāhasrī, chap. I.)

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

(Quoted in Aṣṭasāhasrī, chap. I.)

[illegible]:—

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

(Quoted in Aṣṭasāhasrī, chap. I.)

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

(D. a. Arya of Vākyapadīya by Bhartṛhari as quoted in the Aṣṭasāhasrī, vide J. B. B. R. A. S. for 1892, p. 221.)

otherwise named Patra Kesari or Pātra Kesari Svāmi, who has been praised by Jina Sena in the Ādi Purāṇa[1] composed about Śaka 700 or A.D. 778. He is believed to have lived early in the 8th century A.D. at Pātrapattana.

MĀNIKYA NANDI (ABOUT 800 A.D.)

64. Māṇikya Nandi was a Digambara author whose Parīkshā-mukha sūtra or Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra[2] is a standard work on the Jaina logic. As his work is based on that of Akalaṅka[3] he must have lived after 700 A.D. The earliest commentary on the Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra is the Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa of Prabhācandra. Vidyānanda, Māṇikya Nandi and Prabhācandra have been pronounced to be contemporaries.[4] So Māṇikya Nandi seems to have lived about 800 A.D.

65. The Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra is divided into six chapters thus: (1) the characteristics of valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa-svarūpa*); (2) direct apprehension or perception (*Pratyakṣa*); (3) indirect apprehension (*Parokṣa*); (4) the object of valid knowledge (*Viṣaya*); (5) the result of valid knowledge (*Phala*); (6) the sub-classes of (three) *Naya*.

[illegible]

(Ādipurāṇa, quoted by Mr. K. B. Pathak, J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, p. [illegible])

Mr. Pathak has proved Sarvajñaprakāśa to show that Vidyānanda and Patrasvāmī were [illegible].

[illegible] J.B.B.R.A.S. for 1892, pp. 222, 223.)

[1] Vide K. B. Pathak's article on Bhartṛihari and Kumārila in J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, pp. 227, 229.

[2] [illegible] Vidyānanda.

A manuscript of the Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra was kindly lent to me by Mr. [illegible] another manuscript of this work was [illegible] Poona.

[3] [illegible] J.B.B.R.A.S. [illegible] Akalaṅka's Nyāya-viniścaya [illegible] Vādirāja's Nyāya-viniścaya-vivaraṇa [illegible] Ananta's Nyāya-[illegible] Dīpa.

[illegible]

[illegible] J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, pp. 219, 220, 221. [illegible] Sarvajñaprakāśa [illegible] Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa [illegible] commentary.

60 *Pramana*, valid knowledge, is defined as the knowledge which ascertains the nature of what was uncertain to one's self. It generally arises in the form "I know the jar by myself" which consists of a subject, an object, an act, and an instrument. Just as a lamp illumines itself as well as the surrounding objects, so the *Pramana* sets forth the knower as well as the thing known.

Valid knowledge

61 *Pramana* is of two kinds: (1) direct knowledge (*Pratyaksha*), which arises through the senses, etc., and (2) indirect knowledge (*Paroksha*), consisting of recollection, recognition (*Pratyabhijnana*), argumentation (*Tarka* or *Uha*), inference (*Anumana*), and the scripture (*Agama*). Recollection is a knowledge of the form "that" which arises through the awakening of impressions, thus "that Devadatta." Recognition is a knowledge which arises from perception through recollection in the forms "this is that," "this is like that," "this is not like that," "this is the counterpart of that," etc., thus "this is that Devadatta," "the *Gavaya* is like the cow," "the buffalo is different from the cow," "this is far from that," "this is a tree," etc. Argumentation is a knowledge of the connection between the minor term and the major term based on the presence or absence of the latter, in the form, "if this is that, so it this is, and that is not, this is not." Thus smoke arises only if there is fire, but it cannot arise if there is no fire. Inference[1] is the knowledge of the major term arising through the middle term, thus "there is fire because there is smoke."

Kinds of valid knowledge

65 Pervasion[2] or invariable connection (*Vyapti* or *Avinabhava*) is the universal attendance of the middle term by the major term in simultaneity or succession, thus fire and smoke may abide simultaneously or the latter may follow the former.

Terms of a Syllogism

If the middle term and the major term exist simultaneously, the former is called *vyapya*, pervaded or contained, and the latter *vyapaka*, pervader or container.

But if the middle term follows the major term, the former is called effect (*Karya*) and the latter cause (*karana* or *hetu*), thus fire is the cause of smoke. Generally, however, the major term is called *sadhya* or that which is to be proved, and the middle term is called *sadhana* or that by which it is to be proved. Sometimes the major term is also called *dharma* or predicate, and the middle term *linga*, mark or sign.

The minor term is called *Paksha*, the place or locus in which the major term abides, or *Dharmin*, the subject, thus "this

[1] अनुमानम् साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥ ९ ॥ (Parikshâ-mukha sûtra)

[2] सहक्रमभावनियमो व्याप्तिः ॥ १० ॥ (Parîkshâ-mukha sûtra)

place is fiery", "sound is mutable" here "this place" and "sound" are the minor terms. Some philosophers, who divide the middle term (reason) into three phases, dispense with the minor term in an inference.

The middle term (*Hetu*) is defined as that which is inseparably connected with the major term, or in other words, which cannot come into existence unless the major term exists. For instance, smoke could not come into existence unless the fire existed.

Internal phases of the middle term.

69. The middle term or reason (*Hetu*) is divided as (1) perceptible (*upalabdhi*), and (2) imperceptible (*anupalabdhi*). Each of these again may occur in the form of an affirmation (*Vidhi*) or negation (*pratisedha*).

70. The *perceptible* reason in the *affirmative* form admits of six subdivisions according as it is:—

(i) the pervaded (*vyapya*)—sound is mutable because it is factitious;

(ii) an effect (*karya*)—this man has got intellect because there are intellectual functions in him;

(iii) a cause (*karana*)—there is a umbrella here because there is an umbrella;

(iv) prior (*purva*)—the Rohini stars will rise for the Kṛttikas have risen.

(v) posterior (*uttara*)—the Bharani stars certainly rose for the Kṛttikas have risen.

(vi) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—the man had a mother for he had a father—or this mango has a particular colour because it has a particular flavour.

71. The *perceptible* reason in the *negative* form admits of six subdivisions as follows:—

(i) the pervaded (*vyapya*)—there is no cold sensation because of heat.

(ii) an effect (*karya*)—there is no cold sensation because of smoke.

(iii) a cause (*karana*)—there is no happiness in this man because of the shalt in his heart;

(iv) prior (*purva*)—the Rohini stars will not rise at once for the Revati [only] has risen.

(v) posterior (*uttara*)—the Bharani did not rise a moment ago for the Punya has risen.

(vi) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—there is no doubt of the existence of the other side of this wall for this side of it is perceived.

72 The *imperceptible* reason in the *negative* form admits of seven subdivisions as follows —

(i) identity (*svabhāva*) there is no jar here because it is imperceptible

(ii) the pervaded (*vyāpya*) there is no Śiṁśapā here because there is no tree at all;

(iii) an effect (*kārya*) there is no smoldering fire here because there is no smoke;

(iv) a cause (*kāraṇa*) there is no smoke here because there is no fire;

(v) prior (*pūrva*) the Rohiṇī stars will not rise in a moment for the kṛittikās are not perceptible

(vi) posterior (*uttara*) the Bharaṇī did not rise a moment ago for the kṛittikās are not perceptible,

(vii) non illusions (*abhāvana*) in this even branch there is no breaking upwards because it is not perceptible

73 The *imperceptible* reason in the affirmative form admits of three subdivisions thus : —

(i) an effect (*kārya*) in this man there is some disease because there is no healthy movement in him

(ii) a cause (*kāraṇa*) this man is sorrowful because he has no union with his beloved ones;

(iii) identity (*svabhāva*) there is uncertainty here because certainty is not discernible;

73. The middle term and the major term are the parts of an inference, but the example (*udāharaṇa*) is not. Nevertheless for the sake of explaining matters to men of small intellect the example *udāharaṇa* or *dṛiṣṭānta*, nay even the application (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*) are admitted as parts of an inference. The example is of two kinds (1) the affirmative or homogeneous (*anvaya* or *sadharmya*) which shows the middle term as covered by the major term, such as whenever there is smoke there is fire, as in a *kitchen* and (2) the negative or heterogeneous (*vyatireka* or *vaidharmya*) by which the absence of the middle term is indicated by the absence of the major term, *e g.*, wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke as in a *lake*

Example.

74 Inference is of two kinds viz (1) inference for one's own self (*svārthānumāna*) and (2) inference for the sake of others *parārthānumāna*)

Inference

An instance of the latter kind of inference is given below —

(1) Sound (minor term) is mutable (major term) —proposition,

(2) because it is factitious (reason or middle term),

(3) whatever is factitious is mutable, as a jar (affirmative or homogeneous example);
(4) sound is factitious (application);
(5) therefore sound is mutable (conclusion).

Or

(3) whatever is not mutable is not factitious, as the milk of a barren woman's breast (negative or heterogeneous example);
(4) but sound is factitious (application);
(5) therefore sound is mutable (conclusion).

Verbal testimony.

75. Testimony (*āptavacana*) is a knowledge of objects derived from the words of reliable persons or scripture in virtue of their natural fitness or suggestiveness—*e.g.*, the north pole exists.

Objects of valid knowledge.

76. (1) Objects of valid knowledge are either general (*sāmānya*) or particular (*viśeṣa*). The general is of two kinds: (1) homogeneous (*tiryak*), including many individuals of like nature, as, the "cow" is a generic notion which signifies many individual cows as Sabalā, Kalabā, Mukulā, etc., and (2) heterogeneous (*ūrdhvatā*), including many individuals of dissimilar nature, as "gold" is a generic notion comprising a bracelet, necklace, earring, etc. The particular is also of two kinds: (1) relating to things (*padārthe*), *e.g.*, cow, buffalo, elephant, dog, are four particular things distinguished from one another, and (2) relating to a term such as pleasure, pain, etc., experienced by the soul.

Result of valid knowledge.

77. The result or consequence of valid knowledge is the cessation of ignorance enabling one to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable.

Various kinds of Fallacies.

78. Fallacy or semblance consists of the knowledge of that which is different from the real thing. It is of many kinds, such as the fallacy—

(1) of perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*), *e.g.*, to mistake a post for a man;
(2) of recollection (*smaraṇābhāsa*), in trying to recollect Jinadatta to say, "O that Devadatta!";
(3) of recognition (*pratyabhijñānābhāsa*), on seeing a grey hound to say, "this is a tiger";
(4) of argumentation (*tarkābhāsa*)—"whoever is his son must be black";
(5) of the minor term (*pakṣābhāsa*), "sound is imperminent." This is a fallacy of the minor term according to the Mīmāṁsakas, for they do not attribute

impermanency to sound, or fire is not hot because it is a substance as water;

(6) of the middle term or reason (*hetvābhāsa*): sound is eternal because it is factitious;

(7) of example (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*): sound is eternal because it is corporeal, like a jar;

(8) of verbal testimony (*āgamābhāsa*): — "There is a heap of sweetmeats on the side of the river, run you boys. There are a hundred elephants on his finger. The Jainas are allowed to eat in the night" [as a fact they are not so allowed according to their scripture].

79 Māṇikya Nandin the Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra (chapter vi, aph. 56-57) has mentioned the Lokāyatika, Sāṅgata Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Prabhākara, Jaimīnīya etc. In the 3rd chapter of the work he has alluded to a certain philosopher who maintaining three phases of the reason or middle term (*hetu*) dispenses with the minor term (*pakṣa*).[1]

References to various philosophical systems.

80 He concludes his work by referring to it as a mirror through which a man can see what is to be accepted and what rejected.[2]

Prabhā Candra (about 825 A.D.)

81 Prabhā Candra styled a Kavi, a member of the Digambara sect, was the author of the famous logical treatise called the Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa, the earliest commentary on the Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra of Māṇikya Nandin. He was also the author of the Nyāya-kumuda-candrodaya (or briefly Candrodaya), a commentary on the Laghīyastraya of Akalaṅka. He has in his Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa mentioned Bhagavān Upavarṣa,

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[1] धारावाहिकाकारविकल्प विधिना हेतुः ॥ ३० ॥

को वा विधा हेतुभूतः पक्षधर्मत्वादौ न दर्शयति ॥ ३१ ॥

Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra, MSS. lent to me by Mr. Jain Vaidya of Jaipur).

[2] यदं वस्तुजातमादर्शे हेयोपादेयतत्त्वेन ।

संविदे तादृशो बालः परीक्षादृगयमद्य वयम् ॥

Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra, chap. VI, MSS lent to me by Mr. Jain Vaidya of Jaipur).

Śabarasvāmi, Bhartṛhari, Bāṇa, Kumārila[2], Prabhākara, Dignāga, Udyotakara, Dharmakīrti, Vidyānanda and others. He himself has been mentioned by Jina Sena in the Ādi Purāṇa[4] composed about Śaka 760 or A.D. 838. Prabha Candra, as a contemporary of Māṇikya Nandi and Vidyānanda, is believed to have lived in the first half of the 9th century A.D.

MALLAVĀDIN (ABOUT 827 A.D.).

82. He belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was the famous author of a commentary on the Buddhist logical treatise Nyāyabindu called Dharmottara-tippanaka. According to a Jaina legend[5] Malla was the son of King Salādityas sister. He was called *vādin* or logician because having vanquished the Buddhists in a dispute he re-established the Jaina faith and brought to its former glory the great figure of Adinātha on Mount Śatrunjaya (in Kāṭhiāwāṛ).

83. A palm-leaf manuscript of the Dharmottara-tippanaka

[1] Prabhā Candra has quoted the following verse from Bāṇa's Kādambarī:—

[illegible]

(Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa, Deccan College, MSS., p. 21a, quoted by Mr. K. B. Pathak in J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, p. 221.)

[2] Prabhā Candra refers to Kumārila otherwise called Bhaṭṭa thus:—

[illegible]

(Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa, quoted by Mr. K. B. Pathak in the J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, p. 227).

[3] In the Ādi Purāṇa Prabhā Candra is thus mentioned:—

[illegible]

(Quoted by Mr. K. B. Pathak in J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, p. 222.)

On p. 227 of the same journal the date of the Ādipurāṇa is fixed at Śaka 760 or 838 A.D.

[4] Peterson's 4th Rep., p. 14, in which is mentioned the legend of the Prabandhacintāmaṇi (Rāmacandra's edition, Bombay, p. 273).

[5] इति श्रीमत्तरुणगच्छीयश्रीमल्लवादिविरचिते धर्मोत्तरटिप्पनके [illegible] समाप्तः [illegible] ॥

is preserved at Anhilwad Patan and is said to be dated Samvat 1231 or 1174 A.D. According to the Prabhāvaka-caritra[1] Mallavādin was also the author of a Padma-caritra and lived in Vīra Samvat 884 or 357 A.D. But this is impossible as Dharmottara (q.v.), on whose Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā Mallavādin wrote Ṭippanaka, lived about 847 A.D. On the other hand Mallavādin is mentioned[2] by Hem Candra Sūri who lived during 1088-1172 A.D. It seems therefore probable that the year 884 in which Mallavādin lived does not refer to Vīra Samvat but to Vikrama Samvat. On that supposition Mallavādin lived in 827 A.D. and was a contemporary of Dharmottara.

PRADYUMNA SŪRI (ABOUT 980 A.D.)

84. He[3] belonged to the Rājagaccha of the Śvetāmbara sect. In Mānikyacandra's Pārśvanāthacaritra[4] his prowess in logical discussions is referred to in the following terms:—

"There was born the preceptor Pradyumna Sūri, the first healer of disease of the world, who entirely removed all corruptions from the body of men (or detected all defects in disputation committed by men) and who, using sharp logical expressions, made the irrelevant opponents to sweat and thereby to be cured of the fever of pride."

संवत् १२३१ वर्षे भाद्रपद शुदि ११ रवौ चन्द्रगच्छे श्रीमानदेवसूरिशिष्य वादिदेवसूरिभिः चाचदेव भक्तौ भक्तागार द्विजवर्ग विचारितम् ॥

(Noticed in Peterson 5, App. p. 3.)

1 *Vide* Kātī, Vienna Oriental Journal, Vol. IV, p. 67.

2 चतुः सहस्रादिनं वादिनः ।
सहस्रमेकं चौरा इत्यर्थः ॥

(Siddha Hema Śabdānuśāsana Bṛhat Ṭīkā, 2-2-39).

3 For further particulars about Pradyumna Sūri see Peterson's 4th Report, p. lxxix.

4 पूर्वं विचारचर्चा विचारचर्चिके विचूर्णयद्भूतकर्म-
कथाकः कलङ्कः प्रकाशयन्निव यद्यशःपुरिर्यः ।
येन सद्भिर्मया यद्यपि तरसा सर्वोऽप्यसौ भारती
वाहोन्मा चर्चिकापिनो वनतरं हर्षेश्वरं त्याजिताः ॥ ७ ॥
द्विजवरवनाशाकाशेदुपद्मं वनाद्रेः ।
यः प्रत्यर्थं वादिनः जनतकथयं पुनः ॥ ८ ॥
मौरावनाविधो राजवच्छत्रुंजयादिभिः ।
सूरिः प्रद्युम्नसूर्योऽसौ पूर्वं वा पूर्वजाग्रजः ॥ ९८ ॥

85. In the same work reference is made to his victory over the Digambaras of Vedkapura in the presence of the king of that province. He delighted the kings of various countries by no fewer than eighty-four treatises in discussion. He was eleventh in ascent from Manikyacandra Sūri, who wrote his Pārśvanātha caritra in Samvat 1276 or 1219 A.D. Pradyumna must have flourished about 980 A.D., for he was the preceptor of Abhayadeva Sūri (q.v.), who lived a little before 1039 A.D.

ABHAYADEVA SŪRI (ABOUT 1000 A.D.)

86. Abhayadeva Sūri belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect[1] and was the pupil and successor of Pradyumna Sūri of the Rājagaccha. He was an eminent logician and author of **Vādamahārṇava**, a treatise on logic called the Ocean of Discussions, and of a commentary on the Sanmati tarka sūtra called **Tattvārtha bodha vidhāyinī**[2]. He is described as a lion that roamed at ease in the wild forest of books on logic. That the rivers of various conflicting opinions might not sweep away the path of

[illegible]

[illegible] (Peterson in his 3rd Report, pp. [illegible])

[illegible]

(Dhanapāla's caritra by Manikyacandra noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, pp. 158-59.)

[1] See R. Mitra's Catalogue, X, pp. 39-40.

the good, Abhayadeva[1] wrote his Vada-mahārṇava.[2] He was succeeded by Jineśvara Sūri, a contemporary of King Muñja.[3] He was the ninth predecessor of Siddhasena Sūri, who wrote Pravacana-saroddhāra-vṛtti in Samvat 1242 or 1185 A.D. It was probably this Abhayadeva Sūri who was "world-renowned" and a teacher of Santi Sūri who died in Samvat 1096 or 1039 A.D.

LAGHUSAMANTABHADRA (ABOUT 1000 A.D.)

87. He[4] wrote a commentary on the Aptamīmāṃsā of Vidyānanda called the Aptamīmāṃsā-viṣamapada-tātparya-ṭīkā[5] and seems to have belonged to the Digambara sect and lived about 1000 A.D.

ANANTA-VIRYA (ABOUT 1039 A.D.).

88. Ananta-vīrya was the Digambara author of a commentary on the Parīkṣāmukha of Māṇikya Nandi called Parīkṣā-mukha-pañjikā or Prameya-ratnamālā, as also a commentary on Akalaṅka's Nyāya-vinicaya called the Nyāya-vinicaya-vṛtti. He wrote the former for Santi Sūri at the request of Hiraṇya son of Vijaya and Nāgāmba.[6] Now Santi Sūri, supposed to be identical with Santi Sūri died in Samvat 1096 or A.D. 1039. His contemporary Ananta-vīrya must therefore have flourished

[1] For particulars about Abhayadeva Sūri see Peterson's 4th Report, p. [illegible]

[2] Weber's Die Handschriften-verzeichnisse [illegible], p. 851, vv. 1, 2, and p. [illegible] Jineśvara Sūri was probably a spiritual brother of Dhaneśvara Sūri.

यस्यामुद्भटराजन्यमुखमिषि [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] ? [illegible] ?
[illegible]

Uttarādhyayana-ṭīkā-vṛtti by Santyācārya edited by Dr. R. [illegible] Hemacandra's Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1916–18, p. 44.)

[3] See also Weber's Die Handschriften-verzeichnisse der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin, p. 87.

[4] *Vide* Peterson's Sixth Report, p. xxiii.

[5] The Aptamīmāṃsā-viṣama-pada-tātparya-ṭīkā has been noticed in Peterson's Fourth Report, pp. 216–219, where we read

[illegible]

[illegible]

(Parīkṣā-mukham sūtikam [illegible] in Peterson's Fourth Report, p. 155.)

about that time.[1] Ananta vīrya must have lived before the 14th century, for he is mentioned by Madhvācārya in the chapter on Jaina darśana in the Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha.

Deva Sūri (1086-1169 A.D.)

89. Deva Sūri called Vādipravara or the foremost of disputants, belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was a pupil of Municandra Sūri. He was the author of the well known treatise on logic called Pramāṇa naya tattvālokālaṅkāra on which he himself wrote an elaborate commentary named Syādvāda ratnākara. He totally vanquished the Digambara Kumudacandrācārya in a dispute over the salvation of women at the court of Jayasiṃhadeva at Anahilapattana in N. Gujarat] and thereby practically stopped the entrance of the Digambaras into that town. The dispute took place in Saṃvat 1181 or 1124 A.D.

90. Ratnaprabha Sūri, a pupil of Deva Sūri, in his Upadeśamālā-ṭīkā[2] composed in Saṃvat 1236 or A.D. 1181 writes:—

"Lord Sri Deva Sūri, who was the foremost of the pupils of the reverend Municandra Sūri and who resided here in his pattā (sacred chair), conquered the Digambaras in the council room of

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[1] Vide the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, p. [illegible] and Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report on Sanskrit MSS. [illegible] 1883-84, p. 1[illegible].

[2] [illegible]

Mallādhar [illegible] Sūri [illegible] Syādvāda-ratnākarāvatārikā, p. [illegible].

[3] [illegible]

(Prabhāvaka-carita, XXI, [illegible]) quoted by Dr. Kielhorn in his article on "Religious Beliefs [illegible] Jainas" in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 254.)

[4] Ratnaprabha Sūri observes:—

[illegible]

(Upadeśamālāṭīkā noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, p. 167.)

King Jaya-simha-deva and raised a pillar of victory by maintaining the nirvana or salvation of women (that is, holding that even women are capable of attaining nirvana)."

91. In Samvat 1204 or 1147 A.D. Deva Suri founded a caitya, raised a bimba at Dhanavardhagrama and established an image of Neminatha at Arasana.[1] He was born in Samvat 1143 or 1086 A.D., attained the rank of Suri in 1174 Samvat or 1117 A.D., and ascended to heaven in Samvat 1226 or 1169 A.D.[2]

Subject of the Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra.

92. The Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra[3] consists of eight chapters (paricchedas), viz.:—

(1) Determination of the nature of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa-svarūpa-nirṇaya*), (2) determination of the

Mānatuṅga Sūri in his Gurvāvali composed in Samvat 1[illegible] gives a similar account:—

देवाद्रिमस्तकपुरप्रभृति सुराद्रिशीर्षा
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

nature of perception (*pratyakṣa-svarūpa-nirṇaya*); (3) determination of the nature of recollection, recognition, ratiocination and inference (*smaraṇa-pratyabhijñāna-tarkānumāna-svarūpa-nirṇaya*); (4) determination of the nature of valid knowledge derived from verbal testimony or scripture (*āgamaikhya-pramāṇa-svarūpa-nirṇaya*); (5) determination of the nature of objects of knowledge (*viṣaya-svarūpa-nirṇaya*); (6) determination of the consequences and sequences or fallacies of knowledge (*phala-pramāṇa-saṃkhyādābhāsa-nirṇaya*); (7) determination of the nature of complete knowledge (*saptabhaṅgī-svarūpa-nirṇaya*); and (8) determination of the right procedure of a disputant and his opponent (*vādi-prativādi-nyāya-nirṇaya*).

As this work is written on the same plan as Māṇikya Nandi's Parīkshāmukha-sūtra or Akalaṅka's Nyāyaviniścaya as well as Siddhasena's Dvātriṃśikā, I shall pass over the common points, mentioning only the special features.

Valid knowledge.

93. *Pramāṇa* or valid knowledge is defined here as the knowledge which ascertains the nature of itself and of other things. The intercourse between the sense-organs and the objects of sense is not *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge), for though it can ascertain the nature of objects outside itself, it cannot ascertain its own nature, since it has no [illegible]. *Pramāṇa* must certainly be *knowledge*, for it is capable of [illegible] what is [illegible] and rejecting what is undesirable. It must also be definite in character, for it prepares the competent person (*saṃvitti*). Superimposition is of three kinds: (1) inversion (*viparyaya*), such as to look upon a pearl oyster as a piece of silver; (2) doubt (*saṃśaya*), such as: is this a post or a man? and (3) uncertainty (*anadhyavasāya*), consisting in a mere cogitation in the mind as to what the thing might be.

Direct knowledge: Perception.

94. *Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) is of two kinds: (1) direct (*pratyakṣa*) perception, and (2) indirect (*parokṣa*). The direct knowledge or perception is of two kinds: practical (*saṃvyavahārika*) and transcendental (*pāramārthika*). The practical direct knowledge again is subdivided into that which arises through the sense-organs (*indriya-sākshāt-janya*) and that which does not arise through the sense-organs (*anindriyānindriyādhīna*), but through the mind (*manas*). Each of these passes through four stages, as: (1) *avagraha*, distinguishing the type whether it be *e.g.*, horse or man, but not discerning the characteristics,

The explanation of *avagraha* etc., as given here, is taken from Col. Jarrett's translation of the Ain-i-Akbari published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. III, p. [illegible], as the portion treated in *pramāṇa* in the Jaina

(2) *tha* inquiring *e.g.* whence came the man and from what country came the horse; (3) *tenga* arriving at a correct identification of the above; and (4) *dharanna* recollecting the thing particularised and keeping it in mind.

The transcendental direct knowledge (*pāramārthika*) is that which comes exclusively from the illumination of the soul and is probable to consumption. It is twofold: (1) *vikala* (defective) including *avadhi jñāna* (limited knowledge) i.e. knowledge of specific objects which near or remote are not differentiated and *manah paryāya* i.e. definite knowledge of another's thoughts and the laying bare of the secrets of the heart; and (2) *sakala* i.e., perfect which is the undistorted knowledge of the entire aspects of a thing. One who possesses this perfect transcendental knowledge is called an *arhat* i.e. one free from all faults or obstructions.

96. Indirect knowledge (*paroksa*) is of two kinds i.e. (1) recollection (*smarana*), (2) recognition (*pratyabhijñana*), (3) argumentation (*tarka*), (4) inference (*anumana*), (5) verbal testimony or the knowledge derived from the words of a reliable person or scripture (*āgama*).

Inference

96. Inference is of two kinds: (1) *svartha* for one's own self, and (2) *parartha* for the sake of others.

Inference

* *Hetu* (reason or the middle term) is defined as that which cannot be perceived in connection with the major term. The definition that the *hetu* (middle term) is that which possesses three characteristics is to be rejected as involving fallacies. Some mention the threefold characteristics or elements of the *hetu* (reason or middle term) but do not admit the necessity of using the latter term (*pakṣa*) in an

chapter of Vādidevasūri's well known text, the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra*. Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's edition of the text given on p. 93, footnote of his report on Sanskrit MSS., for 1883-84, however, different.

निश्चितान्यथानुपपन्नैकलक्षणो हेतुः न तु त्रिलक्षणादिः।
तस्य हेत्वाभासत्वादि वक्तव्यम् ॥ ११ ॥

(Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra, Chap. III.)

This is an attack on Dharmakirti and other Buddhist logicians who define the three characteristics of *hetu* as follows:

हेतुश्च पुनस्त्रिलक्षणः पक्षसत्त्वं सपक्षे सत्त्वं
असपक्षे च सत्त्वम्। तत्र पक्षे सत्त्वमेव निश्चितम्।

(Nyāyabindu, Chapter II.)

inference.[1] Again, according to others, as the connection or absence of connection between the middle and the major terms can be shown by internal inseparable connection (*antar-vyāpti*), the example forming the external inseparable connection (*bahir-vyāpti*) is useless.[2] For instance

> The hill (minor term) is fiery (major term), because it is smoky (middle term) as a kitchen (example).

Here the hill is an integral part of the inference, and in it may be found the necessary connection between fire and smoke. Why then should we burden our inference with an example from without? The kitchen certainly shows the same connection fire and smoke are found together there, but the kitchen is not an essential part of the inference, and so for the purpose in hand the connection which it proves may be described as the external inseparable connection. We must look to logical neatness and the economy of mental labour, since the mind is liable to be confused when the unessential is brought across its track.

97. The application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*) as parts of the syllogism are also useless, but these together with the example are to be employed to convince men of small intellect.[3]

Parts of a syllogism. Avayavas or parts of a syllogism are stated to be the following:

1. *Pakṣa-prayoga* (use of the minor term, otherwise called proposition *pratijñā*): the hill is fiery.
2. *Hetu-prayoga* (use of the middle term): because it is smoky.
3. *Dṛṣṭānta* (example): whatever is fiery is smoky, just as a kitchen.
4. *Upanaya* (application): this hill is smoky.
5. *Nigamana* (conclusion): therefore the hill is fiery.

98. Non-existence (*abhāva* or *anupalabdhi*) is subdivided as (1) antecedent (*prāgabhāva*), (2) non-existence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*), (3) mutual (*anyonyābhāva*), and (4) absolute (*atyantābhāva*). Various kinds of *ābhāsas* or fallacies are also enumerated. Under the verbal

[1] चिविधं साधनमभिधायैव तद्व्यतिरेकं विदधानः कः खलु न बालप्रयोगमुद्भावयति ॥ ३१ ॥
(Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra, Chap. III.)

[2] बाह्यव्याप्त्या हेतोः साध्यस्याभावे प्रमाणाभावो न च दृष्टान्तमन्तरेण बाह्यव्याप्तिः शक्या ॥ ३२ ॥
(Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra, Chap. III.)

[3] तच्चावयवमात्रं दृष्टान्तोपनयनिगमनान्यपि प्रयोज्यानि ॥ ३९ ॥
(Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra, Chap. III.)

testimony (i.e. *āpta*) as also under the method of one-sided interpretation (*naya*) there is given an elaborate exposition of the *Saptabhanganaya* (sevenfold paralogism). The mediate and immediate results of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) have been clearly laid down.

99. The results of knowledge and the practical use made of them are stated to be not unreal (*amṛita*) but real (*paramartha*).

100. Under *naya* (the method of comprehending a thing from one particular point of view) the fallacies of it (*nayābhāsa*) are also enumerated thus:—

Fallacies of Naya

(1) *Naigamābhāsa* (the fallacy of the *naigama*) *e.g.*, in estimating a soul we make a distinction between its existence (generic property) and its "consciousness" (specific property).

(2) *Saṃgrahābhāsa* (the fallacy of the collective) occurs when we call a thing real if it possesses the generic property alone, altogether losing sight of its specific properties, as when we say a bamboo (stick) is a tree as it is a tree, but it has no specific properties.

(3) *Vyavahārābhāsa* (the fallacy of the practical)—*e.g.*, the Carvaka philosophy which makes a wrong distinction of substance, quality, etc.

(4) *Ṛjusūtrābhāsa* (the fallacy of the straight) (expression) as the Bauddha philosophy which altogether denies the reality of things.

(5) *Śabdābhāsa* (the verbal fallacy) occurs when we recognise the distinction of times into past, present and future, but group all the long one and the same meaning word to all the three times *e.g.* if we now use the word "kriyā" (work) in the sense of "strength" which it signified a thousand years ago.

(6) *Samabhirūḍhābhāsa* (the fallacy of the subtle) occurs when we interpret synonymous words such as Indra, Sakra, Purandara, etc. signifying altogether different things.

(7) *Evambhūtābhāsa* (the fallacy of the such-like) occurs when a thing is called simply because it does not, at the moment, possess the properties implied by the name *e.g.* Rama is not a man (a thinking animal) because he is not at present thinking.

101. The soul (*ātma*) which is the doer and enjoyer and an embodiment of consciousness is of the same size as its body

In every person there is a separate soul which having got rid of the bondage of its *karma* (or fruits) attains eternal peace.

102. The last chapter expounds the method of debate.

Rules of Debate.

Discussion (*Vada*) consists in assertion and counter-assertion for the establishment of a certain proposition by rejecting its opposite. The disputant or the person who opens the discussion may be eager either to establish or to ascertain a truth. The truth may be sought either for one's own self as a disciple seeks it or for others as a teacher *seeks* it. The same remarks apply to the opponent or respondent. There are four constituents of a council of discussion, viz. (1) the disputant (*vadin*), (2) the opponent (*prativadin*), (3) the members (*sabhya*), and (4) the president (*sabhapati*). The duty of the disputant and his opponent consists in establishing his own side and opposing the other side by means of proof. The members must be acceptable to both the parties in respect of the skill in practice their dogmas; they must have a good memory, be very learned and possess genius, patience and impartiality. Their duties consist in stating the assertions and replies of the disputant and his opponent with reference to the particular subject of discussion, in estimating the merits and demerits of these arguments and counter-arguments, in not unduly interrupting them for setting forth suggestive hints and conclusions, and in as far as possible declaring the result of the discussion. The President must be endowed with wisdom, authority, forbearance and impartiality. His duty consists in judging the speeches of the parties and the members, able in preventing quarrels etc. among them. In the event of the parties being desirous of victory alone, they may continue the discussion with vigour as long as the members wish; but if they are eager to ascertain the truth alone, they may continue the discussion as long as the truth is not ascertained and so long as they retain their vigour.

HEMACANDRA SURI (1088-1172 A.D.)

103. Hemacandra Suri[1] (surnamed Kalikalasarvajña), born at Dhandhuka in Ahmedabad, was a pupil of Devacandra of the Vajrasakha. He was a contemporary of King Jaya Simha and is said to have been the preceptor of Mahārāja Kumāra Pāla of Gujarat about Samvat 1194-1229. He was the author of a large number of works such as Kavyanusasana with Chan-

[1] For details about Hemacandra see Buhler's Uebersicht des Jaina Mythus, Leben Hemacandra's, Peterson's Report, p. xl, and p. 82, and also Peterson's letter on the story of Hemacandra published in the *Bombay Gazette*, August 29, 1885.

donu-āmnāyavṛtti, Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi or Nāmamālā, Anekārtha-saṃgraha, Dvāśraya-mahā-kāvya, Triṣaṣṭi-śalākāpuruṣa-caritra (a part of which is called Mahāvīra-caritra and the appendix called Pariśiṣṭaparva), Yoga-śāstra, Nighaṇṭuśeṣa, etc.

104. He was also the author of a most important work on logic called Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā,[1] on which he himself wrote a commentary. This work, which is divided into five chapters, is written in the *Sūtra* or aphoristic style and not in the form of a *prakaraṇa* (commentary).

105. He was a spiritual brother of Pradyumna Sūri[2] was born in Saṃvat 1145 or 1088 A.D., took the vow (*vrata*) in 1150 Saṃvat or 1093 A.D., attained the rank of Sūri in 1166 Saṃvat or 1109 A.D., and ascended to heaven (died) in 1229 Saṃvat or 1172 A.D.[3]

Candraprabha Sūri (1102 A.D.).

106. Candraprabha Sūri, born in Gujarat, who founded the Pūrṇimāgacchha[4] in Saṃvat 1159 or 1102 A.D., was a pupil of

[1] A manuscript of the commentary was with the commentary by the author himself has been noticed in Peterson's Report on Sanskrit MSS., pp. 147-148. In a copy of the Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā was written in the form of a commentary. It accordingly the first chapter of the commentary says:—

[illegible]

(Quoted in Peterson's 5th Report, p. 148.)

[illegible]

(Cf. Hemacandra's commentary on [illegible], a manuscript of which is noticed in Peterson's [illegible] Report, p. [illegible])

[illegible]

(Prabhāvaka-cc., XXII, v. 851 seqq., quoted by Klatt in Ind. Ant., Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 254.)

[4] For the origin of the Pūrṇimāgacchha see Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report, 1883-84, p. 147.

Jayasimha Sūri and preceptor of Dharmaghosa. He was the author of Darsana-suddhi otherwise called Samyaktva prakarana, and possibly also of the two brief treatises called the Pramoyaratnakosa and Nyāyāvatāra vivṛti.[1] He was a great logician, and in debate appeared as a lion before the opponents who resembled elephants.[2]

107. The Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti is an excellent commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara. In it mention is made of the Buddhist logicians Dharmottara, Arcata[3] and others, and there is also a criticism of the views of Sangata, Naiyāyika, Mīmāmsaka, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Cārvāka, Bauddha, Saugata, Kapālika, Akṣapāda, Prābhākara-vādi, etc.

NEMICANDRA KAVI (ABOUT 1150 A.D.)

108. Nemicandra, born in Guzerat, who combatted the views of the Hindu philosopher Kaṇāda, was a great teacher of

[1] For Candraprabha Sūri see ... Peterson's 4th Report, p. xxxv.

[2] The manuscript of Nyāyāvatāra vivṛti, which I consulted, was obtained from Bhavanagar by ... through Muni Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya. In the Nyāyāvatāra vivṛti itself there is no mention of Candraprabha Sūri. Elsewhere I have seen it stated that it was the work of that author. The authorship must, however, for the present remain an open question. In the colophon of the Nyāyāvatāra vivṛti it is stated that it was the work of Siddhasena Divākara vyākhyānaka or simply Siddha-vyākhyānaka, which was evidently a surname. Munis Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya relying on the line [illegible] (quoted from Ratnaprabha Sūri's Upadeśamālā vivaraṇa) in Peterson's 3rd Report, p. 158, are inclined to identify Siddha vyākhyānaka with Siddharṣi who lived in Samvat 962 or 964 A.D. (as is evident from Peterson's 4th Report, p. xxxix). There is another commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra by Haribhadra Sūri. For Darśana-suddhi, vide Peterson 3, App. p. 91; for Pramoyaratnakosa, vide the Jaināgama List, published in Bombay, p. 77; and for the Nyāyāvatāra vivṛti vide Peterson 3, p. xvi.

[illegible]

(Dasavaikālika-ṭīkā by Dhanaśekhara, quoted in Peterson's 5th Report, p. 66.)

[3] [illegible]

(Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti, on verse 1.)

logic.[1] He was a pupil of Vairasvami and preceptor of Sagarendu (Sāgaracandra) Muni, as is mentioned by Mankyacandra, Sagarendu Muni's pupil in his Pārśvanātha-caritra written in Samvat 1276 or 1219 A.D. As Mankyacandra flourished about 1219 A.D., his preceptor's preceptor Nemicandra[2] must have lived about 1150 A.D. Nemicandra was styled a *Kavi*.[3]

ĀNANDA SÛRI AND AMARACANDRA SÛRI NICKNAMED TIGER-CUB AND LION-CUB (1093-1150 A.D.).

109. These two, born in Gujerat, were great logicians who, even in their boyhood having overcome their elephant-like opponents in dispute, were nicknamed respectively, *Vyāghra-śiśuka* (Tiger-cub) and *Siṃha-śiśuka* (Lion-cub).[4] They[5] were the twin pupils and successors of Municandra Sūri in the Nāgendra-gaccha and were succeeded by Haribhadra Sūri. As Siddharāja from whom they received their nicknames ascended the throne in Samvat 1150 or 1093 A.D., they must have flourished at the beginning of the 12th century A.D. It is probably these two

[1] [illegible]

(Pārśvanātha-caritra noticed in Peterson 3, p. [illegible])

The same verse is quoted almost verbatim in the Kavya-prakāśa-saṃketa by Mankyacandra Sūri, noticed in Peterson 3, p. 121.

[2] For Nemicandra see [illegible] Peterson 4, p. [illegible].

[3] See Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report 1883-84, p. 122.

[4] Udayaprabha Sūri, who was the successor of Haribhadra Sūri through Vijayasena Sūri, in his Dharmābhyudaya-mahākāvya, noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, pp. 18-19, says:

[illegible]

[5] For further particulars of Ānanda Sūri and Amaracandra Sūri see Peterson 4, p. vii.

logicians who are referred to by the Hindu logician Gangeśa Upādhyāya in his Tattvacintāmaṇi and a *Sādhāraṇa vyāpti lakṣaṇa* of Vyāpti.

HARIBHADRA SŪRI (ABOUT 1168 A.D.)

110. We find mention of at least two Śvetāmbara Jaina authors bearing the name Haribhadra Sūri. One died in Samvat 535 or 478 A.D., while the other, who was a pupil of Ānanda Sūri and Amaracandra Sūri of the Nāgendragaccha, lived about Samvat 1225 or 1168 A.D.[1]. It is this second Haribhadra Sūri who was called "Kalikāla Gautama"[2]. He must have been an eminent logician if we suppose him to be the author[3] of the Saḍdarśana samuccaya, the Daśavaikālika niryukti ṭīkā, the Nyāya praveśaka sūtra and the Nyāyāvatāra vṛtti. There are

[1] पंचसय पचसीए विक्कमकालाओ झत्ति चत्थिवो।
चरिमहरुहरिसूरी सिद्धो दिवंमि सिवसुक्खं ॥ १०० ॥

(Gaṇadharasārdhaśatakaprakaraṇa [illegible] to Gaṇadhara are extracted in Peterson 3, p. 284.)

[2] Introduction to Haribhadra's Saṭṭīkasamarāiccakahā, pp. 24-25; see Peterson 4, pp. cxxxix, cxl.

[3] विद्वाञ्जयविजयिविश्वहृदयो भोजप्रसन्नमिलयो
यद् भोजरिमहरुहरिस्वकरिविचारपदः।
जन्मा सूत्रमनाचयोरतिचिरात्सिद्धिप्रसिद्धाजन
यत्तुद्दे कलिकालगौतम इति ख्यातिर्विशेषं मुनेः ॥ ५ ॥

(Dharmabhūṣaṇa's Nyāyadīpikā by Uttaraprabhāsūri, cited in Peterson 4, Appendix I, p. 18.)

[4] In the concluding lines of the Daśavaikālika-niryukti ṭīkā it is stated that the author of that work was an Haribhadra Sūri who was a *Dharma putra* of Jinadatta. A minute description of Haribhadra, the author of Saḍdarśana samuccaya, is found in the opening sentences of Guṇaratna's commentary on that work, dated about 1400 A.D. The Caturvimśati prabandha by Rājaśekhara Sūri composed in Samvat 1405 = 1348 A.D. makes a like reference to Haribhadra, the author of Nyāyāvatāra vṛtti. Now the *dharma putra* of Jinadatta is generally held to be a surname of the first Haribhadra Sūri who was a pre-Hemacandra and Jaramalaguru, as is evident from Prabhācandra Sūri's Prabhāvaka caritra dated about 1277 A.D.

In the Gacchotpatti prakaraṇa, Gāthā sāhasrī, Vicāra sāra prakaraṇa, Vicārāmṛta saṃgraha, Upakeśagacchapaṭṭāvalī, Kharataragacchīya paṭṭāvalī, etc., Haribhadra Sūri I is stated to have flourished in Samvat 535 or 478 A.D.

Now the Nyāyāvatāra which is alleged to have been commented on by Haribhadra Sūri I was itself composed about 513 A.D. (that is, after 478 A.D.), and Dharmakīrti whose logical doctrines have been referred to in the Saḍdarśana samuccaya lived about 650 A.D. These facts prove that Haribhadra, the author of Nyāyāvatāra vṛtti and Saḍdarśana samuccaya lived after 650 A.D.

strong grounds for supposing that the Saddarśana-samuccaya was not the work of the first Haribhadra Sūri, as it refers in the chapter on the Bauddha-darśana to the views of such authors as Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and others who flourished long after the 5th century A.D. The six systems (saddarśana) treated by him are (1) Bauddha, (2) Naiyāyika, (3) Sāṃkhya, (4) Jaina, (5) Vaiśeṣika and (6) Jaimīnīya.

III. Haribhadra Sūri is often described as having protested the word of the Arhats like a mother by his 1,400 works. He is said to have used the word *viraha* (separation or sorrow) as his mark in the last verse of each of his works. He was by birth a Brāhmaṇa and was chaplain to king Jitāri whose capital was

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Dr. Jacobi in his letter dated the 21st October 1907, writes to me that "Hemacandra's Saddarśana-samuccaya which is allotted to by Sōmatilaka was written in A.D.

Regarding the last Saddarśana-samuccaya he observes: "There are two commentaries on it by the first Haribhadra, whose date I believe with Prof. Leumann to be some time within the 8th century A.D. The Vaiśeṣika chapter was commented on 3.9 A.D."

According to Dr. Jacobi the two Saddarśana-samuccayas, were written by the first Haribhadra Sūri who lived in the Gupta Samvat or 804 A.D.

Dr. Jacobi's theory explains many of our difficulties, yet it is far from being conclusive as the Jaina authors very seldom used the Gupta era. Moreover, Hemacandra's Anyayogavyavacchedadvātriṃśikā and Vītarāgastotra do not refer to such a great [illegible] philosophy as the Saddarśana-samuccaya. It is not clear as the 8th century contains A.D. [illegible] Haribhadra Sūri II was the author of the Saddarśana-samuccaya. Nyāyāvatāra-vārtika etc. which the Saddarśana-samuccaya and other treatises cite to the works of the first Haribhadra Sūri.

But I must confess that the reasons from Jaina sources such as Muni Dharmasāgara and Vādi Devasūri are very [illegible] authority of all these works was the first Haribhadra Sūri who, according to them, flourished in 535 Vikrama Samvat, or 478 A.D.

> प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तं तच्च भाषितम् ।
> विकल्पाश्रिता चिन्तेयं अनुमानसंज्ञितम् ॥
>
> (Saddarśana-samuccaya, chapter on Bauddha-darśana, p. 46 edited by Dr. Suali).

The verse refers without doubt to the definitions of *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna* given by Dharmakīrti who lived about 600 A.D.

[illegible] his Tattva-[illegible] in the Ind. Ant., Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 241 [illegible] p. 63. Also

> छोमि चाचरिअं मं वेआवेइ अमेव चमरा ।
> चतुरत्थकरचलणाणाणुगत माहवम् ॥ १९ ॥

Anuyogavārtika by Mahābala Sūri edited in Pt. [illegible] p. 31.

Chittore near the Citrakūta hill. He was instructed in the Jaina doctrine by Jinabhata. Two of his pupils, named Haṁsa and Paramahaṁsa, are said to have left him as missionaries of the Jaina faith and to have been slain in the Bhota country (Tibet) by the fanatical Buddhists whom they sought to convert. The sorrow caused by the death of these two pupils is said to have been symbolised in the word *viraha*.

112. It is generally supposed that Haribhadra Sūri, whose pupils were killed in Tibet, was the first author of that name. But there will be no inconsistency if we suppose him to be the second Haribhadra Sūri, for the religious intercourse between India and Tibet was more frequent in the 12th century A.D. than in the 5th century, when Tibet had scarcely emerged into the ken of history.

RATNAPRABHA SŪRI (1181 A.D.).

113. Ratnaprabha Sūri, who belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect, was a logician of repute, being the author of a light commentary (*laghu-ṭīkā*) on the Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra called **Syādvāda-ratnāvatārikā**[3] in which are quoted the views of the Buddhist logicians Arcaṭa (q. v.) and Dharmottara (q. v.).

114. While in Broach at the Aśvāvabodhatīrtha in Saṁvat 1238 or 1181 A.D. he wrote another work called Upadeśamālā-vṛtti[4] to please Bhadreśvara Sūri and in payment of the debt he owed to Vijayasena Sūri, the brother of Bhadreśvara. There he gives his spiritual descent in the Vaṁśavṛkṣa as follows: (1) Muṇicandra Sūri, (2) Deva Sūri, (3) Bhadreśvara Sūri and (4) **Ratnaprabha Sūri.**[4]

[3] *Vide* Introduction to Saddarśanasamuccaya published in the Chowkhamba series, Benares.

[4] (Syādvāda-ratnāvatārikā: Mun Dharmavijaya's MSS., p. 99). A part of the Syādvādaratnāvatārikā has been printed and published in the Benares Jaina Yaśovijaya series.

(Upadeśamālā-vṛtti, noticed in Peterson 5, p. 124).

[4] For other particulars of Ratnaprabha Sūri, *vide* Peterson 4, p. [illegible]. Compare also Weber II, p. 922, note.

MALLIṢEṆA SŪRI (1292 A.D.).

115 He belonged to the Nagendra Gaccha of the Śvetāmbara sect, and was the author of the Syādvādamañjarī, a commentary on Hemacandra's Vītarāgastuti or Dvātriṁśikā. The Syādvādamañjarī contains an exposition of the *Pramāṇa*, *Saptabhaṅgīnaya*, etc., and criticises Akṣapāda's theories of *Pramāṇa*, *Jāti*, *Jalpa*, *Nigrahasthāna*, etc. The doctrines of the Sāṁkhya, Aulūkya, Jaiminīya, Bhāṭṭapāda, Vedānta, Yogācāra, Madhyamika, Cārvāka, etc., have also been his favourite subjects of attack. At the close of his work Malliṣeṇa describes himself as a pupil of Udayaprabha Sūri and as having composed the work in Śaka 1214 or A.D. 1292.[1]

RĀJAŚEKHARA SŪRI (1348 A.D.).

116 Rājaśekhara Sūri or Mallādhari Śrī Rājaśekhara Sūri, belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was the author of the Ratnāvatārikā-pañjikā,[2] a sub-commentary on the Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṁkāra, as also of two other works called Syādvāda kalikā and Caturvimśatiprabandha.[3] He is also the author of a Pañjikā (commentary) on the Nyāyakandalī of the Hindu philosopher Śrīdhara. He studied the Nyāyakandalī under teacher Jinaprabha,[4] and is said to have lived in Samvat 1405 or 1348 A.D.[5]

JÑĀNA CANDRA (1350 A.D.).

117 He belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was the author of a gloss on the Ratnāvatārikā called the Ratnāvatārikā tippaṇa, which discusses many abstruse points of logic and criticises the

[1] चोमक्षिपेक्षुरिभिरक्षारि मन्दहसनमहिमनधिभिः ।
इभिरिव मनुरभिमिनमनाम्र द्वाविंशतिं जनो ॥ १ ॥

(Syādvādamañjarī, p. 220, printed in the Benares Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, and edited by Dāmodara Lal Gosvāmī.)

[2] A part of the Ratnāvatārikā-pañjikā has been printed and published in the Benares Jaina Yaśovijaya series.

[3] This work has been published by Hira Lal Hansarāja at Jāmnagara in Kathiwar.

[4] चोमक्षिमन्दमतिमोदधिमत्र व्याचक्षदन्यो विदिन् ।
नक्षा निर्वसिनक्षमं करवै मदरीपक्षारावे ॥

(Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara with the Pañjikā of Rājaśekhara noticed in Peterson 3, p. 273; cf. also Peterson 3, pp. 28-29.)

[5] *Vide* Weber II, p. 1207.

views of Dignāga [illegible] He composed this work[1] under orders from his [illegible] who flourished in 1348 A.D. [illegible] approximately be fixed at about 1350 A.D.

GUNARATNA (1409 A.D.).

118. Guṇaratna [illegible] the Svetāmbara sect and was the [illegible] of a commentary on the Saddarśana samuccaya [illegible] Saddarśana samuccaya vṛtti or Tarka rahasya dīpikā [illegible] Nyāya [illegible] along with other systems [illegible] He also wrote the Krīyā-tantra [illegible]

119. He is mentioned by Ratna-śekhara Sūri in the Śrāddha pratikramaṇa sūtra vṛtti [illegible] in Samvat 1496 or A.D. 1430.[2] In that work Guṇaratna is mentioned as a pupil

तेषामन्वयोद्भविष्णवः पञ्चाः सामान्यगोचराः ।
[illegible] ॥
[illegible] दिवाकरेण
[illegible] ... [illegible] ॥

Uṇṇacandra's Ratnāvatārikā [illegible] p. 7 published in [illegible] of Jaina [illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] Mss. [illegible] by Muni Dharmavijaya [illegible] of this work has been printed and published in the [illegible] series.

A Saddarśana [illegible] edited by Dr. Suali [illegible] has been published by the [illegible] Mehta Jaina [illegible] It has been published [illegible]

[2] The Śrāddha [illegible] Ratna-śekhara Sūri, has been noticed in [illegible] pp. 20-22, where the following lines are quoted:

विद्यातिलकशेखाख्या जगति जातबन्धुरपाश्रुवन् ।
[illegible] ॥ १ ॥
यश्च तेषां विद्याशेखाख्या ज्ञानसागरो मुनिः । २ ॥
कुलमण्डना दिनोदा [illegible] ॥ २ ॥

of Devasundara who attained the vaidika pattam of Sūri at Anahillapattana in Samvat 1420 or A.D. 1364. Guṇaratna must therefore have lived between A.D. 1364 and A.D. 1449. Devasundara Sūri, the guru of Guṇaratna, was a contemporary of Munisundara Sūri, the author of the Upadeśaśataka, composed in Samvat 1400 or A.D. 1344. Guṇaratna himself says that his Kriyārucikośa was composed in Samvat 1466 or A.D. 1409.

120. Guṇaratna in his elaborate commentary (Ṭīkā) on the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya quotes Haribhadra, Dharmottarācārya, Arcaṭa, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākara, Kamalaśīla, Diṅnāga and other Buddhist authors as well as Jayoddyota, Hetubindu, Anekāntajayapatākā, Tattvasaṃgraha, Nyāyabindu, Nyāyapraveśaka, and other Buddhist works on logic, etc. Mention has also been made in the chapter on the Nyāya of such Hindu authors as Vācaspati, Udayana, Śrīkaṇṭha, Abhinavagupta, Jayanta, and of some works like Nyāyasūtra, Nyāyavārtika, Nyāyavārtikaṭīkā, Nyāyakalikā, Nyāyatātparyaṭīkā, Nyāyaṭīkā, Nyāyaṭīkāṭīkā, etc. The Nyāyaṭīkā (Nyāyaṭīkāṭīkā) and the Nyāyaṭīkāṭīkā are mentioned in the Nyāyakalikā, Nyāyakośa, etc. (see above) are mentioned.

षड्दर्शनसमुच्चिचारक्रमसमयविचारनिपुणकृतः ।
यथा बाहुमुकथा प्रमादतो ऽत्र षड्दुनिर्मिते ।
वीरशेखरमविकृतिमिमामकृत कृतिनुदे ॥ १

1. *Vide* Dr. Klatt on the Jaina [illegible] in the Ind. Ant., Vol. XI, [illegible] 1882, p. [illegible] and Weber II, p. 884, and Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report 1883-84, p. [illegible]

2. एवरसमुनिसमयं १४६६ मुनिसुन्दरसूरिणा कृता पूर्वम्
अथ वीरमयाख्यां मुनिसोम उपाधिभाः ॥ ८९

(Colophon of Jinavijaya's granthaprasaṣṭi, p. [illegible])

काले वसुरसपूर्वे १४६६ वसुरसमिते चाविकलमाकाङ्क्षे
मुनिदेवसूरिसूरेः पदा मान्यापकारं परम् ।
एवं मानुषरसमुनिरसलाभ प्रज्ञाविशालाभ्यमे
निष्कलुषकलिप्रमालजलनं क्रोधस्य बोधैः ॥ ९ ॥

(Colophon of Jinavijaya's granthaprasaṣṭi, p. 309).

DHARMA-BHŪṢAṆA (ABOUT 1600 A.D.)

121. A Digambara author who wrote the **Nyāya-dīpikā** about 300 years ago. He has been mentioned in the Tarkabhāṣā[1] by Yaśovijaya Gaṇi.[2]

122. The Nyāya-dīpikā begins with a salutation[3] to Arhat Vardhamāna. It is divided into three chapters (*Prakāśa*, viz., (1) general characteristics of valid knowledge *pramāṇa-sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, (2) perception, *pratyakṣa* and (3) indirect knowledge *parokṣa* including recollection, *smṛti*, recognition *pratyabhijñāna*, argumentation *tarka*, inference *anumāna*, tradition, *āgama*, and the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints, *naya*.

123. The technical terms of logic have been defined and minutely examined and the views of other logicians, specially of the Buddhists, have been severely criticised. There are references to Sugata, Saugata, Bauddha, Tathāgata, Mīmāṁsaka, Yauga, Naiyāyika, Bhaṭṭa, Prābhākara, Dignāga, Siṁhanta Bhadra, Akalaṅka Deva, Sāṅkhā, Nātha, Jaimini, Syādvāda-vidyāpati, Mārkya Nandi Bhaṭṭāraka, Kumāra Nandi Bhaṭṭāraka, Udayana and others. The following works are also mentioned: Pramāṇa-kalpa, Mārtaṇḍa, Rājavārtika, Ślokavārtika, Ślokavārtika-bhāṣya, Tattvārtha-sūtra, Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika, Āptamīmāṁsā-vivaraṇa, Nyāyavinścaya, Pramāṇa-nirṇaya, Pramāṇa-parīkṣā, Parīkṣā-mukha, Nyāyabindu, etc.

YAŚOVIJAYA GAṆI (1680 A.D.).

124. Yaśovijaya[4] belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was the famous author of **Nyāya-pradīpa**, **Tarkabhāṣā**, **Nyāya-rahasya**, **Nyāyāmṛta-taraṅgiṇī**, **Nyāya-khaṇḍa-khādya**, **Anekānta-Jaina-mata-vyavasthā**, **Jñānabindu-prakaraṇa**, etc. He also wrote a commentary on the Digambara work Aṣṭasahasrī

[1] This work has been printed in Kolhāpura.

[2] एवं च सामान्यविशेषात्मक सकल पदार्थ सर्वज्ञप्रणीत सत्य तत्र विद्याप्रमाणयोर्मध्ये प्रमाणयोर्मध्ये प्रमाणयोर्मध्ये ।

Yaśovijaya's Tarkabhāṣā, leaf 10, MSS. lent to me by Muni Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya.

[3] श्रीवर्द्धमानमर्हन्तं नत्वा वाक्सत्यवृत्तये
विरच्यते जिनेन्द्रस्य न्यायदीपिकाख्यदीपिका ॥ १ ॥

(Nyāyadīpikā, chap. I).

[4] For other particulars about Yaśovijaya see Peterson 6, p. xiv. For his works see the Jaināgama list published in Bombay.

called **Aṣṭasahasrī vṛtti**. The Tarkabhāṣā begins with a salutation to Jina.[1] It consists of three chapters, *viz.* (1) Valid knowledge, *pramāṇa*, (2) Knowledge from particular standpoints, *naya* and (3) Imposition, *nikṣepa*. He occasionally discusses *vyāptigraha*, or the means of establishing the universal connection between the middle term and the major term.

123. He is descended from Hiravijaya, the well known Sūri of Akbar's time (no. 58 of the Lagaccha-paṭṭāvalī). He ascended heaven in Saṃvat 1745 or A.D. 1688 at Dabhoi in modern Baroda State. To perpetuate his memory there has been established at Benares a college called Jaina Yaśovijaya-pāṭhaśālā under the auspices of which the sacred Jaina works are being published in a series called Jaina Yaśovijaya-granthamālā.

[1] वेदुहन्दवनं नत्वा जिनं नत्वार्थदेशिनम्
वक्ष्यामि नयनिक्षेपैस्तर्कभाषां नयीमिमाम्
(Tarkabhāṣā, Chap. I).

BOOK II.

The Buddhist Logic.

CHAPTER I.

THE OLD BUDDHIST REFERENCES TO LOGIC.

Buddha Gautama (623 B.C.—543 B.C.)

1. The Buddhists maintain that their religion is eternal. It was taught at different cycles by so-called Buddhas, the Enlightened Ones or Tathāgatas, those who have realised the truth. In the present cycle, called *Bhadra-kalpa* (the very blessed cycle), four Buddhas are said to have already appeared, viz. Krakucchanda, Kanaka Muni, Kāśyapa and Gautama, while the fifth, viz. Maitreya, is yet to be born.

2. Of the past Buddhas the last, viz. Buddha Gautama, otherwise called Śākya Muni, was born at Kapilavastu (modern Nigliva in the Nepal Terai) in 623 B.C., and attained *nirvāṇa* at Kusinagara (modern Kasia, near Gorakhpur) in 543 B.C.[2] He passed almost his whole life in Magadha (modern Behar). He is regarded by modern scholars as the real founder of Buddhism, while his predecessors are considered as purely mythical.

Origin of the Pāli Buddhist Literature (543 B.C.—70 B.C.)

3. Buddha Gautama is said to have delivered his teachings in the Magadhi or Pāli language. On his death these teachings were rehearsed by the Buddhist monks in three councils, held

[1] Cf. Hardy's Manual of Buddhism, second edition, pp. 88—91.

[2] The exact date of Buddha's death is known. The date given here is according to the Mahāvaṁsa, a Pāli chronicle of Ceylon. The date of Buddha's birth is given by Professor [illegible] between 470—480 B.C. Cf. Dr. Fleet's article "On the Dates of Buddha's Death," in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, January, 1904.

[3] For an account of the first and second councils, cf. Vinaya Piṭaka, Culla Vagga, 11th and 12th Khandhakas, translated by Rhys Davids and

at Rajagrha, Vaiśali and Pāṭaliputra under the patronage of kings Ajātaśatru, Kālāśoka and Aśoka in the year 543 B.C., 443 B.C. and 255 B.C. respectively. The texts of the teachings as discussed and settled in these councils form the sacred scripture of the Buddhists. This scripture is called in Pali *Tripiṭaka* or *Piṭakattaya* and in Sanskrit *Tripiṭaka* or *Piṭakatraya* which signifies "Three Baskets." It consists of the Sermon Basket (Sutta Piṭaka), Discipline Basket (Vinaya Piṭaka) and the Metaphysical Basket (Abhidhamma Piṭaka) each of which embodies a large number of distinct works.

4. The monks assembled in the First Council, that is in the Council of Rājagṛha in 543 B.C., were called (1) Theras and the scripture compiled by them was called Therāvāda. Subsequently ten thousand monks of Vaiśālī having violated certain rules of the Therāvāda were, by the decision of the Second Council in 443 B.C., expelled from the community of the Theras. These excluded priests were called (2) Mahāsaṃghikas who were the first heretical sect of the Buddhists. They made certain additions and alterations to the Therāvāda. Afterwards within two hundred years from the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha 14 other heretical sects arose, viz. (3) Gokulika, (4) Ekabbohārika, (5) Pannatti, (6) Bahulika, (7) Cetiya, (8) Sabbatthi, (9) Dhammagutika, (10) Kassapiya, (11) Sankantika, (12) Sutta, (13) Hubbavata, (14) Rajagiriya, (15) Siddhatthika, (16) Pubbaseliya, (17) Aparaseliya and (18) Vajiriya.

5. Just at the close of the Third Council about 255 B.C., the teachings of Buddha as enunciated by the Theras in the form of the *Tripiṭaka* were carried[5] by Mahinda, son of Emperor Aśoka, to the island of Ceylon where they were perpetuated by priests in oral tradition. They are said to have been committed to writing[6] for the first time in Ceylon in the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇī during 104-76 B.C. Besides the *Tripiṭaka* there

Oldenberg, S.B.E. series, vol. XX, pp. 380-385. For an account of the third [illegible] as one of the first and second [illegible] Wassiljew's translation of the Mahāvaṃsa, chapter V, pp. 2[illegible] [illegible] III and IV. [illegible] and of Ch[illegible] [illegible] 15th Mahāvaṃsa. The date of the 3rd Council [illegible] with its form to searches. Aśoka ascended [illegible] (see Vincent A. Smith's Aśoka, p. 63), [illegible] that the third Council took place [illegible] Wassiljew's Mahāvaṃsa, p. 25.

[illegible] of these [illegible] Mahāvaṃsa, p. [illegible], chapter V, p. [illegible], and Dr. R[illegible] of the [illegible] of the Rāja Vasat [illegible] 1882, pp. [illegible].

Vide the Mahāvaṃsa, chapter XII.

6. *Vide* the Mahāvaṃsa, [illegible] XXXIII. Cf. the Dr. Alwis's Lecture on the Pali Language to the [illegible] the Pali Text Society, London 1883, p. 42.

were numerous other works written in Pali which have immensely added to the bulk of the Pali literature.

Logic touched on in the Pali Literature.

6. In the *Tipiṭaka* — nay in the whole Pali literature — there is not a single treatise on Logic. This is not at all a matter of surprise, for according to the Pali works our knowledge (called in Pali *Ñāṇa*[1] and in Sanskrit *Jñāna*) has arisen from *Avijjā* or cosmic blindness and is therefore a mere illusion. Such being the character of our knowledge it can not form the subject-matter of Logic, the sole function of which consists in laying down criteria for determining real or valid knowledge.

7. The only topic bearing upon Logic which has been touched on in the Pali works is the division of knowledge into six kinds. In the Tipiṭaka[2] knowledge (*Ñāṇa*) has been classified as (1) ocular (*cakkhu-viññāṇam*), (2) auditory (*sota-viññāṇam*), (3) olfactory (*ghāna-viññāṇam*), (4) gustatory (*jivhā-viññāṇam*), (5) tactual (*kāya-viññāṇam*) and (6) mental (*mano-viññāṇam*). But this classification has not been carried far enough to lay the foundation of a Logic that deserved the name of science.

8. In the Tipiṭaka there are however occasional references to a class of men who were called *Takki* in Sanskrit *Tarkin* or *Tarkika* (in Sanskrit *Tarkika*) — that is, those versed in reasoning. It is not known whether these men were Buddhists, Jainas or Brahmanas; perhaps they were recruited from all communities. They were not logicians in the proper sense of the term but they appear to me to have been sophists who indulged in quibble and casuistry.

The Brahma-jāla-sutta (543 B.C. — 255 B.C.)

9. In the Brahma-jāla-sutta which forms a part of the Dīgha Nikāya of the Sutta Piṭaka and was rehearsed in the three Buddhist Councils during 543 B.C. — 255 B.C.[3] mention

[1] Jñāna — connected in origin with the root jñā — the root jñā is the root of the word *Prajñā* — wisdom. Prajñā — Mahāyāna Text — Khotanese, translated by Rhys Davids and Oldenberg, S.B.E. series, vol. III, p. 73.

[2] In the Aṅguttara Nikāya III. 61. 8, edited by Dr. Morris in the Pāli Text Society series, Dhammasangaṇī and compare Farcehola IV. of the Vibhaṅga in which Jñāna not included in the Tipiṭaka, as up the Tipiṭaka of the Abhidharma Piṭaka.

[3] Jñāna is translated as knowledge or consciousness, such as *cakkhu-viññāṇa* (ocular knowledge or eye-consciousness).

[4] Hofrath Dr. Bühler, in the last work he published, expressed the

is made of these Sramanas and Brahmanas who were *Takkis* and *Vimamsis* and indulged in *Takka* and *Vimamsa*. Buddha speaks of them thus :—

"In this case brethren some recluses and Brahmans addicted to *logic* sophistry and *enquiry*, by guess work and according to the fancy of their own brain cast forth as an *argument* these and based on by *sophistry* the soul and the world arose without a cause."[1]

This passage refers, in my opinion, to a sophist rather than to a teacher of Logic.

The Udana (543 B.C.—255 B.C.)

10. Again in the Udana, which is a little later than the Khuddaka Nikaya of the Sutta Pitaka and is supposed to have been released in the three Buddhist Councils during 544 B.C.—255 B.C., we read :—

"As long as the perfect Buddhas do not appear the *Takkiks* sophists are regarded as the Saints in the world and sages but when they appear they are regarded as miserable."

This passage leaves no doubt that the *Takkiks* were sophists.

The Kathâvatthuppakarana (after 255 B.C.)

11. The Kathâvatthuppakarana, a work of the Abhidhammapitaka composed by Moggaliputta Tissa at the Third Buddhist

opinion that these Sutras are not less than the Pali are good evidence [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] B.C. [illegible] Preface to the Dialogues of the Buddha p. [illegible]

[1] The Brahmajala Sutta [illegible] Dialogues of the Buddha translated by Rhys Davids [illegible] p. [illegible]

Dr. Rhys Davids translates [illegible] "addicted to [illegible] and [illegible]" [illegible] may also be rendered as [illegible]

The original [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Pali Text Society series London.

[illegible] Council during the reign of Asoka about 245 B.C.,[1] mentions *pātimokha* in Sanskrit *prātimokṣa* [illegible] *uposatha* in Sanskrit *upavasatha* [illegible] *nagaha* in Sanskrit *nagara* [illegible] which are the technical terms of [illegible] Mahinda's [illegible] has not made any actual [illegible] to [illegible] yet [illegible] If the technical terms were [illegible] that that [illegible] in some shape existed in [illegible] about 250 B.C.

The Milinda pañha and the Bhikṣu sūtra (about 100 A.D.).

12. The only Pali work in which there is a direct reference to Jainism called Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta is the Milinda pañha, otherwise known as the Bhikṣu-sūtra, which was composed about 100 A.D.* It was translated into Chinese during the Eastern Tsin dynasty (A.D. 317–420).* It is one of the Buddhist books it is designated as Nāgasena's Bhikṣu-sūtra. This work contains questions and answers between King Menander of Bactria and a priest of Buddha Nāgasena. Nāgasena, or rather the author of the Milinda, who was versed in Jainism, Nāṭa or Nāgaputra is thus described :—

[illegible] Vincent A. Smith's [illegible] pp. [illegible]

* *Nāgaṇṭha* [illegible] the [illegible] *nāgaṇṭha* [illegible] a quotation [illegible]

[illegible] 5, actually lent to me by Anagārika H. Dharmapāla).

[illegible] (Dr. [illegible] Text Society of London, p. 13).

It [illegible] speaks [illegible] that Moggaliputta [illegible] known by those doctrines—B[illegible] date *vide* Rhys [illegible] Quest[illegible] in the S. B. E. series, vol. xxxv.

* [illegible] Nāgaṇṭha [illegible] Nāṭaputta [illegible]

[illegible] were the arts and sciences he knew: holy tradition and secular law, the Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems of philosophy, arithmetic, music, medicine, the four Vedas, the Purāṇas, the Itihāsas, astronomy, magic, conjuration and spells, the art of war, poetry, conveyancing, [illegible] and the world generally.

As a disputant he was [illegible] and to equal, [illegible] and to overcome, the acknowledged superior of all the teachers of the various schools of thought. [illegible] in wisdom [illegible] and valour. There was [illegible] and none equal to Milinda in India. He was rich, too, mighty in wealth and prosperity, and the number of his armed hosts knew no end. The king, who was fond of [illegible] and eager for discussion with [illegible] at the sun to ascertain the time), and [illegible] as it to his [illegible].[1]

13. The following dialogue between Milinda and Nāgasena is quoted to show what was thought to be the proper mode of carrying on debate in the days of those notable persons:—

'The king said: "Reverend Sir, will you discuss with me again?"

"If your Majesty will discuss as a scholar (Paṇḍita), well; but if you will discuss as a king, no."

"How is it then that scholars discuss?"

"When scholars [illegible] with one another there is there a winding up, an unravelling, and either is convicted of error, and he then who wedges his mistake [illegible] are drawn and [illegible] distinctions, and yet thereby they are not angered. Thus do scholars, O king, discuss."

"And how do kings discuss?"

"When a king, Your Majesty, discusses a matter, and he advances a point, if any [illegible] on that point, he is apt to fine him, saying: 'Infidel! which makes the punishment upon that fellow?' Thus, Your Majesty, do kings discuss."

"Very well. It is as a scholar, not as a king, that I will discuss. Let Your Reverence talk unreservedly, as you would with a brother, or a novice, or a lay disciple, or even with a servant. Be not afraid."

Origin of the Mahāyāna (about 78 A.D.)

14. At the opening of the Christian era the north-western part of India was invaded by the Turuṣkas or Scythians. Kaniṣka,[3] who was one of their chiefs, conquered Kashmira

[1] Taken from Rhys Davids' translation of the Milinda-pañha, entitled "The Questions of King Milinda," in S. B. E. series, vol. xxxv., pp. 6-7.

Nyāya is an equivalent for the original *Nīti*, *conjuration* for *Mantra*, *counsels* for *Ito-ūgato* and *sophists* for *Vādavādī*.

Nīti may mean 'policy,' but placed between Yoga and Vaiśeṣika it cannot but signify *Nyāya*.

[2] Vide Rhys Davids' Questions of King Milinda, in the S. B. E. series, vol. xxxv., p. 40.

[3] In the Tangyur, Mdo, vol. ta, there is *Mahārāja Kaniṣka-lekha*, which is a letter said to be sent by Matricta to King Kaniṣka. Hiuen Tsiang in the 7th Century A.D. records a prophecy of Buddha that 400 years after his nirvāṇa Kaniṣka would be born. (*Si-yu-ki*, Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. i., p. 93.) The same prophecy is mentioned by Fa-hian about 399 A.D., showing thereby that Kaniṣka was regarded as historical even at that time. According to Tibetan books such as the

Pallavas and Delhi and is said to have founded the era called *Sakābda* in 78 A.D. He accepted the Buddhist faith and established a new system of Buddhism called *Mahāyāna*, the Great Vehicle. The old system of Buddhism as promulgated in the Pāli Tripiṭaka was henceforth nicknamed *Hīnayāna*, the Little Vehicle. The *Mahāyāna* gradually spread to Nepal, Tibet, Mongolia, China, Japan, Corea, etc., while the *Hīnayāna* continued in Ceylon and Lanka spread to Burmah, Siam, etc. In India both the systems prevailed.

ORIGIN OF THE SANSKRIT BUDDHIST LITERATURE (ABOUT 78 A.D.).

15. Under the patronage of Kaniṣka a council[1] was held at Jālandhara under the superintendence of Pārśva (or Pūrṇaka) and Vasu Mitra. It consisted of 500 monks who composed in Sanskrit three works expository of the Pali *Tripiṭaka* viz. Sutra Upadesa of the Sutta Piṭaka, Vinaya Vibhāsa of the Vinaya Piṭaka and Abhidharma Vibhāsa of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. These three works written in Sanskrit were the earliest canonical books of the Mahāyāna School.

16. It must not, however, be supposed that there had been no Buddhist books written in Sanskrit before Kaniṣka held his council. As a fact Kaniṣka thought it expedient to introduce Sanskrit as the medium of Buddhistic composition after seeing that there had already existed many valuable Buddhist books in that language. For instance the Abhidharma Vibhāṣā or rather the Abhidharma mahāvibhāṣā śāstra, which was compiled

Sampahcho bvan Kaniṣka flourished in 33 B.C., i.e. 110 years after the nirvāṇa of Buddha which is said to have taken place in 444 B.C. Dr. J. F. Fleet holds that Kaniṣka founded the Vikrama era in 58 B.C. vide Tradition and Date of Kaniṣka in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland October 1906. Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar places Kaniṣka at the 1st quarter of the 1st century A.D., as appears from A peep into the early history of India in the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1897-98, p. 33. Vincent A. Smith places Kaniṣka in the 2nd century A.D. while Sylvain Lévi assumes the accession date of Kaniṣka as 78 A.D. (J.R.A.S. January 1905, pp. 253). But Mr. Rea, Mr. [illegible] Professor Kern all share with the view that the Saka era after Kaniṣka was 78 A.D.

[illegible] Takakusu I-tsing, p. xxv. [illegible] Sutra Gandha Vidyābhūṣaṇa's Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, January 1909.

[illegible] An account of this council is given by Rai Sarat Chandra Das C.I.E. in an article entitled "Sutra Hīnayāna" to be found in the rise and progress of Mahāyāna Sect. [illegible] Buddhism translated from the Sanskrit Tibetan, in the Journal of Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta vol. I, part III, p. 18. Fide also Watters On Yuan Chwang, vol. I, p. 276, and also Monier Williams' Buddhism, pp. 65-69.

at the council of Kanishka was a new commentary on Katyayani's [illegible] Abhidharma [illegible] Text of a Sanskrit work explanatory of the Tripitaka. It was composed 300 years after the parinirvana of Buddha or 100 years before the time of Kanishka. Kanishka was not thus the first founder of the study of Buddhist literature, but he must be acknowledged that he was the first who proclaimed Sanskrit as the language of the Buddhist Canon. Since his time many more Buddhist works in Sanskrit of which [illegible] the *Nava Dharmas*[4] are specially worshipped by the Mahayana Buddhists.

Logic Mentioned in the Sanskrit Buddhist Literature.

17. Some of the works composed during or before the time of Kanishka are extant down to the Sanskrit original and I have had opportunity to examine the Chinese or Tibetan versions of the same. I proceed then to say what I find. There is any mention of Logic in those works. But we have before us a very large collection of Sanskrit Buddhist works composed after the time of Kanishka. Many of these works such as some of the *Nava Dharmas* contain references to Logic and several works are even regards with logical discussions.

The Lalitavistara (before 250 A.D.)

18. The Lalitavistara, which is one of the *Nava Dharmas*, was translated into Chinese in 221-263 A.D.[5] The Sanskrit original of it must have been prepared in India before that

[1] [illegible] Tripitaka was 1200-1275 and [illegible] A.D. [illegible] Royal Asiatic Society [illegible] 1893 p. 20.

[2] [illegible]

(1) [illegible] (4) [illegible] (7) [illegible]

[illegible] Buddhists p. 19.

Dr. R. [illegible] Buddhist [illegible] p. 314 [illegible] that the three works composed at the council of Kanishka are extant in Chinese and Tibetan.

[5] The Lalitavistara was translated into Chinese four times. The first and [illegible] A.D. [illegible] was prepared [illegible] the third [illegible] 221-263, [illegible] the Western Tsin dynasty A.D. 265-316, the [illegible] Sui dynasty A.D. [illegible], and the fourth under the Tang dynasty A.D. [illegible] *Life of Hiuen Tsang*, at the legend of the Chinese Emperor [illegible] 100.

time. In this work Logic under the name of *Hetu-vidyā*,[1] is mentioned along with the Sāṁkhya Yoga, Vaiśeṣika etc in all of which the Bodhisattva (Buddha Gautama) is said to have acquired distinction.

EIGHTEEN SECTS OF THE BUDDHISTS

19 In article 4 we have found that within 200 years after the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha there arose in India 17 heretical sects besides the orthodox priesthood called the Theras. In course of time some of these sects disappeared while new ones grew up the result being that at the time of Kaniṣka about 78 A D, the Buddhists had already been divided into 18 sects[2] grouped into four classes as follows.—

I. Ārya Sarvāstivāda (1) Mūla Sarvāstivāda (2) Kāśyapīya (3) Mahīśāsaka (4) Dharma-guptīya (5) Bahuśrutīya (6) Tāmraśātīya (7) Vibhajyavādin	Belonging to the *Vaibhāṣika* School of Philosophy
II. Ārya Sammitīya (8) Kurukullaka (9) Āvantika (10) Vātsiputrīya	
III. Ārya Mahāsāṁghika (11) Pūrva-śaila (12) Apara-śaila (13) Haimavata (14) Lokottaravādin (15) Prajñaptivādin	Belonging to the *Sautrantika* School of Philosophy
IV. Ārya Sthavira (16) Mahāvihāra (17) Jetavanīya, and (18) Abhayagirivāsin.	

All the sects mentioned above belonged to the *Hīnayāna* though later on they joined the *Mahāyāna* too.

[1] त्रिवेदी त्रिसमे पुराणे इतिहासे वेदे व्याकरणे निरुक्ते शिक्षायां कल्पे गणकसंख्याने सांख्ये योगे वैशेषिके वैद्यके पारमार्थिके पारमार्थिके पारमार्थिके चातुरे सत्यपरीक्षणे हेतुविद्यायां चतुरश्च ..... यश्च बोधिसत्त्व एव विशिष्टो बभूव ॥

Lalitavistara, edited by Dr Rājendra Lal Mitra in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta Chapter XII p 179

[2] Vide the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, vol. I,

Four Schools of the Buddhist Philosophy

20 The philosophical views of the sects mentioned above were gradually formulated into two schools, viz. the (1) *Vaibhāsika* and (2) *Sautrāntika*. The Mādhyamika sect of the Buddhists founded by Kanishka also had two other schools of philosophy, viz. the (3) *Madhyamika* and (4) *Yogāchāra*. So there were altogether four schools of philosophy, two of the *Hinayana* and two of the *Mahayana*.[1]

21 *Vaibhāsika* was a later appellation of the philosophy of the Sarvāstivādin Bhikshus, a sect[2] which, as their name implies, admitted the reality of the world, both internal and external. The fundamental philosophical work of this sect is Kātyāyanīputra's Abhidharma-jnāna-prasthāna-śāstra, or simply Abhidharma, compiled at the council of Kanishka about 78 A.D. It is from this Upadesa that the name Vaibhāsika was derived. Vibhāsa means commentary,[3] and the Vaibhāsika philosophy seems to have been so called because it was based on commentaries rather than on the original text of the Tripitaka. Vasubandhu's Abhidharma-kośa-śāstra,[4] also called Kośa-bhāshya-śāstra, composed about 480 A.D.,[5] is a most learned work of the Vaibhāsika philosophy.

part III, p. 18; Eitel's Hodgson, pp. xxii, xxv, and xxvi; Rhys Davids' article in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1891, p. 411, and 1892, pp. [illegible]; Rockhill's Buddha, p. 251; [illegible] Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. 1, pp. 120, 130; and Eitel's Hodgson, p. xxii.

[2] Eitel's Hodgson, p. xxi. The Arya Sammatīyas, at any rate, were a branch of the Vātsīputrīyas, who were called Sammatīyas. The Vātsīputrīyas had [illegible] The Hindu philosopher Vasumitra, Mādhyamika Nāgārjuna's disciple, [illegible] Vātsīputrīyas, who were called Sammatīyas.

[3] This work exists in Sanskrit and Chinese. See Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, p. 1[illegible].

[4] This work has exists in Sanskrit and Chinese. See Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, p. 1[illegible].

Compare the [illegible] made by the Hindu philosopher Madhusūdana [illegible] Bhattacharya and translated by [illegible] p. 20. Prof. [illegible] Vidyābhūshana's Madhyamaka [illegible] in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, 1894, part II, p. 1.

[5] This work exists in Chinese and Tibetan. See Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, p. 1[illegible].

[7] See Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix II, no. 9[illegible]; Eitz Sung's Chinese [illegible] translation, see Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. 1, pp. 193-194.

22 The name *Sautrāntika*[1] was derived from *Sūtrānta*, called in Pāli *Suttanta* meaning "original text." The *Sautrāntika* philosophy seems to have been so called because it was based on the original text of the teachings of Buddha rather than on the commentaries thereon. The text on which the *Sautrāntika* philosophy was based belonged to the sect of Arya Sthaviras called in Pāli Theras who held the First Council (543 B.C.), and possibly also to the sect of the Mahāsanghikas[2] who were the first dissenters in 443 B.C. The philosophical principles of this school are said to have been formulated in Kashmir[3] during the reign of Kanishka about 78 A.D. by a sage named Dharmottara or Uttara dharma.[4] But the Chinese pilgrim Hwen Thsang, who visited India early in the 7th century A.D., states that the renowned teacher Kumārālabdha[5] of Takasila (Taxila in the Punjab) was the founder of the *Sautrāntika* school and wrote several very valuable treatises on it. He is supposed to have lived about 500 A.D. as he was a contemporary of Nāgārjuna (q.v.), Āryadeva (q.v.) and Asanga[6]. There was another very famous teacher named Sīlabhadra[7] who wrote *Vibhāsa-vatta* (or commentary on a work) of the *Sautrāntika* school. Hwen Thsang saw in Ayodhya the ruins of a Sanghārāma where Sīlabhadra resided.

MENTION OF LOGIC IN THE WORKS OF THESE SCHOOLS.

23 As none of the old works belonging to the *Vaibhāshika* or *Sautrāntika* school has yet become accessible to us, I cannot state whether there is any mention of logic in these works. But there are a few references to logic in the works of the *Madhyamika* and *Yogācārya* schools about a few of which are given below.

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1 Compare the explanation of Vibhāshika Sautrāntika in the Bodhipathapradīpa, Mahāyāna edition, p. 20; also Sarvadarshana Sangraha, Bibliotheca Indica, p. 20; also Sir Charles Eliot, Sarvadarshana Sangraha, in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1906, part II, p. 4.

2 See Rhys Davids' Buddhist India, p. 165 and Beal's Fahian and Sungyun, p. 143.

3 *Vide* Watters "On Yuan Chwang," vol. II, p. 181.

4 See the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Calcutta, vol. I, part III, pp. 18–19 and Dharmottara's Bindu Tīkā, edited by Professor Stcherbatsky, p. 59.

5 For the Dharmottara see Watters' Buddhism, p. 214 and Mahāyāna, part I, Chapter V, p. 16, Wassiljew's Buddhismus.

6 See Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. II, p. 302 and Taranatha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p. 8 where Kumāralabha is called Kumāra-rāja.

7 See Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, pp. 2[illegible]–290 and Taranatha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p. 67.

ĀRYA NĀGĀRJUNA (ABOUT 300 A.D.)

24. The name *Mādhyamika* was derived from *madhyama* meaning the middle. The *Madhyamika* philosophy was so called because it avoided two extremes, i.e., advocated neither the theory of absolute reality nor that of total unreality, of the world, but chose a *middle path*[1] in claiming that the world had only a conditional existence. The founder of this school was Nagārjuna or rather Ārya Nāgārjuna who was born at Vidarbha (modern Berar) in Malakūta,[2] during the reign of King Sadvaha or Satavahana[3] of the Andhra dynasty.[4] He passed many of his days in meditation in a cave-dwelling of the Śrīparvata, that bordered on the river Krishṇā. He was a pupil of Saraha and is said to have converted a powerful king, named Bhoja Deva,[5] to Buddhism.

[1] Compare—

चतुर्णां कोटीनां विनिर्मुक्तत्वात् सर्वप्रकारसर्वविकल्पना शून्यता मध्यमा प्रतिपत्प्रज्ञप्तो मार्ग इत्युच्यते ॥

Madhyamika Vṛtti published by the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, chapter XXIV, p. 159.

Compare the explanation of the term *Madhyamika* given by the Hindu philosophy Madhyamaka in the Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, chapter on Buddha Darśana (translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition, p. 24, and also Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's History of the Madhyamika Philosophy of Nāgārjuna in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, 1897, part IV, pp. 7-20.

[2] Vide Hwen-thsang's Travels in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. II, Book XIII, p. 97, and Book X, p. 210, Watters' On Yuan Chwang, vol. II, pp. 181, 182, and Wassilyew quoted by Schiefner in the Geschichte des Buddhismus, p. 101.

[3] Sadvaha is the same as Satavahana, which was a general name of the kings of the Andhra dynasty. See Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Early History of the Deccan, second edition, pp. 25-47.

Nāgārjuna wrote an autobiographical letter to Satavahana, whose private name in Chinese was Shi-yuan-tsi-co. This letter is called Ārya Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva's Suhṛillekha. It was translated into Chinese in 434 A.D. An English translation of this letter has appeared in the Journal of the Pali Text Society of London, 1883, pp. 71-75.

[4] The Andhra kings ruled the northern portion of the Madras Presidency and the whole of Bombay, and overthrew the Kanva dynasty in northern India about 31 B.C. They remained powerful up to 430 A.D. They were Buddhists, and it was by them that the magnificent marble steps at Amaravati were erected.—Vide Sewell's Lists of Antiquities in Madras, vol. II, pp. 142-145.

[5] For an account of Śrīparvata or Śrīśaila see Hwen-thsang's Life, Introduction, p. xii, by Beal. Taranatha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p. 84. Wilson's Mālat Mādhava, act I, and Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's Notes on Ratnāvalī, pp. 27-29.

[6] See Taranatha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 66, 69-73.

25. Nagarjuna is said to have lived four hundred years[1] after the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha, that is, in 33 B.C. But he does not appear to me to have so early a date as he was one of the early patrons or founders of the university of Nālandā[3] which had not, perhaps, come into existence in the 1st century B.C., and was insignificant even at 600 A.D., when the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsang came to visit India. Nagarjuna is stated by Lama Tāranātha to have been a contemporary of King Nemi Candra, who is supposed to have reigned about 700 A.D.[4] The

[1] It is prophesied in the Maṇjuśrī mūla tantra (Tibetan Ḥjam-ḥjal-rtsa-rgyud) that :—

ནི་ཟླ་ནས་ཀུན་ཏུ་ཡང་ངེ་ཚད་ནས།

ལོ་ངེ་ཟླ་ཏ་ཀ་ལ་ལ་ཡང་ན།

དགེ་སློང་ཀླུ་རྒྱལ་ནི་ནི་ཏ་ཡ།

ཐམ་ཕ་ལ ནི་ནད་ཟིན་ཡང།།

(Quoted in the Introduction to Ngag-gi-ḥbyung-ba published in Calcutta).

[2] Four hundred years after Buddha's departure from the world there will appear a Bhikṣu, named Nāgārjuna, who will do good to the believers in the doctrine.

It also should be noted that according to some books of Tibet, Buddha was born in 624 B.C., and 484 years or Lotsawas in 433 B.C. Nāgārjuna, who was born 400 years after the *nirvāṇa* event, at this calculation, be placed in 33 B.C.

[3] *Vide* Ehrôrsens a Gesch. Ind. Bhattacharya von Schlieper pp. 66, 69-73.

[4] Fahian describes Nālandā as a village Nālo. *vide* Beal's Travels of Fahian and Sungyun, p. 111.

[4] According to Lama Tāranātha Nāgārjuna was a contemporary of King Nemi Candra, whose genealogy is thus traced :—

Akṣa Candra Jaya Candra Nemi Candra	Ruled in Aparāntaka.
Phagi Candra Bhanva Candra Śila Candra Candra Gupta	Ruled in Magadha.

The six kings beginning with Akṣa Candra to Śila Candra, are stated to have been weak and insignificant, while Candra Gupta, the seventh king,

latest date that can be assigned to Nāgārjuna is 401 A.D.,[1] when his biography was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva.

26. Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika kārikā is the first work of the *Mādhyamika* philosophy. In it he has essentially referred to certain technicalities of logic such as the fallacy of *Sadhyasama*[2] (*petitio principii*) in chapter IV. He was the author of several other works on the *Madhyamika* philosophy such as the (1) Yuktisastikā kārikā or sixty memorial verses on argumentation, (2) Vigraha-vyavartani kārikā or memorial verses on argumentative disputes and (3) Vigraha-vyavartani vṛtti or a commentary on the Vigraha-vyavartani kārikā.[3] In these works he has set forth the logically employed the methods of logic to establish the distinctive conclusions of the *Mādhyamika* philosophy.

ĀRYA DEVA (ABOUT 320 A.D.).

27. Deva[4] or rather Arya Deva was the next writer on the *Mādhyamika* philosophy. He is otherwise known as Kāṇerīpa [illegible] Candra Gupta, who [illegible] Candra Kīrti [illegible] Nāgārjuna [illegible] (See Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. [illegible])

[1] See Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. [illegible]

[2] The Mādhyamika-kārikā with the Vṛtti of Candra Kīrti has been published by [illegible] Society [illegible] Bibliotheca Buddhica [illegible] under the editorship of [illegible] de La Vallée Poussin. [illegible] verse refers to the fallacy of *Sadhyasama* —

विचारं वा परीक्षायां कृते शून्यतया भवेत् ।
एवं तथागतविचारं कथं वाक्यैः करोमि ॥

(Madhyamika-karika, chapter IV)

[3] For an account of the writings of the Tantra by Nāgārjuna *vide* Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's Introduction to the Sanghasamaja Tantra [illegible] Bibliotheca Buddhica [illegible] 1917 and for his hymns such as अचलप्रकाश, चित्तविशुद्धिप्रकरण see Tangyur, Ratnolpa, vol. [illegible]

[4] For an account of these works and the author's Indian logic as preserved in Tibet, see Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana on the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, new series, vol. III, No. 7, 1907. For the genuine works of Nāgārjuna see Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, no. 1.

[5] The Nyāyadvāramukha-śāstra, quoted in Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Nos. 1223, 1224, is not a work of Nāgārjuna but of Dignāga.

[6] Vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix

Kana Deva, Nagarjuna and Prasanta-netra. He was born in Southern India and was an eminent disciple of Nagarjuna. According to Hiuen-tsang, he visited the countries of Matsyakuta, Simhala, Pravara, Cola and Vanavasi, all of which he won great renown by defeating the Tirthikas and preaching the true doctrines of Buddha. According to Taranatha,[2] he resided for a long time in Nalanda where he was a Pandita. He flourished during the reign of Canora Gupta, whose date is supposed to be about 320 A.D. The latest date that can be assigned to Deva is 401 A.D., when his hagiography was translated into Chinese by Kumarajiva. He wrote numerous works on the *Madhyamika* philosophy, such as the Satoka sastra, *Bhrama-pramathana yukti-bhasa-siddhi*,[3] etc., all of which bear evidence of his knowledge of Logic.

LOGIC OF THE YOGACARA SCHOOL (ABOUT 300-500 A.D.)

28. The word *Yogacara* is compounded of *yoga* meaning meditation and *acara* meaning practice. The *Yogacara*[4] or the contemplative school was so called because it emphasized the practice of meditation as means of attaining *Jnanam* or the seventeen stages of Buddhist Perfection. The first definite outline of its *Logic* appeared in the form of consecutive dates

[1] N. [illegible], and Watters, On Yuan Chwang, vol. I, p. 124, vol. II, pp. 224-230.

[2] The Bhavya Prakasa of Taranatha, Watters' Wei-shi, vol. I, Book IX, pp. 18-19; Book X, p. [illegible]; vol. II, Book X, pp. 210, 227; Book XII, p. 42; Book XV, pp. 103.

[3] The Tibetan translation of this work is Sa-ka-ma-ra-ba-ma-ra-ba-ma-ra-ba

which is the same as our 'ego' or 'soul'. It is not known who was the founder of the *Yogacara* school but in the Tibetan and Chinese books the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Mahāsamaya Sūtra, Bodhisattva-caryā-nirdeśa and the Sapta-daśabhūmi śāstra-yoga-ārya have been named as the prominent old works of the system.[1]

The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (about 300 A.D.).

29. **The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra**[2] is a very sacred work as it is one of the *Nava Dharmas*. The exact date of it is unknown, beyond the fact that it was translated into Chinese in 443 A.D.[3] The approximate date seems to be 300 A.D., for it existed at or before the time of Āryā Deva who mentions it.[4] This work speaks in a prophetic style of the *Nāgārjunas* (dialectitians) and *Tārkikas* (logicians). Thus in chapter II of the work Mahāmati asks Buddha:—

"Say how in the time to come *Nāgārjunas* will flourish?"[5]

[1] *Vide* Section Mdo of the Tangyur, Lama Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p. 111 f; Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Appendix I, No. 1; Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, p. 126, vol. II, pp. 220, 275, and Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. I, p. 371.

[2] The Sanskrit original of this work is being published by the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta under the editorship of Rai Sarat Chandra Das C.I.E., and Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhūṣaṇa. The work also exists in Chinese and Tibetan. Hwen-Thsang mentions the Laṅkāvatāra, *vide* Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, Book XI, p. 251.

Vide an account of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra by Satis Chandra Vidyabhūṣaṇa in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1908.

[3] *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, nos. 175, 176 and 177.

[4] *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, nos. 1250, 1260 and Appendix I, no. 4.

[5] The Sanskrit original runs as follows:

मेघाधिष्ठानं कथं भूयो भविष्यन्ति नागार्जुनाः ।

(Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Asiatic Society of Bengal's MSS., chapter II, leaf 11).

The Tibetan version runs thus:—

ལྷ་ཡི་ཐུགས་ཀྱང་ཇི་ལྟ་བུར།

མཁའ་ཝཻ་ཌཱུ་র্য་ནི་ཇི་ལྟ་ཡིན།

(Kangyur Mdo vol. V, Asiatic Society of Bengal's xylograph).

"How is *tarka* (reasoning or argumentation) corrected, and how is it carried on?"[1]

Again in chapter X of the work we read:

"Whatever is produced is destructible—this is the conclusion of the *Tārkikas*."[2]

MAITREYA (ABOUT 400 A.D.).

30. The date of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra is not known. The Bodhisattvacaryānirdeśa was translated into Chinese during 414–421 A.D. and the Saptadaśabhūmi-śāstra-yogācārya in 646–647 A.D. The author of these two works was Maitreya[4] (called in Chinese 'Mi-lo'), who lived 900 years after the nirvāṇa of Buddha, that is about 400 A.D.[5] He is reported by Hwen-thsang to have communicated the materials of three Buddhist treatises to Āryā Asaṅga while the latter was residing in a monastery in Ayodhyā. In the Saptadaśabhūmi-śāstra-yogācārya[7] Maitreya has discussed certain topics of Logic, a

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[1] [illegible] ।

(Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, chapter II, leaf 11, A.S.B. MSS.)

ཇི ལྟར་རྟོག་ཀྱང་ཤེས་ནས་ཀ་ལ ।
རྟོག་ཀྱི་ཅིས་ཟློ་ལ་ཅི ॥

(Kangyur, Mdo, vol. V.)

[2] [illegible] ।

(Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, chapter X, leaf 43, A.S.B. MSS.)

ཕྱིས་ནས་ལས་ལས་འཇིག་ལས་འདུག ॥
འདི་ནི་རྟོག་ཀྱི་ཚད་ཀྱི་ཏེ་ཞེས ॥

(Kangyur, Mdo, vol. V.)

[3] *Vide* Dr. Schlagintweit's Buddhism quoted in the Journal of the Bod Rout Lost Society of Calcutta, 1865, part II, Appendix IV, p. 16.

[4] *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Appendix I, No. 1.

[5] *Vide* "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan," by Dr. Sugiura, p. 30.

[6] *Vide* Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," Vol. I, pp. 155–56. The three treatises are—Saptadaśabhūmi-śāstra-yogācārya, Sūtrālaṃkāraṭīkā and Madhyānta-vibhāga-śāstra.

[7] It is perhaps this work which is called Yogo by Dr. Sugiura, and its Chinese version Yuka Ron, Book XV.

short account of which is given below from the researches of Dr. Sugura.[1]

31. Maitreya [illegible] discussed the practical questions of Logic [illegible] in the form of [illegible] of the chapters of his work [illegible] Kārikā [illegible] Conditions of Debate [illegible] of the Attributes of the Debate [illegible] of Debate [illegible] But [illegible] Pure Logic [illegible] Maitreya [illegible] to be supported by [illegible] *Indirect* Validity of the [illegible] Exception [illegible] they be based [illegible] *Universal* [illegible] Agreement [illegible] *Agreement* [illegible] Reasoning is illustrated as follows:

1. Sound is non-eternal,
2. Because it is a product,
3. [illegible] (*Indirect*)
4. [illegible]
5. [illegible] product

Arya Asaṅga (about 450 A.D.).

32. [illegible] Maitreya [illegible] Indian [illegible] He was [illegible] of the Mahāyāna [illegible] Maitreya and adopted the [illegible] He [illegible] lived [illegible] He died about 450 A.D. [illegible] 750 A.D. [illegible] Mahāyāna [illegible] According to the 7th century A.D. [illegible] and Asaṅga [illegible] He wrote 12 works [illegible] Vasubandhu [illegible]

[1] [illegible]

[2] [illegible] Western World [illegible]

[3] [illegible]

[4] [illegible] 122

[5] [illegible] the best [illegible]

[6] [illegible] Bunyiu Nanjio [illegible] Appendix I no. 5

[7] [illegible]

[8] [illegible] Bunyiu Nanjio [illegible] Appendix I no. 6

33 Dr Sugiura has ascertained from Chinese sources that Asanga treated [illegible] in the tenth volume of **Gonyo** in which he simply reproduced the conclusions of his master Maitreya, and also in the sixteen volumes of **Zuschub**, in which he showed a slight originality. Asanga's form of syllogism, which is somewhat different from Maitreya's, is given below.

1. **Sound is non-eternal.**
2. **Because it is a product.**
3. **Like a pot (but not like ether) ;**
4. **Because a pot is a product it is non-eternal, so is sound, as it is a product ;**
5. **Therefore we know sound is non-eternal.**

Here we find that Asanga made some improvement on the form of syllogism adopted in the Lamp of his master. The basis of Maitreya's inference, so far as it related to the connection between "produced-ness" and "non-eternality" was a mere analogy founded upon a single instance. The connection (between "produced-ness" and "non-eternality" in the case of the pot) might be accidental. Asanga expressed the essential connection between "produced-ness" and "non-eternality" by saying "Because a pot is a product, it is non-eternal." In so doing he appealed not merely to an instance but to a *law*.

VASUBANDHU (ABOUT 480 A.D.)

34 Vasubandhu[1] called in Chinese Seshi was born in Gandhara (modern Peshawar) where a relic to his memory was seen by Hiuen Thsang in the 7th century A.D. His father's name was Kausika. He began his career as a Sarvastivadin philosopher of the Sarvastivada sect, but was later converted by his eldest brother Asanga to the Yogachara school of the *Mahayana*. He passed many years of his life in Sakala, Kausambi and Ayodhya, in the last of which places he died at the age of eighty years. He was a friend of Manoratha, a master of the Vaibhashika Shastra, who flourished in the middle of the thirteenth century after the nirvana of Buddha, that is before 500 A.D. He was a contemporary of another Vaibhashika

The original Sanskrit text of Vasu's Vajracchedikā has been published in the Anecdota Oxoniensia by the Professor Max Müller.

[1] Fade Hiuen Chwang's Travels in Buddhist Records of the Western World, Vol. I, pp. 98, 145, 172, 194, 225, 240, and Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," Vol. I, p. 210.

teacher, named Saṅghabhadra, who lived about 489 A.D.[1] So we may approximately fix the date of Vasubandhu at about 480 A.D. His biography[2] was translated from Sanskrit into Chinese during 557-69 A.D. Vasubandhu was the author of a large number of very valuable works[3] including the **Tarka-śāstra** which consists of three chapters and is perhaps the first[4] regular Buddhist work on Logic. This work was translated into Chinese in 648 A.D. The Chinese version still exists, while the Sanskrit original has been long lost. The work appears to have been translated into Tibetan too, but my persistent efforts to discover the Tibetan version were unsuccessful.

35. Dr. Sugura[5] from Chinese sources has ascertained that in the 7th century A.D., while Hwen-thsang was in India, he saw three other books on Logic attributed to Vasubandhu, which are called in Chinese **Ronki**, **Ronshiki** and **Ronshin**, respectively. In the **Ronki** quoted by Kwei-ke Vasubandhu maintained that a thesis can be proved by two propositions only, and that therefore, the necessary parts in a syllogistic inference are only three (i.e. *pakṣa* or minor term, *sādhya* or major term

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[1] Saṅghabhadra translated Abhidharmaya into Chinese in 489 A.D. *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Appendix II, No. 65.

Mr. Takakusu's very learned article on Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu and the date of Vasubandhu's death in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, January 1905, says that Saṅghabhadra, contemporary of Vasubandhu, was the translator of the Sumantapasādikā, Buddhaghoṣa's Commentary, 488 A.D.

[2] *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Appendix I, No. 6. The statement that there was another translation of the life of Vasubandhu by Kumārajīva A.D. 401-409 and that it was lost in 730 A.D., cannot be accepted without further testimony. Takakusu says that "some Catalogues mention by mistake that such a work was then in existence." *Vide* Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, January 1905, p. 29.

[3] *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Appendix I, No. 6.

[4] *Vide* Dr. Sugura's "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan," p. 32.

[5] The Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara probably refers to Vasubandhu when he says that according to some logicians *antaraṅga* (internal inseparable or essential) consisting of *pakṣa* or minor term, *sādhya* or major term and *hetu* or middle term is quite enough in establishing a thesis, and that *dṛṣṭānta* or example is altogether useless. Siddhasena Divākara writes:

अन्तर्बाह्यार्थ संपत्तिः निर्हेतोर्विनिवृत्तिमत्
अन्तर्व्याप्तिबलाद्धेतोः न्यायविद्भिः विनिश्चितः ॥ १८ ॥

(Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara, edited by Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa and published by the Indian Research Society of Calcutta).

and *hetu* or middle term) But it is to be regretted that these three logical works are lost and we cannot know how far the theory of syllogism was developed in them The work in Chinese from which alone we can know anything of his Logic is his polemic against heresies (Nyojitsu-ron,[1] In this book he gives the following form of reasoning —

1 Sound is non-eternal,
2 Because it is a product of a cause,
3. Things produced by a cause are non-eternal like a pot, which is produced by a cause and is non-eternal,
4 Sound is an instance of this (kind),
5 Therefore sound is non-eternal.

[1] Is this the same work as the Tarka-sastra already referred to ?

CHAPTER II.

SYSTEMATIC BUDDHIST WRITERS ON LOGIC (500—1200 A.D.).

Logic distinguished from Philosophy

30. In the previous chapter we have seen that from the origin of Buddhism in the 6th century B.C. to its extinction in the 12th century A.D. there were no systematic Buddhist works on Logic, but only a few stray references to that science in the works on philosophy and religion. During 400—500 A.D. Maitreya, Asanga and Vasubandhu founded Logic, but their treatment of it was merely incidental, being mixed up with their philosophical theories of *Yogacara* and *Madhyamika* schools of philosophy. Vasubandhu's three works on Pure Logic mentioned by Hiuen-Tsang are now lost and consequently their merits cannot be judged. After 500 A.D. began a period when Logic was completely divorced from general philosophy and a large number of Buddhist writers gave their undivided attention to this branch of learning. Dignaga is the earliest known writer of this period.

31. Acharya Dignaga, Father of Mediæval Logic.

Converted to Buddhism, he left his religion in the Madras Presidency, about 450 A.D.

The 6th century A.D. may be regarded as the great period in India when Logic was prominently to the front. From the 6th century onwards, Logic was practically the last word in the life of the most of the Buddhist writers. Dharmakirti, who lived early in the fourteenth century A.D., must have spread the knowledge from some centre in India to Tibet during his in[illegible] with India between 600 A.D. and 1200 A.D.

A peculiarity of this [illegible] is that Buddhist Chief Priests were not allowed to wear [illegible] the Patchakkha [illegible] of the Vatsya Empire. With the [illegible] of Mahayana in the first century A.D. by Kanishka, a new [illegible] was [illegible] in the dress of monks and special [illegible] were [illegible] to Buddhist writers as called Patachakkhawa [illegible] Patachkhawa red [illegible] with a pointed

1. [illegible] Book II, Chapter I, under the head "Vasubandhu".
2. [illegible] Sarat Chandra Das's Tibetan Dictionary, p. 870.
3. [illegible] Waddell's Lamaism, pp. 194—196.

peak and long lappets. The lappets of the cap were lengthened in proportion to the rank of the wearer.

It is not known when the Pandita's cap was first introduced. It is said to have been taken to Tibet in 749 A.D. by Śānta Rakṣita. Pandita was a [illegible] which was [illegible] by the Vikramaśilā University [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] what title the Uni-

 བསྟན་འགྱུར་རིན་ཆེ་ནི།

ཇི་ལྟ་ནམ་མཁའ་ཐོ་ཡངས་ལ།

[illegible] of Nālandā [illegible] students. Perhaps [illegible] was possibly a distinctive bulge of the [illegible] that [illegible] philosophical [illegible]

The word *shad* which here is indicative of the fact that after [illegible]

dhism had spread into Central China, monks like Brahmans or sages were allowed to sit on a raised chair. There is also in the palms of the image a thousand-headed in Sanskrit Pāṇi and in Tibetan *Ta ye* which is a remarkable fact. The halo round the head of the image indicates that Dignāga was a saint.

LIFE OF DIGNĀGA (ABOUT 500 A.D.)

38. Dignāga or rather Ācārya Dignāga is called in Tibetan Phyogs glaṅ. He was born in a Brāhmaṇa family in Siṃhavaktra near Kāñcī, modern Conjeeveram in the Madras Presidency. By Nāgadatta, a Paṇḍita of the Vātsīputrīya sect, he was admitted to the religious system of that sect and attained ordination in the *Tripiṭaka* of the *Hīnayāna*. Afterwards he became a disciple of Ācārya Vasubandhu with whom he studied all the Piṭakas of the *Mahāyāna* and *Hīnayāna*. He miraculously saw the face of Mañjuśrī, the Buddhist god of learning, from whom he received inspiration in the Law (Dharma). A few years later he was invited to Nālandā (*Vide* appendix A) where he defeated Brāhmaṇa Sudarśana and other Tīrtha dialecticians and won them to the doctrine of Buddha. Since he had refuted chiefly the Tīrtha controversialists he was called the "Bull in discussion" (Sanskrit: Tarkapuṅgava and Tibetan: Rtsod pahi khyu mchog). He travelled through Orissa and Mahārāṣṭra to the south, meeting the Tīrtha controversialists in discussions. At Mahārāṣṭra he is said to have resided frequently in the Ārya's Monastery.[2] At Orissa he converted Bhadra Pālita, Treasury-minister of the king of the country, to Buddhism. He was a man of vast learning and wisdom and practised during his fortune twelve tested virtues. He is said to have died in a solitary wood in Orissa.

39. Dignāga must have lived before 557—560 A.D.[3] when two of his works were translated into Chinese. The early limit

[1] This account of Dignāga is taken from Lama Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 130—135. Lama Tāranātha also relates that Dignāga frequently resided in Orissa in a cavern of a mountain called Śrīparvata where he used to give himself up to contemplation. He was specially versed in meditation formulas. It is stated that the stem of a new Palan tree called Mahāmaitakī in the garden of Bhadra Pālita in Orissa withered but it revived in seven days after Dignāga had uttered incantation for its restoration. For a fuller account of Dignāga *vide* Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Dignāga and his Logical Analysis" in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. I, No. 9, 1905.

[2] *Vide* Watters' On Yuan Chwang, Vol. II, p. 122.

[3] *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, App. I, No. 10, where Dignāga is called Jina. The Chinese name of Dignāga has been wrongly rendered as Jina by Japanese writers as well as Rev. Beal.

of his date in 480 A.D. when his teacher Vasubandhu lived. Dignāga flourished possibly about 450 A.D. when the Buddhist kings of the Pallava[1] dynasty ruled the eastern coast of Southern India.

40. We have already seen that Dignāga travelled in Nālandā, Orissa, Mahārāstra and Dakshina (Madras) entering everywhere into disputes with controversialists. He attacked his opponents as frequently as he was attacked by them. His whole life was passed in giving blows and receiving counter-blows. On account of this habit of discussion he was during his lifetime called the "lion in debate[2]" (*Tarka pancānana*).[3] Even his death did not terminate the great intellectual war in which he had been engaged; though he could no longer offer any resistance his opponents continued to fall upon him with force. Mark the volleys on his dead body coming from no mean warriors! Kālidāsa, the prince of poets, wants his poem to avoid the rugged hand (*sthūla hasta*) of Dignāga. Udyotakara[4] the commentator begins with Dignāga "a quibbler" (*kutarkika*). Vācaspati Miśra[5] describes him as an erring one (*bhrānta*) and speaks of his "blunders" (*bhrānti*). Mallinātha[6] compares him with a rock (*adri-śilpa*). Kumārila Bhatta and Partha-sārathi Miśra[7] turn their arrows against him. He

[1] On the downfall of the Andhras in 436 A.D., the Pallavas rose to power. They were in close touch with one of their northern possessions, the kingdom of Vengi, by battle. Vijayadevavarman of the Eastern Chālukya dynasty. During 512-554 A.D. Kāñchi, the capital of the Pallava kings, was captured by Vikramāditya I of the Western Chālukya dynasty. See Sewell's Lists of Antiquities, Madras, Vol. II, pp. 141, 180, 318, 49 n. 4, 211, 212.

[2] *Vide* Lama Tāranātha's biography of Buddhaghosa, see Schiefner, p. 134.

[3] *Vide* Meghadūta, Pūrva-megha, verse 14.

> ॥ वह्नयादः प्रकटा इवाभाति
> प्रकाशं दाक्षे जलनो जलाद् ।
> कुमारिकाहस्तविमर्दिकेतुः
> कविर्यदि न स्यात् कथा विदग्धा ॥

[4] Udyotakara's Nyāya-vārtika, Introduction, p. 1, in the Bibliotheca Indica series. Compare also Nyāya-vārtika, 1.1.4, pp. 43–44; 1.1.5, p. 53; 1.1.[illegible], pp. 60–61; 1.1.7, p. 63, etc.

[5] *Vide* Vācaspati Miśra's Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-tīkā, edited by Gangādhara Śāstri, 1.1.1, pp. 1, 31; 1.1.4, pp. 70–77, 92–95, 102; 1.1.5, p. 1[illegible]2; 1.1.6, p. 145, etc.

[6] Mallinātha's commentary on verse 14 of the Meghadūta, Pūrva-megha.

[7] *Vide* Partha-sārathi's gloss on 5.1.89, Anumānapariccheda of Kumārila Bhatta's Vārtika on the 5th Sūtra of Jaimini.

Vedāntins and Jainas were not inactive in their hostility. Even Dharmakīrti[1] the Buddhist sage attempted to oppose him. Dignāga must have been a very strong built man both physically and mentally; otherwise he could hardly have lived for a single day under assaults from so many sides. Those of his works which still exist enable us somehow to measure his strength and his weakness.

Dignāga's Pramāṇa samuccaya.[2]

41. The Pramāṇa-samuccaya is one of the grandest literary monuments of Dignāga. It is said to have been composed while he was residing on a solitary hill near Vengi in Andhra[3] (modern Telingana) in the Madras Presidency. Seeing

1 Vide the works of Prabhākaradeva and Arkakīrtti referred to in the J. B. H. R. A. S., Vol. XVIII, p. [illegible]. The Digambara Jaina [illegible] Dharmakīrtti, in controverting the Vaiśeṣika [illegible] of Sāmānya [illegible] quotes in support of his own [illegible] the following verse of Dignāga:—

न चापि न च नयाणु न पञ्चत्वादि नोऽजवत्
अहानि पूर्वं बाधारसयो अवयवसन्ति ॥
इति दिङ्नागकुचिनकुचकमण्डलपरमाणुः

(Quoted in Dharmottara's Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā, Chap. III.)

The same verse has been quoted in a little altered form by the Hindu philosopher Mādhava Ārya as follows:—

न चापि न च नयाणोऽदि पञ्चाणुचाजवत्।
अहानि पूर्वं बाधारसयो अवयवसन्ति ॥

(Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, chapter on Buddhadarśana.)

Vide the head "Dharmakīrti" which follows.

2 For an account of the composition of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya given here is taken from Tāranātha's History of the Buddhism, vide Schiefner, pp. 1-2, [illegible] and the Tibetan Dgyan pos zang, edited by Rai Sarat Chandra Das Bahadur, J. B. T., pp. 62-5, 10 and J. N. A. II.

3 Vide Hiuen Thsang's Travel in India, Buddhist Records of the Western World, Vol. II, pp. 215, 219 and 220 where the Chinese term for Dignāga is wrongly rendered as Jina. Hiuen Thsang gives the following account of the composition of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya: "When Dignāga began to compose a treatise, a spirit appeared to him (the Pramāṇa-samuccaya) for ever among the [illegible] of the Hetu-vidyā Śāstra, the mountains and valleys shook and resounded. The sapphire and lapis lazuli changed their appearance, as if the spirit of the mountain appeared before him, asking him to spread abroad the Śāstra. Hetu-vidyā. Then the Bodhisattva (Dignāga) caused a beam to shine and illumine the dark places. Surprised at this wonder, the king of the country (Andhra) came near him and asked whether he was going into nirvāṇa. When the king spoke of the infinite bliss of nirvāṇa Dignāga resolved to enter into it. Mad-

that the Śāstras on Dialectics written earlier by him remained scattered about he resolved to collect them. Accordingly putting together fragments from particular works he engaged himself in compiling in verse a compendium called the Pramāṇa-samuccaya. While he was writing for opening lines the earth trembled and all the places were filled with light and a great tumult was audible. A Brāhmaṇa named Īśvarakṛṣṇa[1] surprised at this wonder came to Āchārya Dignāga and finding that he had gone out to collect rice wiped out the words he had written. Dignāga came and rewrote the words and Īśvarakṛṣṇa wiped them out again. Dignāga wrote them a third time and added "Let no one wipe this out even in joke or sport. For none should wipe out what is of great importance if the sense of the expression is not right and one wishes to dispute on that account let him appear before me in person." When after Dignāga had gone out to collect alms the Brāhmaṇa again came to wipe out the writings he saw what was added and paused. The Āchārya returning from his rounds for meal met the Brāhmaṇa. They began controversy after stating his own doctrine. When he had vanquished the Tīrthika (Brāhmaṇa) several times and challenged him to accept the Buddhist doctrine the Tīrthika scattered some pronouncements of incantations on them, and burnt all the goods of the Āchārya that happened to be before him and when the Āchārya was kept back by him the Tīrthika ran away. Then upon Dignāga reflected that since he could not work the salvation of this single individual he would not be able to work that of others. So thinking he was on the point of giving up his purpose of composing the Pramāṇa-samuccaya when the Bodhisattva Śrī Manjuśrī came and appeared before him in person and said:

"Son refrain refrain. The intellect is infected by arguing with me in person. Please know that when you have demonstrated at this Śāstra cannot be injured by the host of Tīrthas. I undertake to be your spiritual tutor till you have attained the

[1] Īśvarakṛṣṇa here referred to was very probably the author of the Sāṁkhya kārikā.

jewel, the god of learning. Knowing his purpose was moved with pity. He came to Dignāga and said: "Alas! how have you given up your great purpose and only fixed your mind on your own people's profit, without even some giving up for the sake of saving all." Saying this he directed him to explain the Vādanyāyamukha-śāstra and Hetuvidyā-śāstra. Dignāga receiving these directions, respectfully assented and saluted the saint. Then he gave himself to profound study and explained the Hetuvidyā-śāstra and the Vādanyāyamukha.

stage of perfection. In later times this śāstra will become the sole eye of all the śāstras."[1]

So saying Manjuśrī disappeared and Dignāga resumed his work and completed the Pramāṇa-samuccaya.

42. The Pramāṇa-samuccaya[2] is a Sanskrit work written in *anuṣṭubh* metre. The Sanskrit original of it is lost, but a Tibetan translation still exists. The translation was prepared by an Indian sage named Jñāna-varma in Tibetan (ye-śes-go-ca) and a Tibetan interpreter named Dge-ldan-rgyal-mtsan in the monastery of Se-pa-bu-gangs. It occupies folios 1–13 of the Tangyur section Mdo, volume Ce.[3] In Tibetan it is called Tshad-ma-kun-las-btus-pa (= Pramāṇa-samuccaya) or briefly Tshad-ma-kun-las-btus-pa (= Pramāṇa-samuccaya) signifying a compilation of questions on Pramāṇa, valid knowledge. It begins thus: "Bowing down before Sugata, the teacher and protector, who is *Pramāṇa* incarnate and benefactor of the world, I, for the sake of expounding Pramāṇa (valid knowledge), put together here various scattered matters, collected from my own works." In the closing lines

[1] བྱ་ལ་ཏེ་ལ་ཏེ་ཡེ་ཤེས་ལས་ནང་ནས་ཀློག་ཡིག་ཀུན་ལ་ཡོད་ཅིང་ཡ།
ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་བསྟན་བཅོས་འདི་ལ་ནི་ཐུགས་རྗེ་ཆེ་ཡིས་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཡ
ན་ལག་ཏུ་ཡང་ཡོད།

ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་མ་མཐོང་ཀྱི་ཐམས་ཅད་ཁྱེད་ཀྱིས་ཤུ་ཐ་ལ་ཆུ་ཡ།
ཕྱི་མའི་དུས་ཀྱི་བསྟན་བཅོས་ཀུན་ཀྱི་སྤྱན་ཡིན་ནོ།

Pag tsam jon zang edited by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur C.I.E., p. 101.

[2] Probably the same as "the śāstra on the grouped references," *vide* Takakusu's Essays, p. 107.

[3] The volume Ce of the Tangyur section Mdo was put at my disposal by the India Office, London, through Mr. Thomas.

ཚད་མར་ཀུན་ཏུ་ལེགས་ཕུལ་ཏེ་ཡ
ལྟོ་ཕ་ཆེ་ལ་ཀ ཏེ་ཁམ་ཕྱོགས་ཅན་ལ ཆ་ལ
ཚད་ཆ་ལ ཕྱིན ཕ ངང ཀ ཀ ཀ ལ
ཀ ཀ ལ ལ ལ

it is stated that Dignāga, the subduer of controversialists in all regions and the possessor of emphatic strength, compiled this from his own works.

43. It is divided into six chapters which are named respectively (1) Perception (Sanskrit *Pratyakṣa*, Tibetan Mngon-sum), (2) Inference for one's own self (Sanskrit *Svārthānumāna*, Tibetan Rang-don-gyi rjes-dpag), (3) Inference for the sake of others (Sanskrit *Parārthānumāna*, Tibetan Gzhan-don-gyi rjes-dpag), (4) Three characteristics of the Middle Term (Sanskrit *Trirūpa-liṅga*, Tibetan Tshul-gsum-gyi gtan-tshigs) and Reputed Contradiction (Sanskrit *Viruddhāvyabhicāra*, Tibetan Dpe-dang-bcas-pa'i ngos-po), (5) Refutation of Credible Word or Verbal testimony (Sanskrit *Śabdaparīkṣā*, Tibetan Sgra-rtog (pag-tsam)), and (6) Parts of a syllogism (Sanskrit *Nyāyāṅga*, Tibetan Rigs-pa'i yan-lag).

Perception.

44. Dignāga does not give any formal definition of Perception which is well known as the knowledge of objects derived through the channels of the senses. But he describes Perception as that which is freed from illusory experiences and is not connected with name, genus, etc.[1] Suppose a man in the twilight mistakes a rope for a snake: this experience of the snake is merely illusory

[1] ཕྱི་ནས་ཤེས་ཕ་ཀུན་ཏུ་ལམ་ཡང་ཁ་ལ་ཟ་ཞིང།
 འཇིག་ཚོ་ཀ་ཏ་ཡ་ཡ་ཡ ཡ ཡ

and is not, according to Dignāga, an act of Perception. Dignāga contends that Perception is also not connected with name, genus etc. Suppose I see a cow. This cow, which I see, is a peculiar one. Its minute peculiarities can only be realised by me who have seen it. If I proceed to indicate this cow to other persons by saying that I saw a cow which is named Jo-tha or which is red etc., I can only convey to those persons the idea of a cow of a certain case, that is, a cow possessing the common characteristics of a class of cows, but can never express to them the individual cow which I saw. Hence it follows that the content of Perception cannot be properly expressed by name, genus etc. But very different is the case with inference. Knowledge derived through inference is general and can be well expressed by name, genus etc., whereas that derived through Perception is particular and is incapable of being properly communicated to others by name, genus etc.

Dignāga criticises Vātsyāyana.

45. In the chapter on Perception Dignāga has criticised the Hindu logician Vātsyāyana, who recorded that the mind (*manas*) was a sense-organ because it was accepted as such in several systems of philosophy, and the view was not opposed in the Nyāya-sūtra according to the maxim "If I do not oppose a theory of any opponent, it is to be understood I approve of it." Dignāga criticises this maxim of Vātsyāyana saying: "If silent approval assent it was useless for the Nyāya-sūtra to mention other sense-organs."

[1] Vātsyāyana writes:—

मनश्च इन्द्रियमाहुः बाह्यं अन्तरालवर्तिनि सन्निकर्षात्सुखादिषु प्रत्येत्यर्थेषु परमसूक्ष्मतया विद्युत्सञ्चारवत्तिष्ठति च मनस्तृप्तिः

(Nyāyabhāṣya, 1-1-4).

[2] Dignāga writes:—



(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter 1)

The Sanskrit originals of the lines are as follows:

चक्षुरादिपरं चेत्
चक्षुष्मत्त्वं वृथा ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter 1)

These two lines have been quoted and criticised by the Hindu logician Vācaspati Miśra in his Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā, 1-1-4.

46. In chapter II of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Dignāga mentions the views of some logicians who from smoke which is the middle term infer *fire* which is inseparably connected with it, and also of others, who from smoke infer the connection between it and the hill which is the minor term. He argues against the first mentioned logicians saying that if they infer *fire* from smoke they gain no new knowledge from this inference, for it is already known that smoke is inseparably connected with fire. His argument against the other logicians is that they are not able to infer the *connection*, for connection implies two things, whereas here only one thing, *viz.*, the hill, is visible, but the other *viz.*, fire, is not visible. What then do we really infer from smoke? Dignāga says it is not fire nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is the *fiery* hill that is inferred.

• Inference.

What Dignāga meant to say is

The Nyāya-sūtra distinctly mentions the eye, ear, nose, tongue and touch as sense organs. But as regards the question as to whether the mind (*manas*) is a sense organ or not, the presumption from the silence is that the mind is not a sense organ according to the Nyāya-sūtra.

But Vātsyāyana, the famous Hindu commentator on the Nyāya-sūtra, interprets the silence in a quite different way, concluding therefrom that the mind (*manas*) is a sense organ according to the Nyāya-sūtra.

Dignāga contends that silence was a proof of assent. Why did the Nyāya-sūtra not remark a word regarding the other five sense-organs too?

Dignāga writes:—

ཤེས་པ་ནི་འདྲ་བ་ཁམས་ལས་ཏེ། ཕྱིར།
ཁ་ཅིག་རྟོག་གེ་པས་ཁ་ཅིག་ཏུ། ཞེས།
རྟོགས་ལྡན་རྟོགས་ཅན་ཕྱི་ཕྱིར།
ཁ་ཅིག་འཇིག་པ་ཁ་ལྟར་ལས།
རྟོགས་ལ་ཤེས་ནི་ཀུན་ཏུ་ཡང་ཡོད།
གདོན་ནོས་ཅི ཇི་ལྟར་ཡང་ཕན་ཏེད།
ཅི ལ་ཏོགས་ཤན ལ་ནི ཀྱིད།
ཅི་ཕྱིར་ཐེག་ཆུ་ལ་ཏོ་ལོ ཅིད།
ཇི་ལྟར་ཕ་ལ་ལ་ཡང་ཁ་ཏོ་ཅིང།

Comparison and Verbal Testimony rejected

47. In chapter III Dignāga says that an Inference for the sake of others consists in making explicit a matter which was inferred by one's own self.[1] In chapter IV, he rejects Comparison as a separate source of knowledge. He says that when we recognise a thing it is just Perception of a familiar thing; we really perform an act of Perception. Hence Comparison or Recognition of Similarity is not a separate source of knowledge but is included in Perception. In chapter V he rejects "Credible Word" or "Verbal Testimony" as a separate source of knowledge. He asks: what is the significance of a "Credible Word"? Does it mean that the person who spoke the word is reliable or that (what he asserts) is reliable?[2] "If the person [illegible] Pramāṇa is credible, it is a more infer-

ཚད་ཕྱིར་ཡང་ངེ་ཤེས་ཡིན།

བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ངེས་ཤེས་ལ་ཁྱད་པར་ཅན།

ལན་ཅིག་ཏུ་ཡང་ངེ་ཤེས་ཡིན་ཕྱིར།

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter II).

(2) In Sanskrit [illegible]

[illegible]

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter II).

The Hindu logician Vācaspati Miśra has quoted and criticised these lines in the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā, I 1 5.

[1] Dignāga writes:—

ཤུགས་ཀྱི་ངེ་ཤེས་ཞེས་ཟློག

ངང་ཚུལ་ལས་ཏེ་ངེ་ཤེས་ལ་ཕྱིན

ངེ ལས་ངག་ཅུ་ཟད་ཟློ་ཕ་ཡིན།

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III).

[2] See a very interesting discussion on it in the Nyāya-vārtika I 1 6, where the Hindu logician Uddyotakara defends the Nyāya-sūtra and the Nyāya-bhāṣya from the attacks of Dignāga.

crew. On the other hand if the fact is credible, it is a case of Perception.' Hence Dignāga concludes that Credible Word or Verbal Testimony is not a separate source of knowledge, but is included in Perception and Inference.

Dignāga's Nyāya-praveśa.

48. The **Nyāya-praveśa**[1] or rather "Nyāya-praveśo nāma pramāṇa-prakaraṇam" is another excellent work on Logic by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original is lost. There exists a Tibetan translation of it which occupies two folios (184–188) of the Tangyur, section Mdo, volume Ce. This translation was prepared by the great Kashmirian Paṇḍita Śaṅkaranandana Jakseta and the Sākya monk Gyaltsen Pal-bzang, in the great Sakya monastery of Western Tibet. The work in Tibetan is called "Tshad-ma'i-rigs-pa'i-lhung-bzed-ces-bya-ba", signifying "The Door of Entrance to Logic." It opens thus:—

"Demonstration and refutation together with their fallacies are useful in attaining well-being; and Perception and Inference together with their fallacies are useful for self-understanding among those I compile this Śāstra."[2]

Parts of a Syllogism.

49. Some of the subjects dealt with in the work are noticed below.

[1] Vide Vācaspatimiśra's commentary on the Nyāya-vārtika I. 1. 7.

[2] I recently met the Nyāya-praveśa from the Tangyur, and the Tibetan Tangyur which was placed at my disposal by the Tashi Lama. I have now brought a copy of the Nyāya-praveśa from the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim which I visited in May 1907. This is probably the same as "Nyāya-dvāra-śāstra" of *Vide* Taranātha's History of Buddhism, p. 180, and Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Nos. 1224 and 1224 (1). The Sanskrit Hetu-vidyā as preserved in China and Japan, pp. 36–60, where Śaṅkaranandana's Nyāya-praveśa-tarka-śāstra is quoted.

ལྷ་ཆགས་ལས་ནི་ཐུན་ནས་ཀྱང་།
ཁྱད་ཆོས་ཅན་ཡིན་ལ་ཡང་ནི་ཡིན་ཏེ།
རང་ཉིད་ཐུགས་ལ་ནི ཕྱི་ཕྱི་ལ་ཐུ ལ་ཀ།
ལྷ་ཆགས་ལས་ཐུན་ནས ལ་ལ ཀ ཡིན།
ཤེས་ཕ ལ ལ ལ

Reasoning according to the Nyāya pravesa is carried on by means of a minor term, a major term, a middle term and two examples. The minor term is also called the subject (in Sanskrit *pakṣa* or *dharmin*, and in Tibetan phyogs-can). The major term is otherwise called the predicate (in Sanskrit *sādhya* or *dharma*, in Tibetan bsgrub-par bya-ba or chos). The middle term is also called the reason or mark (in Sanskrit *hetu* or *liṅga*, in Tibetan gtan-tshigs or ḥbyed-par byed). The example (called in Sanskrit *dṛṣṭānta*, in Tibetan dpe-bsdu) is of two kinds, viz. (1) homogeneous (in Sanskrit *sādharmya*, in Tibetan chos-athun-pa) and (2) heterogeneous (in Sanskrit *vaidharmya*, in Tibetan chos-mi-mthun-pa).

Form of a syllogism.

50. The form of reasoning is as follows:—

(1) This hill is fiery,
(2) Because it has smoke,
(3) All that has smoke is fiery like a kitchen, and whatever is not fiery has no smoke like a lake.

Here hill is the minor term, 'fiery' the major term, smoke the middle term, 'kitchen' a homogeneous example and lake a heterogeneous example.

Thesis.

51. A minor term and a major term linked together constitute a proposition, e.g.

The *hill* (minor term) is *fiery* (major term).

A proposition which is offered for proof is a Thesis.

Five Faults of Thesis.

52. There are certain types of thesis which cannot stand the test of proof and are therefore fallacious.

The following theses are faulty:—

(1) A thesis incompatible with perception, such as "sound is inaudible."

(2) A thesis incompatible with inference, such as "A pot is eternal."

(Really "A pot is non-eternal because it is a product.")

(3) A thesis incompatible with the public opinion, such as "Man's head is pure because it is the limb of an animate being." (Or "money is an abominable thing." For some men like me may say "money is an abominable thing" but the world does not say so.)

[1] In Tibetan phyogs-bar-ston (ཕྱོགས་བར་སྟོན) or in Sanskrit *pakṣapratiṣedha* (पक्षप्रतिषेध).

(4) A thesis incompatible with one's own belief or doctrine, such as: A Vaiśeṣika philosopher saying: "sound is eternal."

(5) A thesis incompatible with one's own statement such as: "My mother is barren."

(6) A thesis with an unfamiliar minor term, such as: The Buddhist speaking to the Sāṃkhya: "Sound is perceptible." (Sound as a subject well known to the Mīmāṃsaka but not to the Sāṃkhya.)

(7) A thesis with an unfamiliar major term, such as: The Sāṃkhya speaking to the Buddhist: "The soul is minute."

(8) A thesis with both the terms unfamiliar, such as: The Vaiśeṣika speaking to the Buddhist: "The soul has feelings as pleasurable, etc."

The Buddhist neither deals with the soul nor with its feelings.

(9) A thesis universally accepted, such as: "Fire is warm." (This thesis cannot be adduced for proof as it is accepted by all.)

Three characteristics of the Middle Term.

34. The Middle Term (Hetu) must possess three characteristics, viz.:

(1) The whole of the minor term (pakṣa) must be connected with the middle term, *e.g.*

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
Like a pot but unlike ether.

In this reasoning product, which is the middle term includes the whole of sound, which is the minor term.

(2) All things denoted by the middle term must be homogeneous with things denoted by the major term, *e.g.*

All things produced are non-eternal as a pot.

(3) None of the things heterogeneous from the major term must be a thing denoted by the middle term, *e.g.*

No non-non-eternal (that is, non-eternal) thing is a product, as ether.

34. If we suppose the minor term or subject to be 'S', the middle term or reason to be 'R' and the major term or predicate to be 'P', then the above-mentioned three characteristics of the middle term may be symbolically set forth as follows:

(1) All S is R.
(2) All R is P.
(3) No R is non-P.

Called in Tibetan: rtsa ba'i tshul gsum (གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་གསུམ) and in Sanskrit: Liṅgasya trairūpyam: लिङ्गस्य त्रैरूप्यम्.

Now, the negative aspect of the middle term, viz., as R is not P, only confirms the truth conveyed by one of the positive aspects, viz., that R is P. Hence we may put aside the negative aspect, and exhibit the positive aspects as follows:

(1) All S is R.
(2) All R is P.

Again, in the above instances R and P may be taken in their whole extent or partially. So the two positive aspects mentioned above may be fully exhibited as follows:

(1) (*a*) All S is all R.
(*b*) All S is some R.
(2) (*a*) All R is all P.
(*b*) All R is some P.

Combining aspect (1) with aspect (2) together we find that a syllogism may be set up in the following forms:

(1) All S is all P (conclusion):
Because All S is all R,
All R is all P.
(2) All S is some P (conclusion):
Because All S is all R,
All R is some P.
(3) All S is some P (conclusion):
Because All S is some R,
All R is all P.
(4) All S is some P (conclusion):
Because All S is some R,
All R is some P.

Hence we find that Dignâga admits only two conclusions:

All S is all P, and
All S is some P.

Relative extension of the Middle Term and the Major Term.

5. The second and third of the characteristics mentioned above indicate the relative extension of the middle term and major term. They show that the middle term is universally or inseparably connected with the major term. This universal or inseparable connection between them is called in Sanskrit *Vyapti* and in Tibetan *Khyab* which was, as far as I find, first discovered by Dignâga.

Supposing that the middle term or reason is R and the major term or predicate is P, the connection between the two terms may be symbolically set forth as follows:

(1) All R is all P, and
(2) All R is some P.

(6) Owing to the existence of one or more of the three characteristics there are fallacies of the Middle Term which may be of fourteen kinds as follows :—

Fallacies of the Middle term

A. The *unproved* (Sanskrit Asiddha, Tibetan Ma grub) which occurs :

(1) When the lack of truth of the middle term is recognised by both the parties, *e.g.*

Sound is non-eternal
Because it is *visible*

Neither of the parties admit that sound is visible.

(2) When the lack of truth of the middle term is recognised by one party only, *e.g.*

Sound is evolved,
Because it is a *product*

(The Mīmāṁsakas do not admit that sound is a product.)

(3) When the truth of the middle term is questioned, *e.g.*

The hill is fiery
Because there is *vapour*.

(Vapour may or may not be an effect of fire and may or may not be connected with it otherwise.)

(4) When it is questioned whether the minor term is predicable of the middle term, *e.g.*

Ether is a substance,
Because it has qualities.

(It is questioned whether ether has qualities.)

B. The *uncertain* (Sanskrit Anaikānta, Tibetan Ma nges pa) which occurs :

(5) When the middle term is too general, abiding equally in the major term as well as in the opposite of it, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is *knowable*.

(The 'knowable' is too general because it abides in the eternal as well as the non-eternal. This is a fallacy of being too general called in Sanskrit *Sādhāraṇa* and in Tibetan *Thun mon*.)

(6) When the middle term is not general enough, abiding neither in the major term nor in its opposite, *e.g.*

In Tibetan *Gtan tshigs-ltar snaṅ* (གཏན་ཚིགས་ལྟར་སྣང) and in Sanskrit: Hetābhāsa (हेत्वाभास).

Sound is eternal,
Because it is audible

(This is a fallacy of being not general enough called in Sanskrit *Asādharana* and in Tibetan Thun-mon-ma-yin)

(7) When the middle term abides in some of the things homogeneous with and in all things heterogeneous from the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is not a product of effort,
Because it is *non-eternal*

(The non-eternal abides in some of the things which are not products of effort such as lightning and abides in all things which are not non-products of effort)

(8) When the middle term abides in some of the things heterogeneous from, and in all things homogeneous with the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is a product of effort,
Because it is non-eternal

(The non-eternal abides in some of the things which are not products of effort as lightning and abides in all things which are products of effort).

(9) When the middle term abides, in some of the things homogeneous with and in some heterogeneous from, the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal

(Some incorporeal things are eternal as ether but others are not as intelligence).

(10) When there is a mutual contradiction, that is, when a thesis and its contradictory are both supported by what appear to be valid reasons *e.g.*

The Vaiseika speaking to the Mimâmsaka:

"Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product."

The Mimânsaka speaking to the Vaiseika

"Sound is eternal,
Because it is always audible."

(Both of the reasonings are correct, but as they lead to contradictory conclusions they are classed as *uncertain*)

C The contradictory (Sanskrit Viruddha, Tibetan Hgal-wa) which occurs

(11) When the middle term is contradictory to the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is a product.

(Product is inconsistent with eternal)

(12) When the middle term is contradictory to the implied major term, *e.g.*

The eyes, etc., are serviceable to some being,
Because they are made of particles,
Like a bed, seat, etc.[1]

(Here the major term 'serviceable to some being' is ambiguous for the apparent meaning of 'some being' is the body but the implied meaning of it is 'the soul.' Though things 'made of particles' are serviceable to the body, they are not according to the Sāṁkhya serviceable to the soul which is attributeless. Hence there is contradiction between the middle term and the implied major term)

(13) When the middle term is inconsistent with the minor term, *e.g.*

Sāmānya (generality) is neither substance, quality nor action,
Because it depends upon one substance and possesses quality and action.

(*Sāmānya* or generality does not depend upon one substance etc.)

(14) When the middle term is inconsistent with the implied minor term, *e.g.*

Objects are stimuli of action;
Because they are apprehended by the senses.

('Objects' is ambiguous meaning (1) things and (2) purposes. The middle term is inconsistent with the minor term in the second meaning).

Dignāga's theory of example. Example converted to universal proposition.

57. An example before the time of Dignāga served as a more familiar case which was cited to help the understanding of the former, *e.g.*

The hill is fiery,
Because it has smoke,
Like a kitchen (example).

Asaṅga (q.v.) made the example more serviceable to reasoning, but Dignāga converted it into a universal proposition, that

1. This example may lead us to presume that the author of Nyāya-praveśa knew Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's Sāṁkhya-kārikā which is the oldest of the works on Sāṁkhya philosophy that have come down to us.

is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

The hill is fiery ;
Because it has smoke ;
All that has smoke is fiery, as a kitchen (homogeneous example).

This is an example of homogeneous. A heterogeneous example is thus given :
Whatever is not fiery has not smoke, as a lake.

38. Examples have already been stated to be of two kinds, viz. 1. Homogeneous and 2. Heterogeneous. Each of these kinds becomes fallacious under certain circumstances.

Fallacies of the homogeneous example.

Fallacies of the homogeneous example are the following :

(1) An example of homogeneous with the middle term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
That which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms.

(The atoms cannot serve as an example because they are not incorporeal. This is called a fallacy of the Excluded Middle Term.)

(2) An example not homogeneous with the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
That which is incorporeal is eternal as intelligence.

(Intelligence cannot serve as an example because it is not eternal. This is called a fallacy of the Excluded Major Term.)

(3) An example homogeneous with neither the middle term nor the major term, *e.g.*

The universal proposition (*i.e.* the proposition expressive of the universal relation between the middle term and the major term) was as the major premise of a syllogism of the second figure in Greek logic from Aristotle. It was unknown in India. Dignāga was the very first to introduce the universal proposition into the history of Indian Logic and it was a great development of the proposition but not first approached by Asaṅga in India.

* Called in Tibetan Chos ethun dpe ltar snaṅwa (ཆོས་མཐུན་རྟགས་ལ་ལ་ཡོད་ཕ་) and in Sanskrit Sādharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāsa (साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभास).

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
That which is incorporeal is eternal, as a pot

(The pot cannot serve as an example because it is neither incorporeal nor eternal. This is called a fault of the Excluded Middle and Major Terms)

(4) A heterogeneous example showing a lack of universal connection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

This person is passionate,
Because he is a speaker,
Whatever is a speaker is passionate, as a certain man in Magadha.

(Though a certain man in Magadha may be both a speaker and passionate, there is nevertheless no universal connection between being a speaker and being passionate. This is a fault of Absence of Connection called in Sanskrit Anaikānta, in Tibetan Ḥbyeḡ-su-ḥgro-wa-med.)

(5) A homogeneous example showing an inverse connection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product of effort,
Whatever is non-eternal is a product of effort, as a pot

(The pot cannot serve as an example because though it is both non-eternal and a product of effort, the connection between the major term and the middle term has been inverted, i.e., all products of effort are non-eternal, but all non-eternals are not products of effort. This is a fault of Inverse Connection called in Sanskrit Viparītānvaya, in Tibetan Ḥbyeḡ-su-ḥgro-wa phyin-ci-log-pa).

Faults of the heterogeneous (59) Faults of the heterogeneous generic example are the following

(1) An example not heterogeneous from the opposite of the middle term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal
Because it is incorporeal,
Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as intelligence

[illegible] Tibetan [illegible] Vaiśeṣika attributes peculiar to Buddhism (ཁྱད་པར་ཆོས་ཀ་ཀ
ཀ་ཀ་ཀ), and in Sanskrit Vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta वैधर्म्य
दृष्टान्तः

(Intelligence is non-eternal yet incorporeal. This is a fallacy of Included Middle Term in a heterogeneous example.)

(7) An example not heterogeneous from the opposite of the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as atoms.

(The atoms are not incorporeal yet they are eternal. This is a fallacy of Included Major Term in a heterogeneous example.)

(8) An example heterogeneous from neither the opposite of the middle term nor the opposite of the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot.

(A pot is neither eternal nor incorporeal. This is called a fallacy of Included Middle and Major Terms in a heterogeneous example.)

(9) A heterogeneous example showing an absence of disconnection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

This person is passionate,
Because he is a speaker,
Whoever is non-passionate is not a speaker, as a piece of stone.

(This is called a fallacy of Absence of Disconnection of a heterogeneous example).

(10) A heterogeneous example showing an absence of inverse disconnection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
Whatever is non-product is not non-eternal, as ether.

The example should be inverted as

Whatever is non-non-eternal, *i.e.* eternal, is not a product, as ether. This is called a fallacy of Inverted Negation of a heterogeneous example.

(11) All the three kinds of fallacies of the Thesis, Middle Term and Example are fallacies of reasoning. Refutation (called in Sanskrit Dūsana and in Tibetan Sun-ḥbyin) consists in finding out in the reasoning of the opponent any one of the fallacies aforementioned. Fallacy of Refutation (called in

Sanskrit Dūsanābhāsa and in Tibetan Sun-hbyin-ltar-snan-wa) consists in the very a fallacy where there is no fallacy at all.

61 Perception and Inference are the two kinds of valid knowledge for one's own self. Perception (called in Sanskrit Pratyakṣa and in Tibetan Mngon-sum) is knowledge derived through the senses. It is free from illusory experiences and is not connected with name, genus, etc. Inference called in Sanskrit Anumāna and in Tibetan Rjes-su-dpag-pa is the knowledge of objects derived from a mark. (Tibetan Rtags or middle term which has three characteristics. There are Fallacies of Perception as well as of Inference called respectively Pratyakṣābhāsa and Anumānābhāsa in Sanskrit and Mngon-sum-ltar-snan-ba and Rjes-su-dpag-ltar-snan-ba in Tibetan.)

• Perception and Inference and their Fallacies.

Dignāga's Hetu cakra hamaru.

62 The **Hetu cakra hamaru**[1] is another small treatise on Logic by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original is lost, but a Tibetan translation is preserved in the Tanjur section Mdo, folios 193-194. The Tibetan translation was prepared by the sage Bodhisattva of Zahor and the Bhikṣu Dharmākara. The work in Tibetan is called Gtan-tshigs-kyi-'khor-lo-gsal-ba-bsgrubs-pa, signifying "the Wheel of Reasons put in order." It begins thus:—

"Bowing down to the Omniscient One (Buddha), who has destroyed the net of errors, I explain the system of three characteristics of the Reason (or Middle Term)."

In this work Dignāga has analysed all nine possible relations between the middle and the major terms and has found that there

[1] I brought a copy of the Tibetan version of the Hetu-cakra-hamaru from the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim where I visited in Jan 1907. It a work is probably the same as the Hetu-dvāra-śāstra (vide Takakusu's I-tsing, p. 187)

' འགྲུལ་པའི་དྲྭ་བ་རྣམ་པར་རྒྱལ་ཞིང།
ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ནས།
གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་ཅན་ཡིན།
གཏན་ལས་ཁྱབ་བྱེད་ཕ་ཆད་ལས་ཀྱང།

(Hetu-chakra-hamaru).

[illegible] from two relations which correspond to the three characteristics of the middle term already laid down, and the remaining seven relations are at variance with these characteristics. Accordingly we are compelled that only two relations are valid as will be evident from the annexed diagram.

OTHER WORKS OF DIGNĀGA

Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti.

65. The **Pramāṇa samuccaya vṛtti** is a commentary on the Pramāṇa-samuccaya by Dignāga himself. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[1] which extends over folios 1[illegible]–[illegible] of the Tangyur section Mdo volume [illegible]. The Tibetan translation was prepared at the command of king Ral-pa-can by the famous Indian sage Vasudhara (Dbyig-gnyen) and the Tibetan interpreter Sha-ma-[illegible]-pa-ye-śes-sde. In Tibetan it is called Tshad-ma-kun-las-btus-pa-ṭīk-pa. It is divided into six chapters corresponding to those of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya itself. At the end of the work it is stated that "[illegible] by the command of Mang-po-bzaṅ (the god of learning) Dignāga the great Lord of Sharpa-tshal wrote this sastra which is as deep as the ocean."

66. [illegible] another translation of the **Pramāṇa samuccaya vṛtti** in Tibetan extending over folios [illegible] of the Tangyur section Mdo volume [illegible]. It was prepared by the Indian sage Hor-a Vasu (called in Tibetan Dge-bsñen-gyi-ṭīka) and the Tibetan interpreter Dge-ba-sñiṅ-po in the monastery of Sri-waḥ-[illegible].

Pramāṇa-śāstra-praveśa.

67. **Pramāṇa śāstra praveśa**[2] is another work by Dignāga. It was translated into Chinese by the Chinese interpreter [illegible]. The Chinese version was translated into Tibetan by the Chinese scholar Dge-ses-sñiṅ-po and the Tibetan monk Shiṅ-ṭhoṅ in the Sakya monastery of Western Tibet. The Sanskrit original of the work appears to be lost, but the Tibetan version still exists. It consists of folios [illegible]–[illegible] of the Tangyur section Mdo volume [illegible]. In Tibetan the work is called Tshad-ma-la-ḥjug-pa-ṭīk-pa-ḥjig-rten-la-sgron-ma. "An Entrance to the Science of Logic."

[1] I have consulted the Tibetan xylographic edition of this work in the possession of the India Office Library.

[2] I have consulted the Tibetan xylographic edition of this work in the possession of the India Office Library.

Ālambana-parīkṣā

68. The Ālambana-parīkṣā[1] is another work by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation which consists of one folio only (fols. 180), of the Tangyur section Mdo, volume Ce. The work in Tibetan is called Dmigs-pa-brtag-pa, signifying "An Examination of the Objects of Thought." It begins with an invocation to Buddha and all Bodhisattvas.

Ālambana-parīkṣā-vṛtti.

69. The Ālambana-parīkṣā-vṛtti[2] is a commentary on the Ālambana-parīkṣā by Dignāga (no. 68). The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan version which is embodied in the Tangyur section Mdo, volume Ce, folios 180–182. The work in Tibetan is called Dmigs-pa-brtag-pahi-ḥgrel.

Trikāla-parīkṣā.

70. The Trikāla-parīkṣā is a work by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan version in the Tangyur section Mdo, volume Ce, folios 182–184. This version was prepared by the great Pandita Śāntakara Gupta and the interpreter-monk Ishi-bodhi-ras-pal-bzang-po. The work in Tibetan is called Dus-gsum-brtag-pa-zes-bya-ba, "An Examination of Three Times."[3]

ŚAŚKARA SVĀMIN (ABOUT 750 A.D.).

71. Śaṅkara Svāmin,[4] as it appears from Chinese records, was a pupil of Dignāga. He seems to have been a native of Southern India. Logic is said to have been revealed down by Dignāga through Śaṅkara Svāmin and ten other masters to Śīlabhadra, who was the head of the Nālandā University and the favourite teacher of the Chinese pilgrim Hwen-thsang in

[1] I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work as contained in the India Office, London. This apparently is the same as "Ālambana-pratyaya-Dhīra-śāstra." (Burn. Nep., p. 9, and the Chinese Tripiṭaka, No. 1175, and Taishō, p. 185.)

[2] I have consulted the xylograph of this work as contained in the India Office, London.

[3] I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work as contained in the India Office, London. This work is known in Sanskrit as "Trikālaparīkṣā-śāstra" (Burn. Nep., p. 9) or "Trikālaparīkṣā-śāstra" (Taishō, p. 185). The word "śāstra" is evidently a mistake for "parīkṣā."

[4] See Dr. Sugiura's Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan, pp. 30, 31.

635 A.D. According to the Chinese Tripitaka Sankara Swāmin was the author of a work called Nyāya-pravesa Tarka-śāstra which was translated into Chinese by Hiuen-tsang in 647 A.D. This work seems to be different from the "Nyāya-pravesa" or more fully the "Nyāya-pravesa-nama-prakarana-śāstra" which as we have seen was edited by Dignāga.

DHARMAPĀLA (ABOUT 600–635 A.D.).

73. Dharmapāla[1] a native was a native of Kāncipura in Dravida (modern Conjeeveram in Madras). He was the eldest son of a great minister of the country. From his childhood he exhibited marks of cleverness and as he was a favourite with the king and queen of the country he obtained a great standing at a least. In the evening of the day on which he was crowned with honours a discussion on the rules of a Buddhist recluse he left home and lapped himself with antagonistic instructions in training. He was admitted into the University at Nālandā (*vide* Appendix A) and he acquired great distinction. Subsequently he becomes the head of the University. He must have returned from Nālandā before 635 A.D. when Hiuen-tsang visited it and found that Śīlabhadra had succeeded him in the headship of the University. Dharmapāla composed with Bhartṛihari composed a Bhāṣya on Bhartṛihari's grammar.

74. He was a follower of the Yogācāra philosophy and was the author of several works such as 1. Ālambana-pratyayadhīra-śāstra-vaikhyā, 2. Vidyāmātra-Siddhi-śāstra-vaikhyā and 3. Satyasastra-vaikhyā, which was translated into Chinese in 630 A.D. Hiuen-tsang, who visited India in 629 A.D. found in Kāncipura the ruins of a monastery where Dharmapāla had resided the ornament of the Sangha.

ĀCĀRYA ŚĪLABHADRA (635 A.D.).

74. Śīlabhadra[2] belonged to the family of the king of Samataṭa (Bengal) and was of the Brāhmaṇa caste. He was a pupil

[1] *Vide* Beyun Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, no. 1214, and Appendix I, No. 13.

[2] The Chinese Kiu-w Sankara Swāmin at all. The Chinese pilgrim I-tsing who visited India in 671 A.D. speaks of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti but has not mention Sankara Swāmin. Even Hiuen-tsang in his Travel has not mentioned him.

[3] *Vide* Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, p. 237, vol. II, pp. 110, 221, 229 and 230. Indian Takakusu's I-tsing p. lxx and Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. 16.

[4] *Vide* Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. II, p. 110, and Takakusu's I-tsing p. 181.

of Dharmapāla at the Nālandā University (cf. Appendix A) of which subsequently he became the head. The Chinese pilgrim Hiuen-tsang was his pupil in 635 A.D. Śīlabhadra was a great logician and master of śāstras.

ĀCĀRYA DHARMAKĪRTI (ABOUT 635–650 A.D.)

77. The excellent Dharmakīrti, called in Tibetan Chos-grags, according to the accounts of all earlier sages, was born in the south in the kingdom of Cu-lu-han.[1] Since, however, there is now no country by that name and since on the other hand all the orthodox and heterodox give name Tirumalaya as the birth-place of Dharmakīrti, it is to be accepted that in olden times Tirumalaya was called the kingdom of Cu-lu-han. His father was a Brahmin of the Brahmanical caste, Pattrapāda Kūrmanda by name. He moved from Malaya and up with a very keen intellect he attained to great skill in the five arts, in the Vedas and Vedāṅgas in the art of healing, in grammar and in all the theories of the Tīrthas. When only sixteen or eighteen years old, he was already deeply versed in the philosophy of the Tīrthas. Occasionally he attended lectures of the Buddhists and learned that the teachings of Buddha were without faults. Hence grew up in him a strong inclination towards Buddhism. He claimed the dress of a Buddhist Upāsaka (devotee). When the Brahmanas inquired the reason of this, he praised the excellence of Buddhism for which he was interested. Hence prompted to come to Madhyadeśa[2] (Magadha) was received into the Saṅgha (priesthood) by Ācārya Dharmapāla and attained to great learning in the three Piṭakas and knew in all 500 sūtras and dhāraṇīs by heart.

78. Dharmakīrti desired to become acquainted with the

[1] Cf. Takakusu's I-tsing, p. xlv.

[2] This account is taken from Lama Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 178–180.

Cu-lu-han is probably the same as Cola or Chola country in the Eastern Deccan. As a fact Dharmakīrti was born in the Deccan. Cf. article 82 under Pramāṇa vārtika kārikā.

[2] In Pāli and Literature Madhya-deśa signifies Magadha (Behar). But Manu defines Madhya-deśa as the country lying between the Himalayas on the north, the Vindhya mountains on the south, Prayāga in the east, and the river Sarasvatī on the west:

हिमवद्विन्ध्ययोर्मध्यं यत् प्राग् विनशनादपि
प्रत्यगेव प्रयागाच्च मध्यदेशः प्रकीर्तितः ॥

Manusaṃhitā 2. 21.

In this connection cf. a very learned article named "Note on the Middle Country of Ancient India" by Rhys Davids in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, January 1904.

secret doctrine of the Tirtha system donned a slave's attire and went southward. On inquiring who was versed in the Tirtha system he was informed that the Brahmana Kumārila was an unsurpassable master of the same. The assertion that Kumārila was an uncle of Dharmakīrti is unsupported by Indian authority. Kumārila had received a large fortune from his king, owned many mounds, five hundred male slaves and five hundred female slaves and twenty hundred men. When Dharmakīrti after entering the service performed the work of fifty slaves, maidens and eunuchs, Kumārila and his wife were satisfied. They allowed him to hear the secret doctrines. Obtaining knowledge of the secret teaching from Kumārila, he left his house. With the wages which he received from Kumārila for his special services he gave a great feast to the Brāhmaṇas on the eight of his departure.

77. Dharmakīrti challenged the followers of the system of Kaṇāda named Kaṇāda Gupta and the followers of the Tirtha system and entered upon debates with them. The debates lasted for three months, during which he withstood all his opponents and converted many of them to Buddhism. Upon this Kumārila was enraged and appeared with 500 Brāhmaṇas for debate. He proposed the condition that whoever was defeated should be killed. Dharmakīrti who did not desire the death of Kumārila induced the latter to enter upon the condition that whoever was defeated should accept the doctrine of the winner. Putting *Dharma* doctrine, up as the prize they began the debate and finally Dharmakīrti was victorious. Kumārila and his 500 followers became followers of Buddha.

78. Dharmakīrti then went to the Nagaṇṭhas (Jainas), Pāśupatas and others who lived within the range of the Vindhya mountains. Returning to Dravida Dravidas he challenged by others those who were ready for debate. The majority of the Tirthas fled and some clearly confessed that they were not equal to the task. He at last visited all the religious schools that had fallen into decay in that country and lived in the vastness of the forest given up to meditation.

79. Dharmakīrti towards the end of his life erected a vihāra in the land of Kalinga and after having converted many people to the Law (*Dharma*) passed away. Those of his pupils who by their vows had become like Brahmā carried him to the cemetery for cremation. Then there fell a heavy rain of flowers and for seven days the whole country was freed with fragrance and music.

80. Dos Ācārya (Dharmakīrti) and the Tibetan king Srong-tsan-gam-po are said to have been contemporaries, which statement might be accepted as authoritative.

81 From this account it is evident that Dharmakīrti was a pupil of Dharmapāla. As the latter lived in 635 A.D., Dharmakīrti must also have lived about that time. This date agrees well with the statement that Dharmakīrti was a contemporary of the Tibetan king Srongtsan-gampo who lived during 627—698 A.D.[1] It seems that in 635 A.D. Dharmakīrti was very young as Hiuen-tsang does not mention him. On the other hand I-tsing, who travelled over India during 671—695 A.D., declares emphatically that Dharmakīrti made further improvement in Logic[2] after Dignāga. The Brahmanical logician Udyotakara[3] is attacked by Dharmakīrti. The Mīmāṁsaka Śaṁkarasvāmin[4] (author of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtika) and the Digambara Jaina Vidyānandin[5] (author of the Aṣṭasahasrī) have on the contrary criticised the definition of perception (*Pratyakṣa*) as given by Dharmakīrti, who is sometimes designated by the shorter name Kīrti. Vācaspati Miśra[6] too quotes Dharmakīrti to criticise him.

Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā.

82 Dharmakīrti is the author of numerous works on Logic. The **Pramāṇa vārtika kārikā** is one of them. A verse of this work was quoted by the Hindu philosopher Madhusūdana Sarasvatī

[1] See Wassilief, p. 64, and Csoma de Kőrös, Tibetan Grammar, p. 181.

[2] Takakusu's I-tsing, p. lviii.

[3] See K. B. Pathak, Dharmakīrti and Kumārila, *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1892, vol. xx, p. 2.

[4] Cf. चिन्तेव क्षणिकाभावादिति यत्तत्कथं मिथः
तत्प्रत्यक्षं प्रसिद्धत्वं चोदनाजो न संशयः ॥
(Śaṁkarasvāmin's Bṛhadāraṇyaka vārtika, Ānandāśrama edition, p. 1.)

[5] See the *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. xix, 1888—97, p. 50.

[6] Cf. यत्तावत् भगवता धर्मकीर्तिना—
तत्प्रत्यक्षं न च ज्ञाने ज्ञानाभावस्वरूपतः
एकस्य प्रतिपित्सोरुत्पत्तिर्न च संभवः ॥
(Vācaspati's Bhāmatī on Vedānta-sūtra 2-2-26)

[1] The verse runs thus
भद्रं यत्प्रत्यक्षिकाणां इन्द्रियाद्यविकल्पकं ॥
(Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā quoted in Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's Advaita-siddhi, chapter on Buddhist Logic)

the 14th century A.D. The following story[1] is told regarding the composition of this work:—

It is said that Dharmakīrti studied many dialectic śāstras, but his spirit was not satisfied. Once at the house of one Īśvara Sena,[2] a pupil of Dignāga, he heard the Pramāṇa samuccaya. Having heard it for the first time he at once became as proficient as Īśvara Sena who had minutely studied the work. When he heard it the second time he became like Dignāga, the author of the work, and when he heard it the third time, he recognised several errors in the work. When he mentioned them to Īśvara Sena, the latter, so far from being displeased, told him that he was at liberty to condemn all the mistakes of the work and to propose a critical commentary on it. With the permission thus received he composed a metrical commentary on the Pramāṇa samuccaya, called the Pramāṇa-vārttika kārikā.

84. The Sanskrit original of the Pramāṇa-vārttika appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation of it in the Tangyur, section Mdo, volume Ce, folios 191—208. This translation was prepared by the Indian sage Śākyaśrī-sen and the Tibetan interpreter Dge-wahi-ḥbyes. The work in Tibetan is called Tshad ma rnam ḥgrel gyi tshig leur byas pa, signifying 'Memorial Verses explanatory of *Pramāṇa* or Sources of Knowledge.' The work is divided into four chapters as follows: (1) Inference for one's own self (in Tibetan Rang-don-gyi-ḥjug-pa, in Sanskrit Svārthānumāna), (2) Establishment of *Pramāṇa* (in Tibetan Tshad-ma-ñid-grub-pa, in Sanskrit Pramāṇa-siddhi), (3) Perception (in Tibetan Mṅon-sum, in Sanskrit Pratyakṣa) and (4) Words for the sake of others (in Tibetan Gshan-gyi-don-gyi-tshig, in Sanskrit Parārtha-vākya). The work concludes by stating that it was written by the great sage Śrī Dharmakīrti.

The Tibetan version of the verse runs as follows:

ཤེས་བྱ་ཀུན་ལ་ཁྱབ་བདག་ཅིང་ཐུགས་རྗེ་ཆེ||
མཁས་པའི་གྲགས་ཅན་ཆོས་ཀྱི་རྒྱལ་པོ||

(Pramāṇa-vārttika-kārikā, embodied in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ce, folio 210. Tr. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Le Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques, p. 34.)

[1] See Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p. 170.

[2] It seems that Īśvara Sena, in whose house Dharmakīrti heard the Pramāṇa samuccaya, was not a direct pupil of Dignāga, for, while Dignāga lived about 500 A.D., Dharmakīrti lived about 625 A.D.

[3] I have consulted the copy of this work embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office, London.

who was born in and whose fame filled the entire earth."[1] It is further stated that he was born in the Deccan (in Tibetan Yulgho-phyogs).

Pramāṇa vārtika-vṛtti.

84. There was a sub-commentary on the Pramāṇa-vārtika kārikā called **Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti** by Dharmakīrti himself. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost. There exists however, a Tibetan translation[2] of it in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 420—535. In Tibetan the work is named Tshad-ma-rnam-'grel-gyi-'grel-pa. In the concluding lines of the work Dharmakīrti is described as "a great teacher and dialectician whose fame filled all quarters of the earth and who was as it were a lion pressing down the heart of elephant-like debaters."[3]

Pramāṇa-viniścaya.

85. **Pramāṇa viniścaya** quoted[4] by Madhavācārya is another work on logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original

[1] ཕྱིས་ལས་ཀྱི་ཀུན་ཏུ་ཡང་ཁ་ཅིག་ཏུ་ཡང་ཁ་ཅིག ། ཤུ་ཀ་ཏ ཡུལ་
ལས་ཀྱང་ཁ་ཅིག་ཏུ་ཡང་ཁ་ཅིག ། ཡུལ་ཆེ་ཆེ་ཡི་ཁ་ལ་ཁ་ཅིག ། ཁ
ཅིག ། ཁ ། ཁ ། ཁ

of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[1] of it in the Tangyur (Mdo, Ce, folios 259—347). The translation was prepared by the Kashmirian Pandita Parahita Bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter Rin-chen-sde-grub in the matchless city of Kasmira. The work in Tibetan is entitled Tshad ma rnam par-gtan-pa, signifying "Determination of Pramāṇa or Sources of Knowledge." The work is divided into three chapters as follows: (1) System of Perception (in Tibetan Mngon-sum-gyi-tshul-la-dpyad-pa, in Sanskrit Pratyakshavyavasthā); (2) Inference for one's own self (in Tibetan Rang-gi-don-gyi-rjes-su-dpag-pa, in Sanskrit Svārthānumāna); and (3) Inference for the sake of others (in Tibetan Gshan-gyi-don-gyi-rjes-su-dpag-pa, in Sanskrit Parārthānumāna). In the concluding lines Dharmakīrti is described as a great sage of unrivalled fame born in Southern India.

Prof. [illegible] Vidyābhūṣaṇa has given in his "[illegible]" (pp. 42 and 34) identified [illegible] verses with their Tibetan versions as follows:—

ཚུལ་ཁོན་མངའ་ཤེས་བྱ་ཀུན་ནས།།
ནི་ཟླ་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཁ་ལས་ཤེས།།
གཞན་དང་བདེན་ལྡན་ཀུན་ལ་ཡང་ཕྱིར།
ཇི་ལྟ་ཇི་ལྟར་ཏེ་ཤེས་ཕན་ཡིན།། (ཀ)
ལྷག་ཏུ་ཆེ་ནས་ཐ་ཅིག་ལ ཕ ཅ ལ ལ ཕ ཅ ལ ལ ཕ ཅ ལ

Nyāya-bindu.

86 **Nyāya-bindu** is another excellent work on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work was discovered among the palm-leaf manuscripts preserved in the Jaina temple of Santinātha Candra, and has been published in the Bibliotheca Indica series of Calcutta by Professor Peterson. There exists a Tibetan translation of the work in the Tanjur, Mdo, folios 347—355. The work in Tibetan is called Rigs-pai-thigle-pa (signifying "A Drop of Logic"). It is divided into three chapters as follows: (1) Perception (in Tibetan Mngon-sum, in Sanskrit Pratyakṣa); (2) Inference for one's own self (in Tibetan Rjes-su-dpag-pa, in Sanskrit Svārthānumāna); and (3) Inference for the sake of others (in Tibetan Gzhan-gyi-don-du-yes-su-dpag-pa, in Sanskrit Parārthānumāna). Some of the subjects discussed in the work are noted below.

87 In chapter I it is stated that all objects of man are accomplished by perfect or valid knowledge. Valid knowledge is of two kinds: (1) Perception (in Sanskrit Pratyakṣa) and (2) Inference (in Sanskrit Anumāna). Perception which is knowledge derived through the senses, etc., is described as that which is free from illusory experiences (*kalpanā*) and devoid of confusion (*abhrānta*). Illusory experiences are the experiences of false images which appear real as if they were capable of being addressed and touched, e.g. the shadow of a tree may appear as the tree itself, or a rope may appear as a snake. Confusion is engendered by such causes as dizziness, quick motion, journey by boat, smoking, etc., for instance, to a man journeying by boat trees on both banks appear to move. Perception is of four kinds: (1) perception by the five senses, (2) perception by the mind, (3) self-consciousness, and (4) knowledge of a contemplative saint. An object of perception is like itself (svalakṣaṇa), while an object of inference is like any one of its class (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), for instance, a cow which I see is a peculiar one possessing an infinite number of qualities which distinguish it from all cows, whereas a cow which I infer is a general one possessing certain qualities in common with other cows, that is, perception is individual knowledge, while inference is general knowledge. According to the proximity or remoteness of an object, perception of it varies. This is the peculiar characteristic of an object of perception, and this characteristic proves the object to be absolutely real (paramārthasat) as it

Perception

I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of the Nyāya-bindu contained in the Library of the India Office, London, as also the excellent edition of F. J. Shcherbatski.

shows that it possesses some practical efficacy, and its characteristic also shows that perception is a source of valid knowledge for it exactly corresponds to the object perceived.

Inference for one's own self

88. In chapter II Inference for one's own self (Svarthānumāna) is defined as the knowledge of the inferred through the reason or middle term, with its three forms or characteristics. In the instance "this hill has fire, because it has smoke," the knowledge of the hill as having fire is derived through smoke which is the reason or middle term. The three forms or characteristics of the reason or middle term are the following:—

(1) The middle term must be connected with the minor term, *e.g.*

The hill has fire,
Because it has smoke,
Like a kitchen but unlike a lake.

In this reasoning there must be "smoke" on the "hill."

(2) The middle term must abide only in cases which are homogeneous with the major term, *e.g.* in the above reasoning "smoke" abides in a kitchen which is homogeneous with things that contain fire.

(3) The middle term must never abide in cases which are heterogeneous from the major term, *e.g.* in the above reasoning "smoke" does not abide in a lake which is heterogeneous from things that contain fire.

Three kinds of the middle term

89. The middle term is of three kinds according to the relation which it bears to the major term, thus:—

(1) Identity (in Tibetan Rang-bhin, in Sanskrit Svabhāva), *e.g.*

This is a tree,
Because it is śiṁśapā.

(2) Effect (in Tibetan Hbras-bu, in Sanskrit Kārya), *e.g.*
Here there is fire because there is smoke.

(3) Non-perception (in Tibetan Mi-dmigs-pa, in Sanskrit Anupalabdhi), which is of 11 kinds as follows:

i. Non-perception of identity (Svabhāvānupalabdhi), *e.g.*
Here is no smoke because it is not perceived (though smoke is of a nature as to be perceived if existent).

ii. Non-perception of effect (Kāryānupalabdhi), *e.g.*
Here there are no causes of smoke of unobstructed capacity, because there is no smoke here.

iii. Non-perception of the pervader or container (Vyāpakānupalabdhi), *e.g.*

Here there is no Simapā because there is no tree at all.

iv. Perception contrary to identity (Svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi), *e.g.*

There is no cold sensation here because there is fire.

v. Perception of the opposite effect (Viruddha-kāryopalabdhi), *e.g.*

Here there is no cold sensation because there is smoke.

vi. Perception of contrary connection (Viruddha-vyāparopalabdhi), *e.g.*

Even the destruction of the past entity is not certain, because it is dependent on other causes.

vii. Perception contrary to the effect (Kārya-viruddhopalabdhi), *e.g.*

Here there are no causes of cold of unobstructed capacity, because there is fire.

viii. Perception contrary to the container (Vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhi), *e.g.*

Here there is no cold sensation, because there is fire.

ix. Non-perception of the cause (Kāraṇānupalabdhi), *e.g.*

There is no smoke because there is no fire.

x. Perception contrary to the cause (Kāraṇa-viruddhopalabdhi), *e.g.*

Hair on his body does not stand erect because he sits near a fire.

xi. Perception of effect contrary to its cause (Kāraṇa-viruddha-kāryopalabdhi), *e.g.*

This place does not contain any person on whose body hair stands erect because there is smoke here.

90. In chapter III Inference for the sake of others (Parārthānumāna) is defined as the declaration of the three-formed middle term in words, that is, when the reason is set forth in words with a view to producing a conviction in others, it is said to be an inference for the sake of others.

Inference for the sake of others.

Inference is a kind of knowledge and words are here called inference by the attributing of effect to cause, for, though they

[illegible] themselves knowledge, they produce it. Inference for the sake of others is of two kinds: (1) direct or homogeneous, in Sanskrit Sadharmyavat, and (2) indirect or heterogeneous (in Sanskrit Vaidharmyavat), as follows:

(a) Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
All products are non-eternal as a pot (direct).

(b) Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
Not-non-eternal [illegible] eternal (Akasa) is a product as ether (indirect).

91. The minor term (Paksa) is that to which the relation of the predicate term is to be proved, as "Hill is fire, because it has smoke." In this reasoning, "hill" is the minor term which is to be proved as having "fire," which is the major term. A minor term and its corresponding major term, taken together, constitute a proposition which is adduced for proof, is called a thesis.

Fallacies of thesis or Paksabhasa.

92. There are four fallacies of the Paksabhasa (Basis of reasoning).

A thesis is fallacious if it is contradictable with:

(1) Perception, *e.g.* Sound is inaudible.

(2) Inference, *e.g.* Sound is eternal:

(a) Conception, *e.g.* The moon is not *Soma* (Soma is a plant), or (b) Own statement, *e.g.* Inference is not a source of knowledge.

Fallacies of the middle term.

93. It has already been stated that the middle term must possess three characteristics. Fallacies of the middle term (Hetvabhasa) occur in case of one of the characteristics is unproved, uncertain or contradictory. Thus:

A. Unproved (asiddha).

(1) Sound is eternal, because it is audible.
(Audibility of sound is controlled by opposite party.)

(2) Trees are conscious, because they do if their barks are taken off.
(This peculiar kind of consciousness of trees is not admitted by opponents.)

(3) The hill is fire, because it has vapour.
(Vapour is an effect of fire, questioned.)

(4) The soul is all-pervading, because it is perceived everywhere.
(It is a matter of doubt whether the soul is perceived everywhere.)

B. Uncertain (anaikāntika).

(5) Sound is non-eternal
Because it is knowable.

(The knowable is too general because it includes the eternal as well as the non-eternal).

(6) *A certain man is omniscient,
Because he is a speaker.

The reason is not general enough for speakers are not necessarily either omniscient or non-omniscient.

C. Contradictory (viruddha).

(7) Sound is eternal,
Because it is a product.

(Here 'product' is not homogeneous with 'eternal.' That is, the middle term is opposed to the major term.)

(8) Sound is eternal,
Because it is a product.

(Here 'product' is not heterogeneous from 'non-eternal.')

(9) The opposition of the middle term to the major term is a kind of contradiction which is not admitted by both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Opposition of the middle term to the implied major term (in the event of the major term being ambiguous) is noted by Dignāga in his Nyāya-praveśa as another kind of contradiction (*viruddha*). Dharmakīrti in his Nyāyabindu rejects this view saying that this second contradiction is included in the first kind. Dignāga has in his Nyāya-praveśa treated another kind of fallacy called 'non-

Dharmakīrti criticises Dignāga

* For Nyāya-praveśa fallacies, see the Middle Prose No. 12. The contradiction of the opposition of the middle term to a major term, called in Tibetan ཅོ་ཅན་ཁ་ཏགས་ཀ་ཡ། ཕ་ཡ་ལ་ཁ་ཏགས་ཀ་ཡ། Nyāya-praveśa

सव च कथाचीदपि दृश्यविपरीतदृष्टं विरुद्धः ... स एष कथाचीत्तत्र चाप्रयोजकः (Nyāyabindu, Petersburg edition, Bibliotheca Indica series chapter III, p. 113).

अत्र च विरुद्ध आचार्यं दिङ्नागेन उक्तः स कथं तु वार्तिककारेण उक्तः (Nyāyabindu, Petersburg edition, Bibliotheca Indica series chapter III, p. 78).

erroneous contradiction" (Viruddhāvyabhicāra), which it rejected by Dharmakīrti in his Nyāyabindu, on the ground that it does not arise in the case of inference but is based on the scriptures of the two parties engaged in disputation.

Dharmakīrti's Theory of example.

95. In opposition to Dignāga Dharmakīrti maintains that 'example' is not a part of a syllogism, as it is included in the middle term, *e.g.*,

The hill is fiery
Because it is smoky,
Like a kitchen.

In this reasoning the term 'smoky' includes a 'kitchen' as well as other similar things; hence it is almost unnecessary to cite the example 'kitchen'.

[illegible] (v. R. Pathak's [illegible] by the author-ship of the Nyāyabindu [illegible] in the *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. XIX, p. 51.

Pade Nyāya-pravesa, Fallacies of the Middle Term, No. 10. This fallacy of 'an erroneous contradiction' is called in Sanskrit विरुद्धाव्यभिचारी and in Tibetan འགལ་བ་ལས་ཁྱབ་པ (Nyāya-pravesa).

विरुद्धाव्यभिचार्यपि असाधारणहेतुकः। न हि तत्र कश्चाशङ्कः सम्भवति विपक्षे बाधकप्रमाणात्। (Nyāyabindu, p. 115.)

ननु चाचार्येण विरुद्धाव्यभिचार्यपि असाधारणहेतुकः। स किं चाचार्यो-दिष्टमात्रेण चर्चं हेतुदोषं उक्तः इत्याह। ... तस्माद्दाहनाचयनसमानमनाधिक्यं विरुद्धाव्यभिचार्यस्य। (Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā, p. 84.)

Compare also B. B. R. A. S., vol. XIX, p. 49.

विरुद्धो हेतुदोषः। तावतैव चर्चमानिरिति न प्रयत्न इत्याशङ्क्य तावत्तावतो बाधकः कश्चित्। तेनाह्य चर्चं प्रयत्न (न) चर्चन असाधनात्।

(Nyāyabindu, Peterson's edition, Bibliotheca Indica series, pp. 115—116.) Peterson has omitted न wrongly as will appear from the Tibetan version which runs as follows:

གལ་ཏེ་ཁོ་ནས་ཀྱང་ཁས་ལེན་ནམ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་ཁ་ཅིག ཅེས་ཟེར་ན། ཁ་ཅིག ཅེས་ཟེར་ཞེ་ན། ཁ་ཅིག ཅེ་ན། ཁ་ཅིག ཅ་ལ ཡང ཁ་ཅིག ཅ་ལ ཡང ཁ་ཅིག ཅ་ལ ཡང

Nevertheless, says Dharmakirti, the example has this much value that it points out in a particular way what has been expressed in a general form by the middle term; thus, the general expression "all smoky things are fiery" is made more impressive by the particular example 'kitchen' which is smoky as well as fiery.

96. Example is of two kinds: (1) homogeneous and (2) heterogeneous. Fallacies of the homogeneous example occur as follows:

Fallacies of the homogeneous example

(1) Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Like action.

(Action cannot serve as an example, because it is not eternal, that is, because it is excluded from the major term)

(2) Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Like atoms.

(Atoms cannot serve as an example, because they are not incorporeal, that is because they are excluded from the middle term).

(3) Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Like a pot.

(Pot cannot serve as an example, because it is neither eternal nor incorporeal that is because it is excluded from both major and middle terms).

(4) This man is passionate,
Because he is a speaker,
Like a person in the street.

(The person in the street cannot serve as an example, as it is questionable whether he is passionate, that is, it involves doubt as to the validity of the major term).

(5) This man is mortal,
Because he is passionate,
Like a person in the street.

(This example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, that is, it is questionable whether the person in the street is passionate).

.....उक्तम् चर्चेन.....
पुनर्विशेषेण दृष्टान्तोऽनुमतौ। (Nyāyabindu p. 116)

(6) This man is non-omniscient,
Because he is passionate,
Like a person in the street.

(This example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms that is it is questionable whether the person in the street is passionate and non-omniscient)

(7) This man is passionate,
Because he is a speaker,
Like a certain person.

(This example is uncorrected (*anuvaya*) for there is no inseparable connection between being 'passionate' and being a 'speaker').

(8) Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
Like a pot.

(This example involves the fallacy of connection unshown' *apradarśitānvaya* the connection should be shown as follows All products are non-eternal like a pot

(9) Sound is a product,
Because it is non-eternal
All non-eternal things are products like a pot

(The example involves the fallacy of inverted connection, *viparītānvaya* the real connection should be shown as follows All products are non-eternal like a pot

97 Similarly there are nine fallacies of the heterogeneous example

98 *Refutation* (*Dūṣana*) consists in pointing out in the reasoning of an opponent any one of the fallacies mentioned above. The fallacies or semblances of refutation are the futilities called in Sanskrit *Jāti*.[1]

99. In the concluding lines of the Nyāyabindu it is stated that 'Dharmakīrti vanquished the entire Tīrthikas as Śākyamuni had subdued the large army of Māra, and as the sun dispels darkness the Nyāyabindu has exterminated the Ātmaka theory (that is the Tīrthika doctrine) wonderful'[2]

[1] For Jāti *vide* Nyāya sūtra Book I, aphorism 58

[2] ཀླ་ཀློ་ཐུབ་ཐམས་བདུད་ཀྱི་སྡེ་ཚན་ནི།
ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པས་ལྟ་ཡི་ཁ་ཐམ་ལ་ཕྱིན།

Hetu-bindu vivaraṇa

100. The **Hetu-bindu-vivaraṇa** is another excellent work on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[1] in the Tangyur Mdo, Je, folios 355–375. The work in Tibetan is called Gtan tshigs-kyi thigs-pa-zhes-bya-ba, signifying "A Drop of Reason." The work is divided into three chapters as follows:—

(1) Relation of identity between the mind the term and the major term (in Tibetan: Rang-bzhin-gyi gtan-tshigs, in Sanskrit: Svabhāva-hetu); (2) Relation of effect and cause between the middle term and the major term (in Tibetan: Hbras-bu'i gtan-tshigs, in Sanskrit: Kārya-hetu); and (3) Relation of negation between the middle term and the heterogeneous major term (in Tibetan: Mi-'thun-pa'i gtan-tshigs, in Sanskrit: Anupalabdhi-hetu).

Tarka-nyāya or Vāda-nyāya.

101. The **Tarka-nyāya** or **Vāda-nyāya** is another treatise on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[2] in the Tangyur Mdo, Ce, folios 404–416. The work in Tibetan is called Rtsod-pa'i-rigs-pa, signifying the "Method of Discussion." The Tibetan translation was prepared by the great Indian sage Jñānaśrī-bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Dge-ba'i-blo-gros. Subsequently the translation was retouched by the great Pandita Dīpaṃkara (of Vikramapura in Bengal, born in 980 A.D.) and the interpreter-monk Dar-ma-grags.

Santānantara-siddhi.

102. The **Santānāntara-siddhi** is a philosophical treatise by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan version[3] in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ce, folios

ཏེ་ས་ལ་ལ་ཀུན་ནས་ཉོན་མོངས་པ་ནི། ཕྱིས་ལ་ལ་ཡིས།།

བདག་གི་ལྷ་ཆ་ནུབ་ལ་ལྷུང་ཐོ ལན་ཏེ།།

(Nyāyabindu.)

[1] I have consulted the copy embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office, London.

[2] I have consulted the work embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office, London.

[3] I have consulted the Tibetan version embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office, London.

416—420 The work in Tibetan is called Rgyu-ḥgshan-grub-pa signifying "Proof of the Continuity of Succession."

Sambandha parīkṣā.

103. The **Sambandha parīkṣā** is another philosophical treatise by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[1] in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 376—377. The work in Tibetan is called Ḥbrel-wa-ḥgrag-pa signifying "Examination of Connection." The Tibetan translation was prepared by the Indian teacher Jñānagarbha and the interpreter Vandanaṃ-gkhas.

Sambandha parīkṣā vṛtti.

104. The **Sambandha parīkṣā vṛtti**[2] is a commentary on the Sambandha-parīkṣā by Dharmakīrti himself. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 377—384. The work in Tibetan is called Ḥbrel-wa-ḥgrag-pahi ḥgrel-wa.

Devendrabodhi (about 650 A.D.)

105. Devendrabodhi, called in Tibetan Lha-ḥwan-ḥblo, was a contemporary of Dharmakīrti, and so lived about 650 A.D. He wrote the following work on Logic.

106. The **Pramāṇa vārtika pañjikā**, called in Tibetan, Tshad-ma-rnam-ḥgrel-gyi-rnam-ḥgrel, signifying "An Explanation of Difficulties in the Pramāṇa-vārtika of Dharmakīrti." The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[3] in the Tangyur, Mdo, Che, folios 1—380. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Subhūtaśrī and the Tibetan interpreter monk Dge-wahi-blo-gros.

107. Has story[4] is told regarding the composition of the **Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā**:—

Dharmakīrti chose Devendrabodhi to write a commentary on his Pramāṇa-vārtika. After Devendrabodhi had finished the

[1] I have consulted the copy embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office, London.

[2] I have consulted the copy of this work embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office, London.

[3] *Vide* Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 186—187.

[4] I have consulted the work in the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim in 1907.

[5] *Vide* Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 186—187.

commentary for the time and shown it to Dharmakirti, the latter erased it with water. After he had compiled it a second time, Dharmakirti burnt it in fire. He then compiled it a third time and gave it to Dharmakirti with the observation: "Since the majority of men are incompetent and time is fleeting, I have written this commentary for the people of higher understanding." This time Dharmakirti allowed the work to exist.

SÂKYABODHI (ABOUT 675 A.D.).

108. Sâkyabodhi is stated to have been a pupil of Devendrabodhi. He seems to have lived about 675 A.D. He was the author of the following work:—

109. The **Pramâṇa-vârtika-ṭîkâ** (pañjikâ-ṭîkâ, called in Tibetan Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-ṭîkâ-ḥbyed), which is an annotation on the Pramâṇa-vârtika-pañjikâ of Devendrabodhi. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[1] which covers volumes de and Ne of the Tanjur, Mdo. This translation was prepared by the interpreter **Dge-wahi-ḥbio grog.**

VINÍTA DEVA (ABOUT 700 A.D.).

*110. **Vinita Deva**[2] called in Tibetan Dulḥbyed, lived in Nâlanda during the time of king Lalita Candra, son of Gosi Candra, and Dharmakirti died during the time of Gosi Candra. Vimala Candra, the father of Gosi Candra, was married to the sister of Bhartrihari, who sprang from the ancient royal family of Malwa. Supposing this Bhartrihari to be identical with the famous grammarian of that name who died in 651–652 A.D.[3] we may place his contemporary Gosi Candra in the middle of the 7th century A.D. This is exactly the time when Dharmakirti died. Hence we may conclude that Lalita Candra, son of Gosi Candra, flourished towards the end of the 7th century A.D. Vinita Deva, contemporary of Lalita Candra, must also have lived about this time, a view which harmonises with the date of Dharmakirti on whose works Vinita Deva wrote commentaries.

Vinita Deva, who was the famous author of the Samayabhedoparacanacakra, wrote the following works on Logic:

1 *Vide* Târânâtha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p. 187.

2 I have consulted this work in the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim in 1907.

3 *Vide* Târânâtha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 186–188, 272; Pag sam jon zang, edited by Sarat Chandra Das, pp. xxvii, 198.

4 *Vide* Takakusu's I-tsing, p. lvii.

111. **Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā**, called in Tibetan Rig-pa'i-thigs-pa-rgyas-par-bshad-pa which is a detailed commentary on the Nyāya-bindu of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but a Tibetan translation of it exists in the Tangyur Mdo, Sne, folios 1—43. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Jinamitra and the interpreter of Shu-chen named Vande-ye-śes-sde.

112. **Hetu-bindu-ṭīkā**, called in Tibetan Gtan-tshigs-kyi thigs-pa-rgyas-par-bshad-pa which is a detailed commentary on the Hetu-bindu of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur Mdo, Sne, folios 119—205. The translation was prepared by the Indian teacher Prajña Varma and the interpreter of Shu-chen named Dpal-brtsegs-rakshita.

113. **Vāda-nyāya-vyākhyā**, called in Tibetan Rtsod-pa'i rigs-pa'i-bshad-pa which is a commentary on the Vāda-nyāya of the same author called Tarkanyāya of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur Mdo, Ze, folios [illegible]. The work opens thus: "Who is self-perfected in sweet logical discussion, supreme in patience, affection, charity and self-restraint, and who is the most excellent of teachers to him (Buddha) bowing down I compose a commentary on the text of Vāda-nyāya."

114. **Sambandha-parīkshā-ṭīkā**, called in Tibetan Dngos-po'i-brtag-pa'i-rgyas-par-bshad-pa which is a prose commentary on the Sambandha-parīkshā of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur Mdo, Ze, folios 1—24. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Jinamitra and the Tibetan interpreter Vande-ye-śes-sde. The work opens thus:

"When I contemplate unconnected with the world and is yet designated as the supreme teacher of it, to him bowing down fully I explain the Sambandha-parīkshā."

115. **Ālambana-parīkshā-ṭīkā**, called in Tibetan Dmigs-pa'i-brtag-pa'i-bshad-pa, is an annotation on the Ālambana-parīkshā of Dignāga. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[1] in the

[1] This work was brought down to Calcutta by the British Museum in Tibet during 1904. I examined it by permission of the Government of India. It is now deposited in the British Museum, London.

[2] I examined this work by permission of the Government of India when it was brought down to Calcutta by the British Museum in Tibet, 1904.

[3] I have consulted the India Office copy.

[4] I have consulted the India Office copy.

[5] I have consulted the India Office copy.

Tangyur Mdo, Ze folios 186—200. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Śraddhākaravarmā and the interpreter Vandadpal-betsegs of Shu-ten. The work opens thus:—

"Meditating on the merciful Chenrezi One and salutation by my head I compose the Abhisamayālaṃkāra-ṭīkā."

It ends thus:—

"Here is finished the Abhisamayālaṃkāra-ṭīkā, which is a clear work of the teacher Vinītadeva who was well versed in abhidharma (objects of thought) and is a lion of speakers confounding the brains of the Tārkikas (logicians)."

116. **Santānāntara-siddhi-ṭīkā**, called in Tibetan Rgyu-ṡhan-grub-pahi ṭīkā, being a commentary on the Santānāntara-siddhi of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[1] in the Tangyur Mdo, Tse, folios 1—21. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Vidyākaravarmā and the interpreter of Shu-ten named Dpal-brtsegs-rakṣita.

CANDRA GOMIN (ABOUT 700 A.D.).

117. Candra Gomin, called in Tibetan Zla-wa-dge-bsñen, was born in a Kṣatriya family in the east of Varendra, modern Rajshahye in Bengal. He was endowed with a very keen intellect and acquired distinction in literature, grammar, logic, astronomy, music, fine arts and the science of medicine. Under Ācārya Śākyamati he learnt the Sūtra and Abhidharma Piṭakas of the Buddhist scriptures and was converted to Buddhism by the Vidyādhara Ācārya Asaṅga.[2] He had an ardent faith in the Buddhist god Avalokiteśvara and the goddess Tārā.[3] He was offered in marriage a daughter of the king of Nālandra. But told that she was named Tārā, which was the name of his tutelary deity, he thinking it improper to accept her hands shrank from her with fear. Upon this the king of Varendra became angry and put Candra Gomin into a chest which was thrown into the Ganges. The chest was carried down until it stopped at an island at the place where the Ganges flows into the ocean. Candra Gomin with deep reverence offered a prayer to goddess Tārā by whose blessing he got out of the chest. He

[1] Case-sens (not the Indian Chandragomin) in Tibetan version.

[2] [illegible] Schiefner, pp. 146, 147, 148, 158, and Lama [illegible] translation of original Tibetan by Sarat Chandra Das, Calcutta, pp. 95 96.

[3] Ācārya Asaṅga was the author of [illegible] and Sāmānyadūṣaṇanirdikprakāśikā [illegible] Nepal.

[4] For Candra Gomin's Āryā Tārā-stotrabhāṣya see Satischandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa's Stagbhara-stotra [illegible], pp. xx—xx.

resided in the island which was in course of time named Candra-dvipa[1] or the island of Candra. He as a Buddhist devotee (*upasaka*) established there stone images of Avalokitesvara and Tārā. At first only twenty settled in the island but afterwards other people came to live there. Gradually the island became a town.

118. Candra Gomin thereupon went to Ceylon and on his way back found in Southern India in the house of Vararuci Nāga Sena's (Patañjali's) Bhāsya on Pāṇini's grammar. Finding that it contained many words but few thoughts he himself composed a commentary on Pāṇini which was named Candra vyākaraṇa.[2] Afterwards he came to Nālandā the storehouse of knowledge and met there Candra-kirti, the famous commentator on the Madhyamika Philosophy of Arya Nagarjuna. Candra Gomin himself was a follower of the Yogācāra system expounded by Arya Asanga. While Candra Kirti and Candra Gomin entered upon philosophical discussions people used to observe: "Alas! the text of Arya Nāgarjuna is medicine to some but poison to others, whereas the text of invincible Arya Asanga is very ambrosia to all men." It is further stated that into a well at Nālandā Candra Gomin threw the original manuscript of his grammar thinking that it was not better than the one which Candra Kirti had written. At that time Tārā and Avalokitesvara appeared before him saying: "Though Candra Kirti is overwhelmed with pride as a sage, your work is more useful than all others and will do immense good to the world." They raised the manuscript from the well which was

[1] Candradvipa is situated in the district of Barisal in South-eastern Bengal at a place where the Padmā with its numerous branches of the Ganges, falls into the sea. No. 1 is the island which Candra Gomin was born in, the Ganges with the Padmā is in South-eastern Bengal through which the Padmā flows.

[2] For Candra vyākaraṇa *cf.* Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana — Sanskrit works on Literature, Grammar, Rhetoric and Lexicography as preserved in Tibet — in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* (new series, Vol. II, No. 2, 1907). The Candra vyākaraṇa in the original Sanskrit has been printed in Germany.

ཀ་ཤ ལ་ཡ་གསལ་ཡ ཏ ཐ ཡ ཀ ཏ ། ।

ལ་ལའི་ཐ ན ལ ལ ལའི ད ཀ ། ।

ཐ ཡ ལ ལ ལ ཡ ཏ ཐ ལ ཐ ཡ ད ཀ ། ।

ཐ ཡ ཀ ལ ལ ཡ ད ད ཏ ཐ ཡ ། (Dag yig gsal ba sgron me, p. 96).

thence reputed as "Candra's well" (in Sanskrit Candra-kūpa and in Tibetan Tsandrahi-k'ron-pa), the water of which was wont to be drunk by people in the belief that thereby their intellect would become sharp. Candra Kirti was, however, a great admirer of Candra Gomin. When the latter arrived at Nālandā the monks refused to give him a reception, saying that it was not proper for priests to welcome a mere devotee (*upāsaka*). Hearing this Candra Kirti brought three chariots, two of which were occupied by himself and Candra Gomin respectively, while in the third was placed an image of Manjuśrī, the Buddhist god of learning. The chariots passed through the town in a great procession attended by the whole body of priests who came merely to recite hymns to Manjuśrī, but apparently to accord a fitting welcome to Candra Gomin.[1]

119. Candra Gomin lived at a time when Śīla, son of Harṣa, reigned. During this time king Siṁha of the Licchavi dynasty reigned in Varendra. The famous poet Ravi Gupta was a contemporary of Bhārsa, son of Siṁha. Śrī Harṣa seems to be the same as king Harṣa Vardhana who was a contemporary of Hwen-t'sang, and reigned in 647 A.D. His son Śīla seems, on a rough calculation, to have reigned in 700 A.D. when his contemporary Candra Gomin must also have lived. Jaina Hema Candra Sūri who lived during 1088–1172 A.D. refers to Candra Gomin with Jayādityā,[2] the famous author of the Kāśikā vṛtti, who died in 661 A.D. does not mention him. This may be explained on the supposition that Candra Gomin lived after Jayāditya but preceded Hema Candra.

120. Candra Gomin was the author of the following work on Logic: Nyāyaloka-siddhi, called in Tibetan Rigs-pa-gsal-ba'i-sgron-ma, signifying "a lamp of logical reasoning." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[3] in the Tangyur, Mdo, *Ze*, folios 200–201. The translation was prepared by Pandita Śrī Śīla-prabha and the interpreter-monk Vairocana.

RAVI GUPTA (ABOUT 725 A.D.).

121. Ravi Gupta,[4] called in Tibetan Ñi-ma-sbas, was born in Kāśmīra. He was a great poet, dialectician and Tāntric

1. *Vide* Pag sam jon-zang, pp. 95–96.
2. *Vide* Professor F. Kielhorn's "Indra Gomin and other grammarians" in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. xx, June 1891, pp. 181, 184.
3. *Vide* Takakusu's I-tsing, p. lxii.
4. I have used the India Office copy.
5. *Cf.* Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 116, 117, 243; and Pag sam jon zang, part 1, pp. 80, 101, 118, xxxvii.

teacher, who established 12 great religious schools in his native country and Magadha. He was a contemporary of King Bhāma of Varendra and flourished a little later than Candra Gomin who had lived during the time of Bhāma's father Sūraba. Ravi Gupta must have lived in the first quarter of the eighth century A.D. for he discuss the views of Jñānaśrīmitra Satyakīrti Mitra lived in the middle of that century. Ravi Gupta was the author of the following works on L.[1]

122. **Pramāṇa vārttika vṛtti** called in Tibetan Tshad-ma rnam-hgrel-gyi-ṭīkā-pa, which is an annotation on the Pramāṇa vārttika of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan-hgyur Mdo, Ri, 2[2]

JÑĀNDRABODHI (ABOUT 725 A.D.).

123. In the Tanjur Mdo Ri there is the Tibetan version of a work called Vaidhamala vatī nāma prajñāpāramitāṭīkā. This version was prepared by the Tibetan interpreter Rdo-rje-gyal-mtshan with the assistance of Dpal Ldan-ḥbyor-grags.

124. The author of the original work was Jñānendrabodhi called in Tibetan Ye-śes-dbang-ḥbyor-grags, who was a venerable countryman of the Bodhisattva Āryadeva.[3] He is perhaps the same person who wrote the well-known Nyāya on the grammar of Pāṇini in the eighth century A.D.

ŚĀNTA RAKṢITA (749 A.D.).

125. Śānta Rakṣita, called in Tibetan Ḥtsho-byed-bzhi, was born in the royal family of Zahor in Bengal.[4] The exact date of his birth is unknown, but it is stated that he was born at the time of Gopāla, who reigned up to 749 A.D. (*vide* Appendix B) and died at the time of Dharma Pāla, who became king in 769 A.D. He followed the Svātantra Madhyamaka school and was a Professor at Nālandā (*vide* Appendix A). He visited Tibet at the invitation of King Khri-sron-lde-bstan, who was born in 728 A.D., and died in 804 A.D. The king, with the assistance of Śānta Rakṣita, built in 749 A.D. the monastery of Sam-ye.[5]

[1] *Vide* Satis Chandra Vidyabhūṣaṇa's Sāṃkhya Sūtra, Introduction, p. xxx, printed in the Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta.

[2] For Ravi Gupta's views, see Rocki's Bṛhatī, p. 230, and for his works on Dharmakīrti, see Satis Chandra Vidyabhūṣaṇa's Sāṃkhya Sūtra, Introduction, pp. xxx.

[3] These are described in the India Office Catalogue.

[4] *Vide* Pāṇini, p. 2, edited by Sarat Chandra Das, C.I.E., Calcutta, p. 102.

[5] *Vide* Csoma de Kőrös's Tibetan Grammar, p. 181; Sarat Chandra Das in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1881; Part I, p. 226; and Waddell's Lamaism, p. 28.

Tibet, modelled after the Odantapura Vihāra of Magadha. Samye was the first Buddhist monastery in Tibet and Śānta Rakṣita was its first abbot. He worked in Tibet for 13 years, that is until 765 A.D. He was known there under the name of Ācārya Bodhisattva, and was the author of the following works on Logic:—

126. **Vāda-nyāya vṛtti-vipañcitārtha**, called in Tibetan Rtsod-pahi-rigs-pahi ṭīkhi-don-rnam-par-ḥbyed-pa, an elaborate commentary on the Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Kangyur, Mdo, Ze, folios 65–180, and in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ḥe, folios 21–131. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Kumāraśrī Bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter monks venerable Seṅge-ye and Dhrosen Ikar (who was a native of the province of Dbro or Dog in the holy monastery of Bhaṭṭavas (Satsye). The work opens thus:—

"Who constantly dispersing darkness by the ray of the heap of various pure precious qualities, exerted himself for the sake of obtaining the fruits of desire of various sentient beings and rejoiced to do good to the entire world, to that Magnificent bowing down in reverence I compose this concise and [illegible] Vādanyāyavṛtti-vipañcitārtha."

127. **Tattva saṃgraha kārikā** called in Tibetan: De-kho-na-ñid-bdus-pahi-tshig-leḥur-byas-pa, a work containing memorial verses on a summary of the Tattvas. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[2] in the Tangyur, Mdo, He, folios 1–110. The translation was prepared by the Indian Paṇḍita Gopākara-ri-bhadra (belonging to the religious circle first instituted by the great king Lalitāditya in the incomparable city of Kaśmīra) and the great Tibetan interpreter the Śākya monk Dge-ḥdun-rgyal-mtshan who lived in the province of Gtsaṅ (S.-W. Tibet). The work reviews various systems of philosophy such as the Sāṃkhya, Jaina, etc.[3]

[1] I have consulted the xylograph of this work contained in the India Office, London.

[2] I have consulted the work in the monastery of Labrang, Sikkim, which I visited in June 1907. For a detailed account of this work, see my "Sanskrit Palimpsests in the Land of the Lamas," in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, new series, Vol. IV, No. 8.

[3] The Tattvasaṃgraha here referred to is quite different from the Tattvasaṃgraha, a Brahmanical work on the Sāṃkhya philosophy, a manuscript of which is contained in the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

Dr. Georg Bühler during his exploration of the Bihar jñāna-kosa in the temple of Kṛṣṇa-vihāra at Jesalmir found in 1873 a *Tattva* consisting of 180 ancient palm leaves showing the characters of the 12th or 13th century, and bearing on the outside cover the title *Kamalaśīla-kṛta*

128 The subject-matter of the work begins thus:—

"From *Pradhana* (the primordial matter or nature) possessed of entire powers all sorts of effects are produced."

Note. Dr. G. Bühler's correspondence with Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur (C.I.E.) published in the *Journal of the Bud. Text Society of Calcutta*, Vol. I, part i, p. 5. The real name of the work, according to Dr. Bühler is *Tarkasangraha*. Now the Tarkasangraha is nothing but Tattvasangraha of Santa Rakshita with the commentary by Kamala Sila. The introductory part. Mangalacharana of the Tarkasangraha, as noticed by Dr. Bühler, runs as follows:—

प्रणम्य भगवान्‌आदि (जिनवरः दर्शितं चक्षुः
कृत्स्नं तत्त्वमनन्यं कृपयाऽऽदिसमाचरणम् ॥
गृहीत्वाक्रियाज्ञानिकमवाक्यार्थाधिपतिः
सुन्यसाधिपतिः कृत्स्नतत्त्वपत्त्वयोगरम् ॥
सहकलयसंयुक्तं प्रमाणिसर्वसिद्धिमम्
चतुर्थमपि नाशेन सिद्धाभुतापराक्रमम् ॥
चमत्कारिसमाकृष्टं पतिविद्यादिसंविभम्
सम्यग्दृष्टं चन्द्रोदयिनुकलमं परैः ॥
अनन्यचर्यनिःसङ्गो जगद्धितविधिक्षया
चमत्कृतस्वामध्यायं नाशीकृत्य महोदयः ॥
यः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं जगाद वदतां वरः
तं नमस्ते पत्त्वाय जिनाय तमनमस्तः ॥

The introductory part in the Tattvasangraha is identical with the above as is evident from the Tibetan version extracted below:—

རང་ཉིད་དང་ལྡན་ལྷ་ཁམ་ཀ་ལ།།

བདག་ཏུ་ཡང་ཆུ་ཏ་ལ་ལ་ཡ ཅ།།

ལས་ངང་ངེ་ལ་ལ་ཤ ཆ ལ ལ ལ ཡ ཅ ལ ।

ཤ ལ ལ ངང ཆ ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ।।

ཡ ངེ ངང ཤ ལ ངང ཆ ལ ངང ।।

ཤ ལ ལ ངང ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ।।

ལ ལ ངང ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ।।

ལ ལ ངང ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ལ ।।

The work is divided into 31 chapters, viz. (1) examination of nature (in Sanskrit: Svabhāva-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Raṅ-bshin-brtag-pa); (2) examination of the sense-organs (in Sanskrit: Indriya-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Dwaṅ-phyug-brtag-pa), (3) examination of both (in Sanskrit: Ubhaya-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Gñis-ka-brtag-pa); (4) examination of the theory that the world is self-existent (in Sanskrit: Jagat-svabhāva-vāda-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Ḥgro-wa-raṅ-bshin-du-smra-wa-brtag-pa); (5) examination of Brahma, the presiding deity of sound (in Sanskrit: Śabda-Brahma-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Sgraḥi-tshaṅs-pa-brtag-pa); (6) examination of the soul (in Sanskrit: Puruṣa-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Skyes-bu-brtag-pa), (7) examination of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines of the soul (in Sanskrit: Nyāya-vaiśeṣika-parikalpita-puruṣa-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Ḥphags-pa-can-daṅ-byes-brag-paḥi-kun-tu-brtags-paḥi-skyes-bu-brtag-pa); (8) examination of the Mīmāṁsaka doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit: Mīmāṁsaka-kalpita-ātma-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Spyod-pa-pas-brtags-paḥi-bdag-brtag-pa), (9) examination of Kapila's doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit: Kapila-parikalpita-ātma-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Ser-skya-pas-kun-tu-brtags-paḥi-bdag-brtag-pa); (10) examination of the Digambara Jaina doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit: Digambara-parikalpita-ātma-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Nam-mkhaḥi-gos-can-gyis-kun-tu-brtags-paḥi-bdag-brtag-pa), (11) examination of the Upaniṣad doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit: Upaniṣad-kalpita-ātma-parīkṣā, in Tibetan:

ལས་ནི་ཁྱད་གསལ་ དང་ལྡན་པ་ཡི།།
ཚད་ལ་གནས་ཀྱིས་ཀུན་ལ་ཁ་དཔགས།
ཟ་ཀས་ཀྱི་ངང་ཡིན་ལས་ཀྱང་།།
འདི་ལ་བ་གནས་ཀྱི་ བདག་ཉིད་ཕྱིན།།
ཕྱི་འདོར་ཁོ་ནས་ཤན ཕྱིད་ལ་ཆགས།།
གནས་ལས་ཆ་ཤས་ལ ཕྱིད་ལ་ཆགས་ནས་ཀང་ཉན།།
ཐུགས་ཀ་ཀུན་ཏུ་ཆགས་ནས་ཡང།
གནས་ཀ་ཁ་ཏགས་ལ་ ཕྱིད་ལ་ཆགས།
ཁ་ཏགས་ལ་ ཕྱིད་ལ་ ཆགས་ནས་ ཀང་ ཉ།

U-pa-ni-sa-di-kas-bstan-pahi-dam-bstag-pa ; (12) examination of the Vātsīputra doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit: Vātsīputra-kalpita-ātma-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Gnas-mahi-bu-ḥi-bdag-brtag-pa), (13) examination of the permanence of entities (in Sanskrit: Sthira-padārtha-parīkṣā in Tibetan: Ḥ-tan-pahi-ḥnos-po-brtag-pa), (14) examination of the relation between *Karma* and its effect (in Sanskrit: Karma-phala-sambandha-parīkṣā in Tibetan: Las-dan-ḥbras-buḥi-ḥbrel-pa-brtag-pa), (15) examination of the meaning of the word 'substance' (in Sanskrit: Dravya-padārtha-parīkṣā in Tibetan: Rdzas-kyi-tshig-gi-don-brtag-pa), (16) examination of the meaning of the word 'quality' (in Sanskrit: Guṇa-padārtha-parīkṣā in Tibetan: Yon-tan-gyi-tshig-gi-don-brtag-pa), (17) examination of the meaning of the word *Karma* (in Sanskrit: Karma-padārtha-parīkṣā in Tibetan: Las-kyi-tshig-gi-don-brtag-pa), (18) examination of the meaning of the word 'generality or genus' (in Sanskrit: Sāmānya-padārtha-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Spyiḥi-tshig-gi-don-brtag-pa), (19) examination of the meaning of the words 'generality and particularity' (in Sanskrit: Sāmānya-viśeṣa-padārtha-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Spyi-dan-byes-brag-gi-tshig-gi-don-brtag-pa), (20) examination of the meaning of the

མ་ལ་ཁ་ཏོན་ཏེ་ནས་ཀྱི ། ། །

word [illegible] extent cause [illegible] in Sanskrit Samayaya-sabdârthapariksa in Tibetan [illegible] (21) examination of the meaning of the word sound (in Sanskrit Sabdârthapariksa in Tibetan [illegible]) (22) examination of the definition of perception (in Sanskrit Pratyaksa-lakshanapariksa in Tibetan [illegible]) (23) examination of inference (in Sanskrit Anumanapariksa in Tibetan [illegible]) (24) examination of other kinds of valid knowledge (in Sanskrit Pramanantarapariksa in Tibetan [illegible]) (25) examination of the doctrine of existence (in Sanskrit Vyavahârapariksa in Tibetan [illegible]) (26) examination of the three times (in Sanskrit Kalatrayapariksa in Tibetan [illegible]) (27) examination of entirety of the world (in Sanskrit Samsâra-santatipariksa in Tibetan [illegible]) (28) examination of external objects (in Sanskrit Vâyvartha-pariksa, in Tibetan [illegible]) (29) examination of Sruti or Scripture (in Sanskrit Sruti-pariksa, in Tibetan [illegible]) (30) examination of self-evidence (in Sanskrit Svatahpramanya-pariksa in Tibetan [illegible]) and (31) examination of [illegible] second [illegible] (in Sanskrit [illegible] in Tibetan [illegible])

KAMALA SÎLA (ABOUT 750 A.D.).

130. Kamala Sîla [illegible] called Kamala Sîla was a follower of Santa Rakshita. He was for some time a Professor of Logic in Nâlanda [illegible] (*vide* Appendix A) invited to Tibet by King Khri-sron-lde-btsan (755–797 A.D.). While in Tibet he refuted the doctrines of Padma Sambhava and Santa Rakshita by debates and exposing a Chinese monk named Mahâyana Hoshang. He was of wide fame and the author of the following works :—

131. Nyaya-bindu-purva-paksa-samksipta, called in Tibetan Rigs-pa'i-thig-le'i-snga-rabs-kyi-bshad-pa, a summary of objections on the Nyaya-bindu of Dharmakirti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tanjur Mdo, Sde, Fols. 108—11. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage

1. See Pag-sam-jon-zang, pp. [illegible] edition by Sarat Chandra Das, and also the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, vol. 1, part [illegible] and Waddell's Lamaism, p. [illegible]

2. I have collated the copy brought home by the British Mission to Tibet in 1904.

Vasudhara Sūrya and the interpreter monk of Stag-lhen named Dpal-rtsegs-rakṣita.

131 **Tattva-saṃgraha-pañjika**, called in Tibetan De-bzhin-nyid-bdus-pa-'grel-pa, is a commentary on the Tattva-saṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[1] of part I of this work in the Tangyur, Mdo, Hi, Folios 140—400, and part II of it in the Tangyur, Mdo, Yi, Folios 1—185. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Devendra Bhadra and the interpreter monk Gzugs-kyi-blo-gros-grags-pa.

KAMALA RAKṢITA (ABOUT 829 A.D.)

132 Kamala Rakṣita,[2] called in Tibetan Dge-sloṅ, was a great disciple and teacher of Dharmottarācārya. He flourished during the reign of Mahārāja Dharma Pāla who died in 829 A.D. (*See* Appendix B.). He was the author of the undermentioned works:—

133 **Vādhyartha-nirṇaya-kārikā**, called in Tibetan Phyogs-kyi-don-gtan-la-dpyad-pa-ngag-gi-tshig-leur byas-pa, which signifies 'memorial verses on the reality of external things'. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 202—210. The translation was prepared by the Vidyāsiṃha translator Jina Mitra of Kāśmīra and the Tibetan interpreter monk Dge-bsnyen-rakṣita.

134 **Bruti-parīkṣa**, called in Tibetan Dpyad-pa-bstan-bcos-kyi-don-la-dpyad-pa-ngag-gi-tshig-leur byas-pa, which signifies 'memorial verses on the examination of scriptural verbal testimony'. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 210—211.

135 **Anyapoha-vicāra-kārikā**, called in Tibetan Gzhan-sel-gyi-rnam-par-dpyad-pa-tshig-leur byas-pa, which signifies 'memorial verses on the determination of a thing by the exclusion of its opposite'. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 211—213.

136 **Īśvara-bhaṅga-kārikā**, called in Tibetan Dbang-phyug-gi-rnam-par-bshig-pa-tshig-leur byas-pa, which signifies 'memorial verses

[1] I have consulted this work in the monastery of Labrang Sikyo, which I visited in June 1907.

Vide Taranatha's [illegible] see Schiefner pp. 210—214 and [illegible] p. 154. The part de [illegible] signifies protected and is [illegible] for Sanskrit [illegible]. But Schiefner has taken it as an equivalent for Gupta. This does not seem to be correct, for the Tibetan equivalent for Gupta is [illegible].

[2] I have consulted Kamala Rakṣita's works in volume Ze of the Tangyur sent to me by the India Office, London.

on the refutation of God.[1] The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but it survives in Tibetan translation in the Tanjur (Mdo, Z, folios 214—21).[2]

DHARMOTTARĀCĀRYA (ABOUT 847 A.D.)

137. Dharmottara (Skrit Dharmottara or Dharmottarācārya) called in Tibetan [illegible] was a native of Kalyāṇa (Kāsmīra) and a Dharmakīrti-Dharmottara (Kāsmīra). He appears to have flourished in Kāsmīra where Vācaspati was living in Bengal about 847 A.D. (*vide* Appendix B) and is mentioned by the Jaina philosopher Malliṣeṇa (son of Jinasena) Jinaprabhāvaka about 902 A.D. and Rāmacandra Sūri, the famous author of Sādvādamañjarī who died 1181 A.D. Dharmottara was the author of the following works:—

138. **Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā**, called in Tibetan Rigs-pah-ḥbu-pahi-ṭīkā-ḥ-ḥ-ḥ-ḥ was a detailed commentary on the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work was preserved in the Jaina temple of Santinātha (Cambay) and has been published by Professor Peterson in the Bibliotheca Indica series of Calcutta. There exists a Tibetan translation in the Tanjur (Mdo, Sa, folios 43—100). This translation was prepared by the Indian sage Jinamitra and an interpreter monk of Shu-chen named Dānaśīla and afterwards revised by the Indian sage Sūryaśrī and the Tibetan interpreter monk Ye-śes-sde (Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā, prostration: "Sugata, the conqueror of lust, etc., have overcome the world, the source of series of evils beginning with birth; may his words dispelling the darkness of our mind attain glory

[1] *Vide* Dharmottara's criticism in Bhāṭṭadīpikā of Śālikanātha, p. 255 and Lucman pratīke, p. 114.

[2] The Jaina philosopher Malliṣeṇa (son of Jinasena) called Dharmottara-tarkapaṅkaja or Dharmottarācārya's Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā. The year 884 in which Malliṣeṇa flourished corresponds to 827 A.D. or 902 A.D. according as we take it to refer to Vikrama or Śaka era. He was a contemporary of Dharmottara and on the other he flourished a century later.

[3] अथ धर्मोत्तरमतारी आह। प्रमाणसमाधिगम्येन तत्साहचर्याद्यते इति न चले।
(Syādvādaratnākara, p. 1). Jaina sect of Benares).

[4] I have consulted the copy brought down by the Britten Mission to Tibet during 1904. The Tibetan version has also been edited by F. J. Sherbatski and printed in Russia.

[5] जयन्ति जातिजवरपथ्य प्रहृतिविकारोत्तरो जिनेन्द्रः।
रागतमोराशे सुगतस्य वाचो मनःप्रदीपस्य विकाशमाप्ताः॥
(Nyāyabindutīkā, Chap. I).

140 **Pramāṇa parīkṣā**, called in Tibetan Tshad ma brtag pa, signifying 'an examination of Pramāṇa or the sources of valid knowledge.' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan ḥgyur, Mdo Ze, Folios 215–237, as well as Folios 238–241. The translation was prepared by Rinchen Bzang po and the Tibetan interpreter Bsod nams Rgyal mtsan.

141 **Apoha nāma prakaraṇa**, called in Tibetan Gcan sel ba, signifying 'a treatise on the determination of a thing by the exclusion of its opposite.' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan ḥgyur, Mdo Ze, Folios 254–260. The translation was prepared by the Kashmirian Paṇḍita Dānaśīla and the interpreter monk Bsod nams rgyal mtsan, in the incomparable city of Kasmīra.

142 **Para loka siddhi**, called in Tibetan Ḥjig rten pha rol grub pa, signifying 'proof of the world beyond.' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan ḥgyur, Mdo Ze, Folios 260–270. The translation was prepared by the great Paṇḍita Dānaśīla and the interpreter monk Lotsāba Rin chen bzang po, during the reign of Sri Harsa Deva, king of Kasmīra, 1089–1101 A.D., in the great incomparable city of Kāśmīra.

The work begins thus:—

Some say that the world beyond is possessed of the four [illegible] of a complete separation from the world of [illegible] which begins from birth, [illegible] and continued after death, etc.

143 **Ksaṇa bhaṅga siddhi**, called in Tibetan Skad cig ma grub pa, signifying 'proof of the momentariness of things.' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan ḥgyur, Mdo Ze, Folios 280–282. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Bhavavivek and the interpreter monk Bsod nams rgyal mtsan.

144 **Pramāṇa vinaścaya tīkā**, called in Tibetan Tshad ma rnam par ñes par byed pa'i ṭīkā, was a commentary on the Pramāṇa-viniścaya of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan ḥgyur, Mdo Dse, folios 346 (and) We, Folios 1–188. The translation was prepared by the Kashmirian Paṇḍita Paramārthaśūra and the Tibetan interpreter Bsod nams rgyal mtsan in the model city of Kasmīra. In the colophon of the work

[illegible]

Dharmottara, the author of [illegible] described as "the excellent [illegible] of bad disputants (pubblicy)."[1]

MUKTĀ-KUMBHA (AFTER 847 A.D.).

114. Muktā-kumbha [illegible] Muktā-kumbha-pa was the author of a work called Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi-vyākhyā, which is a commentary on Dharmottara's Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi. Muktā-kumbha must have flourished after 847 A.D. when Dharmottara lived.

115. The Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi-vyākhyā called in Tibetan Skad-cig-ma-[illegible]-grub-pa-[illegible] The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but a Tibetan translation is embodied in the Tanjur, Mdo, Ze, ff. 282–301. This version was prepared by the Indian [illegible] and the interpreter-monk Grags-ḥbyor-ses-rab.

ARCATA (AFTER 847 A.D.).

116. [illegible] Sūtra [illegible] were used in 1008 A.D. [illegible] Arcata. [illegible] Sūtra [illegible] Kathāpadeśa Sūtra [illegible] Sva-bhāvaparīkṣā-ṭīkā, dated 1151 A.D. [illegible] Dharmottara, who lived about 847 A.D. [illegible] flourished in the 9th century A.D.

[illegible] work in [illegible]

117. Hetu-bindu-vivaraṇa, [illegible] Tibetan [illegible] Hetu-bindu of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be

[illegible]

[illegible] 188

[illegible]

[illegible] Sūtra [illegible] on Bauddha darśana.

[illegible] (gronthamālā of Benares)

[illegible] Kalcutta

lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo Sne Folios 205—375. It is divided into four chapters treating respectively of (1) Identity in Tibetan Rang-bshin and in Sanskrit Svabhāva, (2) Effect in Tibetan Ʒbras-bu and in Sanskrit Kārya, (3) Non-perception in Tibetan Mi-ʒdugs-pa, and in Sanskrit Anupalabdhi, and (4) Explanation of Six Characteristics in Tibetan Mtsan-nyid-drug, Ṣaḍ-lakṣaṇa and in Sanskrit Ṣaḍ-lakṣaṇa-vacana. In the beginning of the work it is stated that Arcaṭa was a Brahmana and from the concluding part it appears that he lived in Kashmir. The Tibetan version ends thus:

"In the city of Kashmir, the path of Jambudvīpa, the commentary (on the works of Dharmakīrti) who was the best of sages, was translated. From this transcription of Pramāṇa the pitch of holy doctrines let the unlearned drink wash in."

DĀNAŚĪLA (ABOUT 800 A.D.).

148. Dānaśīla[1] also called Danaśrīla, was born in Kāśmīra about 800 A.D. when Mahī Pāla was reigning in Bengal. He was a contemporary of Prajñā Deva, Jina Mitra, Surya na Deva and Tilopa. He visited Tibet and co-operated in the propaganda of the translations of Sanskrit books into Tibetan.[2] He was the author of the following work on Logic:—

149. **Pustaka pathopāya**, called in Tibetan Ʒegs-pahi bkra-ba-pahi thabs, signifying the method of reading books. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[3] in the Tangyur, Mdo Zi Folio 270. The translation was revised by the author himself.

The volume Sho, containing this work, was brought down by the British Mission to Tibet in 1904. It rescued it from the Government of Lhasa.

[1] འཇམ་ཕྱིར་ལྷོ་ཡི་ཁ་ཅིག་ཏུ་ཁ་ཆེ་ལ། །
མཁས་པའི་ ལྷུང་བོ་ཆེ་ལ་ཀུན་ཏུ་ཁ་ཕྱེ་ནས། །
དམ་ཆོས་ ལྷུང་བོ་ བདག་མེད་ཀ་ལས། །
ལྷུང་བོ་ མདོ་ ལ་ རྒྱས་ཤ་ ཏེ་ ལྷུང་ཕོ་ ཅེས། །

(Tangyur, Mdo, Sho, folio 275).

[2] *Vide* Taranath's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 225—226; and Pag-sam-jon-zang, p. xlvi.

[3] I have consulted the India Office copy.

JINA MITRA (ABOUT 899 A.D.).

150. Jina Mitra[1] was a native of Kashmir who together with Sanghara Deva, Dānaśīla and others visited Tibet and helped the Tibetans in the work of translating Sanskrit books into Tibetan. Jina Mitra lived about 899 A.D., when his contemporary kings Khri-gtsug (or Ral-pa-can) of Tibet and Nayapāla of Bengal, died. He wrote the undermentioned works on Logic:—

151. **Nyāya-bindu-pindārtha**, called in Tibetan Rigs-pa'i thig-pa'i don bsdu-ba, was translated by the pupil of Dharmakīrti's Nyāya-bindu. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[2] in the Tangyur, Mdo, Sne, Folios 115—116. The translation was prepared by the Indian teacher Sīlendrabodhi and the interpreter of Sde-ldan named Vande-ye-śes-sdo.

PRAJÑĀKARA GUPTA (ABOUT 940 A.D.).

152. Prajñākara Gupta[3] called in Tibetan Śes-rab-kyi-byin-gnas-sbyin, lived at the time of Mahīpāla, i.e. in 940 A.D. He was a Vaiśeṣika and quite different from Prajñākara Mati, who was a monk and keeper of the entrance gate of the university of Vikramaśilā during the reign of Cānaka in 983 A.D. (*vide* Appendix C). Prajñākara Gupta was the author of the following works:—

153. **Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra**, called in Tibetan Tshad-ma-rnam-'grel-gyi-rgyan, which is a commentary on the Pramāṇa-vārtika of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[4] which is divided into two parts. The first part extends over Folios 1—302 of volume De and the second part Folios 1—328 of volume Sne of the Tangyur, section Mdo. The translation was prepared by the great Kashmirian Paṇḍita Bhāgyarāja and the Tibetan interpreter Bsod-nam-seg-rab. Subsequently it was looked through by Śraddhākaravarman and the interpreter Blo-ldan-śes-rab. The translation has been important having been assisted by numerous sages of the great monastery of Vikramaśīla in Middle India.

1. For Taranātha's account see his Bodhi-sattva-kalpa, p. 230, and Csoma-de-Koros, pp. xcvi, 116.
2. Cf. Csoma de Koros's Tibetan Grammar, p. 185.
3. I have consulted the Indian Antiquary, [illegible]
4. Cf. Taranātha's account in his Bodhi-sattva-kalpa, pp. 230, 231, and Csoma-de-Koros, p. 116.
5. I have examined this work in the monastery of Tabo-gsang in Sikkim, which I visited in June 1907.

under the supervision of the great wise Pandita Śrī Śāntavaśrī Mitra and also of the wise Pandita Kumaraśrī of the middle city of Kāśmīra.

154 Sahāvalambha niścaya, called in Tibetan Lhan-cig-pa'i-ngo-bo-nes-pa, "The ascertainment of object and the knowledge resting together." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur Mdo, Ze, Folios 301—308. The translation was prepared by the Nepalese Pandita Śākyaśrī Bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter Gyi Sākya-ye-śes of the village of Sa-skar in the province of Ngro (Do).

Ācārya Jetāri (940—980 A.D.).

155 Jetāri, or Śākya Jetāri, called in Tibetan Rje-btsun-pa, was born in a Kshatriya family. His father Gaṇḍhapāda lived at Vikramaśīlā in the court of King Śūrapāla, who was a vassal of the Pālas of Magadha. Jetāri was expelled by his father, during a Kshatriya festival, because he would not visit Śūrapāla. He was given by his father a piece of land in the province of Ngro (Do). Later Pālas were also patrons of Pandita of the university of Vikramaśīlā.

156 The Tibetan Dipaṃkara Śrījñāna Atīśa said that when he was young he lived in the house of his father Jetāri. Atīśa lived up to 1040 A.D. (see Appendix B) and Dīpaṃkara was born in 980 A.D. From contemporary data Jetāri must have lived between those dates.

He was the author of the following works, viz.:

157 Hetu-tattva-upadeśa, called in Tibetan Gtan-tshigs-kyi-de-kho-na-ñid-kyi-gsal-ba-ston-pa, "Exposition of the real nature of the reason." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur Mdo, Ze, Folios 144—15[illegible]. The translation was prepared by the Indian [illegible] Pandita Kumaraśrī and the Tibetan interpreter [illegible] Śākya-śes-rab.

158 Dharma-dharmī-viniścaya, called in Tibetan Chos-dang-chos-can-gyi-rnam-par-nges-pa, "Ascertainment of the nature and properties." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur Mdo, Ze, Folios 153—[illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] Dharmottara's commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu, p. 20[illegible], ed. Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta.

[illegible] Journal of the Asiatic Society of Calcutta, vol. [illegible], p. [illegible].

[illegible] Nothing of Jetāri's works was known to the Tibetan [illegible].

159. **Bālāvatāra tarka**, called in Tibetan Blo-gsal-gyi-pahi [illegible] signifying "Children's introduction to Logic." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tanjur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 349—372. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Nāga Bodhi and the Tibetan interpreter of the province of Sangpu in Ü, named Dpal-ldan-lhag-dag-pa-bzang-po. The work begins thus —

Who by the lustre of knowledge has completely dispersed and cleared the veil of the gloomy ignorance, which is a single lamp to three worlds, may that Bhagavan ever remain victorious! It consists of three chapters, named respectively (1) Perception, (2) Inference for one's own sake, and (3) Inference for the sake of others.

JINA (ABOUT 983 A.D.).

160. Jina, called in Tibetan Rgyal-ba, was the author of the following work —

Pramāṇa vārttikālaṅkāra ṭīkā, called in Tibetan Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-rgyan-gyi-ṭīk, a Buddhist work, the Tibetan version of which occupies volumes Dze and Ni of the Tanjur, section Mdo. This version was reported by Dharma Dīpa, a native of Vikramaśīla (who arrived in Tibet in 1040 A.D.) and the Tibetan interpreter Dge-ldan-lhag-pa-dbyangs-po Shes-rab.

161. Jina, the author of the original work, is probably the same as Jina Bhadra of Kashmir, who was a contemporary of Vāgīśvarakīrti about 983 A.D. (*vide* Appendix C.)

JÑĀNA-ŚRĪ (ABOUT 983 A.D.)

162. Jñānaśrī or Jñānaśrī Mitra (probably the same as Jñānaśrī Bhadra, who worked in Kashmir) was born in Gauḍa. He was at first attracted into the Sravaka school of



(Tanjur, Mdo, Ze, folio 359)

[illegible] p. 24[illegible]
[illegible] Śāstri, pp. 24[illegible]—24[illegible] and Pagsam jon sang, pp. 117—120

Buddhism, but its records unfolded faith in the Mahâyâna Dipankara or Śrîjnana Atisa, born in 980 A.D., is said to have been much indebted to him. Jñânaśrî Mitra was appointed a gate-keeper of the university of Vikramaśilâ by Karaka who reigned in Magadha in 1059 A.D. (*Infra* Appendices B and C). The Hindu philosopher Madhusûdana in the 16th century notes Jñânaśrî, who is perhaps the same as Jñânaśrî Mitra. He was the author of the following works on Logic:—

103. **Pramâṇa viniścaya ṭîkâ**, called in Tibetan Tshad ma rnam par nges pa'i ṭîkâ, which is a commentary on the Pramâṇa viniścaya of Dharmakîrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan'gyur, Mdo, Dse, Folios 1—346, and Wa, Folios 188—322. The translation was prepared by the author[1] himself with the assistance of the interpreter monk Chos-kyi bzang-po.

104. **Karya-karaṇa bhâva siddhi**,[2] called in Tibetan Byas-dan-byas-pa-ñid-ma-grub-pa, signifying establishment of the relation of cause and effect. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation by the Pandita Mdo Ze, Folios 413—418. The translation was prepared by the great Indian sage Kumâra Kalaśa and the interpreter monk Śākya Ye-śes. Subsequently it was revised and published by the Nepalese Pandita Ananda-śrî and the interpreter monk aforementioned.

105. **Tarka bhâṣa**, called in Tibetan Rtog-ge'i sgron-ma, signifying "Light of Logic." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[3] in

[1] See the Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, chapter on Buddhist Logic:—

तदुक्तं ज्ञानश्रिया

यत् यत् तत् चक्षिक यथा अजयत् यत्नतु भाषा चर्चा ।
कलाक्षिप्तिविचारकर्मणि मिते मिश्रं मिश्रं मिश्रा न वा ॥
नाक्षुक्षेव विमाक्षणः परक्षणमपि विचारदक्षेण
ईषापि चक्षमक्षणमतिरतः वर्णं च विमाक्षणि ॥

[1] I have consulted the Tibetan version of this work in the monastery of Tal-rang, Sikkim.

[2] The author of the Pramâṇa viniścaya ṭîkâ is stated in Jñânaśrî Bhadra and also simply Jñânaśrî. He is stated in the Colophon of the work to have been a native of Kośala. See Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet," No. 1, in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, New Series, vol. iii, No. 7, 1907. Jñânaśrî Mitra of course seems to be the same as Jñânaśrî Bhadra, of Kośala, who may have left Gauḍa for Eastern Kośala.

[3] The author of this work is named Jñânaśrî Mitra.

[4] I have consulted the India Office copy.

[5] I have consulted the India Office copy.

the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, folios 373–414. The translation was prepared by the interpreter monk Dpal-ldan-blo-gros-brtan-pa. The work is divided into three chapters named respectively (1) Perception, (2) Inference for one's own sake, and (3) Inference for the sake of others. It begins thus:—"Bowing down to the teacher, the lord of the world, I elucidate Tarkaśāstra (the technalities of logic) for the sake of introducing children of small intellect to the system of Dharmakīrti."

RATNA VAJRA (ABOUT 983 A.D.).

106. Ratnavajra, called in Tibetan Rin-chen-rdo-rje, was born in a Brahmana family in Kashmir. His ancestors were deeply versed in the śāstra of the Tīrthikas. His father Hari Bhadra was the first convert to Buddhism in his family. Ratnavajra, who was an eager student, devoted himself to learning up to the 30th year of his life all the Buddhist sutras, mantras, and śāstras. After this he came to Magadha and Vajrāsana (Buddhagaya), where he beheld the face of Śākyasaṃgha, Vajrayogini and many other deities, by whose grace he completely mastered the Buddhist śāstras. He received the royal diploma of the university of Vikramaśīla and was appointed its Site-keeper of the university (*vide* Appendix C). Afterwards he came back to Kashmira, whence he went through Udyana (Kabul) to Tibet, where he was known by the name of Vajra. He flourished during the reign of Canaka (983 A.D.) (*vide* Appendices B and C). He was the author of the following work:—

107. **Yukti prayoga**, called in Tibetan Rigs-pahi sbyor-ba, signifying "application of reasoning." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, folios 372–373. The



(Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, folio 373).

1 *b* Taranatha's Gyan-gyi Ro-ba Buddhamaya, Schiefner, p. 240.

I have consulted the Tibetan manuscript in possession of the India Office, London.

translation was prepared by the Indian sage Śrī Subhūti [illegible] and the interpreter-monk of Sa-skya [illegible] Ye-śes-bzang-po.

RATNAKARA ŚĀNTI (ABOUT 983 A.D.).

185. Ratnākara Śānti was known to the Tibetans as Vajra Śānti or simply Śānti-pa. He was ordained in the order of the Sarvāstivādins of Dharmapura and studied the Sūtra and Tantra at Vikramaśīla under Jetāri and others. Thereafter he was appointed by King Canaka (who died in 983 A.D.) to be gate-keeper of the University of Vikramaśīla (see Appendix I), where he defeated the Tīrthika disputants. At the invitation of the king of Ceylon he visited that island, where he spread the Buddhist religion. He was the author of a work on *Vādanyāya* preceded by a Commentary and of the following works* on Logic:

186. **Vādaprakaraṇa-nidāna** [illegible] Tibetan translation by the Indian Mahāpaṇḍita Śākyaśrībhadra and the Tibetan translator Mal-ldan-śes-rab [illegible]. The translation was prepared by the Nepalese Pandita [illegible] and the Tibetan interpreter [illegible] of the province of Dbus (Dbus). Subsequently it was published by Gu-ru Dpal-ldan-bzang-po and Ye-śes-rgyal-mtshan.

187. Anter [illegible] Śānti [illegible]

[illegible] Schoefner, pp. 244, 24[illegible] Tibetan equivalent for the [illegible] Rtsa-ba [illegible]

* This Ratnakīrti is different from the [illegible] who was patronized by King Vīrsena Candra about [illegible] [illegible] Dus-gsum-mkhyen-pa [illegible] Mkhas-grub-rje [illegible] King [illegible] Vīrsena [illegible] are being published in the Bibliotheca Indica [illegible] strength of M. M. Gaṅgā Nātha Jhā. Two other [illegible] Vīrsena [illegible] no. 2, 1907.

* [illegible] Śākyaśrī [illegible] Śānti's works [illegible]

* [illegible] Sanskrit [illegible] Śākyaśrī [illegible]

[illegible] It is included in the Tanjur Mdo, Ze, [illegible] 44. The translation was prepared by the Indian [illegible] Kīrtiśīla and the interpreter-monk Śākya-ḥod.

VAK-PRAJÑA (ABOUT 983 A.D.).

171. In the Tanjur Mdo, Ze, folios 201–202 there is the Tibetan version of a work called the Kārikā-vṛtti in Tibetan Tsang-ni [illegible] Ishor [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] in the monastery of Śrī-Gaṇḍan near Lhasa. The volume concludes thus: "By the merit established acquired by me by composing this regular annotation may the world, subduing its adversary death, obtain the indestructible and perfected Nirvāṇa."[1]

SAṄKARĀNANDA (ABOUT 1050 A.D.).

174. Saṅkarānanda, called in Tibetan Bde-byed-kyi-ngag-gi-wa, was born in a Brāhmaṇa family in Kaśmīra. He was learned in all sciences and was also well an expert in Logic. He intended to write an original work on Logic refuting Dharmakīrti, but in a dream he was told by Mañjuśrī: "Some Dharmakīrti (an Ārya or a Buddhist monk) [illegible] refute him, and if there exist mistakes in him, it is due to mistakes of your own understanding."[2] Hereupon Saṅkarānanda refrained not [illegible] a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti in seven chapters. He flourished during the time of Nayapāla, who reigned about 1050 A.D. He was the author of the following works on Logic:—

175. **Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā**, called in Tibetan Tshad-ma-rnam-'grel-gyi-'grel-pa, is an annotation on the Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[3] which covers volumes Pe and Phe of the Tangyur, Mdo.

176. **Sambandha-parīkṣānusāra**, called in Tibetan Dbyel-pa-brtag-pa'i-rjes-su-'brang-ba, was written as a commentary on the



(Tangyur, Mdo, Be, folio 101)

1. Cf. Taranatha's [illegible] (ed. Schiefner), pp. 247–249, and [illegible], pp. [illegible].

Some maintain that Saṅkarānanda was a personal pupil of Dharmakīrti. On this point Lama Taranatha observes: — "The Brāhmaṇa Saṅkarānanda appeared at a much later time and is still from a personal pupil of Dharmakīrti, [illegible] a great [illegible]." — Taranatha's Geschichte des Buddhismus, p. 188.

2. I have consulted this work in the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim, in 1907.

Sanibandha-parīkṣa of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 24—30. The translation was prepared by the great Indian Paṇḍita Paramita and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Dpal-wahi-dbyer.

The work begins thus:

"By whom connection with the world has been renounced, in whom there are no "I" and "mine," who is called free from concerns—to that Omniscient One I bow down."

177. **Apohasiddhi**, called in Tibetan Se-wa-grub-pa, signifying "establishment of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 308—344. The translation was prepared by the Kāśmīrian Paṇḍita Manorathi and the Tibetan interpreter Bla-chen-dge-sraḥ in the incomparable city of Kashmira.

The work opens thus:—

"The Omniscient One who is free from all mistakes and who looks to the interests of living beings in all times, saluting him and relying on his teaching, I explain the puzzle of 'self' and others' connected with the doctrine of *Apoha*."*

* I have consulted the Tibetan version in the possession of India Office, London.

* གང་ཟག་ལ་ཞེས་བ་ཐུགས་ཀྱང་ཡ།།

འཇིག་ཚོ་ཐ་ཆད་ཁང་ཁད་ཀྱི་ཕ།།

ཀུན་ལ་ཕན་ཕྱིར་ཐུགས་ཀྱང་ཡ།།

ཀུན་མཁྱེན་ནི་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།།

(Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, folio 24).

* I have consulted the India Office copy.

* ཀུན་མཁྱེན་ལ་ཕྱག་བྱས་ནས་ཀུན་ལ་ཕན་ཕྱིར།།

དོན་ཤེས་ཤ་ཟ ཀ་ཏེ་ཀ་ཟ་ཀ་ལ་ཁ་ལ་ཁ།།

ཐ་ཆད་ཀ་ནས་ནས་ཏ་ལ ཐ་ལ་ཁ་ཏ་ལ་ཁ།།

ཁ་ཁ་ཀ་ཀ ཀ་ཁ ཁ ཁ

178. **Pratibandha-siddhi**, called in Tibetan Ḥbrel-pa-grub-pa, signifying "establishment of the causal connection." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 314–135. The translation was prepared by Paṇḍita Bhagyarāja and the interpreter Ratnaśrīrakṣita.

[1] I have consulted the India Office copy.

APPENDIX A.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NĀLANDA.

(*About* 300—850 *A.D.*).

Nālandā was a village which is identified with modern Baragaon [1] 7 miles north of Rajgir in Behar. Though occasionally mentioned in the Pali literature Nālandā was not of great importance before the rise of the Mahayana at the beginning of the Christian era Nagarjuna about 300 A.D and Arya Deva about 320 A.D, were the earliest scholars to take interest in the educational institution at that village A Brahmana named Suvarna a contemporary of Nagarjuna is said to have established 108 temples there in order that the Abhidharma of the Mahayana might not decline.[2] About 400 A.D, the Chinese pilgrim Fahian,[3] visited this place, which he calls "the village of Nalo" He saw there a tower which had been erected on the spot where Sāriputra, the right hand disciple of Buddha, had entered Nirvāna. Early in the 7th century A.D, another Chinese pilgrim, the famous Hwen-thsang visited Nālandā and halted [4] there 15 months to study the Sanskrit language under Silabhadra According to him [5] the site of Nālandā was originally a mango garden which was bought by 500 merchants at a cost of ten crores of gold pieces and given to Buddha.[6] After the Nirvāna of Buddha, five kings named Sakraditya Buddha Gupta Tathagata Gupta Bālāditya and Vajra, built five Sanghārāma or monasteries at Nālandā A king of Central India established another magnificent monastery and began to build round these edifices a high wall with one gate A long succession of kings continued the work of building, using all the skill of the sculptor, till at the time of Hwen-thsang in 637 A.D the whole was "truly marvellous to behold" In the estab-

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1 *Vide* Cunningham's Ancient Geography of India p 468

2 *Vide* Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp 70—86.

3 *Vide* Beal's Fa-hian, p. 111

4 *Vide* Cunningham's Ancient Geography of India p x

5 *Vide* Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World vol ii, pp 168—170

6 It must have been given to a Buddhist saint of a later age and not to Buddha himself

tainment were some thousands of monks, all men of great ability and learning. They were very strict in observing the rules of Vinaya, and were looked up to as models by all India. Learning and discussing they found the day too short; day and night they admonished each other, juniors and seniors mutually helping to perfection. Learned men from different cities came to Nālandā to acquire renown, and some persons even usurped the name of Nālandā students in order that they might be received everywhere with honour.[1] Of those from abroad who wished to enter the schools of discussion, the majority, beaten by the difficulties of the problems, withdrew, and those who were deeply versed in old and modern learning were admitted, only two or three out of ten succeeding.[2] Hwen Thsang mentions some celebrated men of Nālandā, such as Dharmapāla and Candrapāla, Guṇmati and Sthiramati,[3] Prabhāmitra and Jinamitra, and Jñānacandra and Śīlabhadra.

Another Chinese pilgrim named I-tsing, who resided in Nālandā for ten years (probably 675–685 A.D.), says that there were eight halls and 300 apartments in the monastery of Nālandā with more than 3,000 resident monks. The lands in its possession contained more than 200 villages which had been bestowed upon the monastery by kings of different generations.[4]

Nālandā assumed the character of a university from about 450 A.D. Bālāditya, king of Magadha, who built a monastery at Nālandā, was a contemporary of the Hun king Mihirakula, who reigned first in Sākala and afterwards in Kāśmīra. New Mihirakula[5] began his reign in 515 A.D., and his contemporary Bālāditya must also have lived about that time. There were three predecessors of Bālāditya who built monasteries at Nālandā. Of them, the earliest, named Śakrāditya, must have reigned about 450 A.D., if we suppose 25 years as the average duration of the reign of each of them. The year 450 A.D. is then the earliest limit which we can roughly assign to the royal recognition of Nālandā. The latest limit which we know with certainty is 781 A.D., when Kamalaśīla (q. v.) was the professor of Logic at Nālandā. But as we read in the accounts of Vikramaśīlā that there was for some time an intercourse between that university

[1] Vide Watters' "On Yuan Chwang" (vol. i, pp. 164–165).
[2] This Sthiramati seems to be the one mentioned by I-tsing (vide Takakusu, p. 181). He died after Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.
[3] Vide Takakusu's I-tsing, pp. xxxi (15) and 14.
[4] Vide Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. i, p. 299.
Takakusu in his "Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu," published in the "Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland," January 1905, marks that Bālāditya came to the throne in 481 A.D., but this statement is by no means final. The date (450–480 A.D.) of Vikramāditya, Bālāditya's father, is also open to dispute.

and Nālandā, we may suppose that the latter continued to exist approximately until 850 A.D.

According to Tibetan accounts[1] the quarter in which the Nālandā University with its grand library was located, was called Dharmagañja (Piety Mart). It consisted of three grand buildings called Ratnasāgara, Ratnodadhi, and Ratnaraṅjaka, respectively. In Ratnodadhi, which was nine-storeyed, there were the sacred scripts called Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra and Tāntrik works such as Samāja-guhya, etc. After the Turuska raiders had made incursions in Nālandā the temples and *Caityas* there were repaired by a sage named Muktā Bhadra. Soon after this Kukutasiddha, minister of the king of Magadha, erected a temple at Nālandā, and while a religious sermon was being delivered there two very indigent Tirthika mendicants appeared. Some naughty young novice monks in disdain threw washing water on them. This made them very angry. After propitiating the sun for 12 years they performed a *yajña*, fire sacrifice, and threw living embers and ashes from the sacrificial pit into the Buddhist temples, etc. This produced a great conflagration which consumed Ratnodadhi. It is, however, said that many of the Buddhist scriptures were saved by water which leaked through the sacred volumes of Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra and Tantra.

1. *Vide* Pag sam jon zang, edited in the original Tibetan by Rai Sarat Chandra Das Bahadur, C.I.E., at Calcutta, p. 92.

APPENDIX B.

A LIST OF KINGS OF THE PALA DYNASTY OF BENGAL AND BEHAR.

(From Tibetan sources).

In the Tibetan books,[1] such as Pagsam jon zang, Lama Taranatha's Chos-byung, etc., we find a short account of the kings of the Pala dynasty of Bengal. Go Pala, the founder of the dynasty, lived principally in Pundra-vardhana. His successor, Deva Pala, annexed Varendra to his kingdom. Deva Pala's grandson, Dharma Pala, conquered Magadha and annexed it to Bengal. Dharma Pala's power is said to have extended in the east to the ocean, in the west to Delhi, in the north to Jalandhara, and in the south to the Vindhya ranges. It is stated that during his reign Santa Rakshita died. Now Santa Rakshita visited Tibet during the reign of Thi-srong-deu-tsan in 749 A.D., and worked there for 13 years, that is, till 762 A.D. His death must therefore have taken place after 762 A.D. Dipankara Srijnana, *alias* Atisa, High-priest of Vikramasila, who was a contemporary of king Nya-Pala of Magadha, visited Tibet in company with Nag-tsho-lotsava in 1040 A.D., during the reign of Lha-tsun-byang-chub, son of Lha-lama-yeshes-od, who held his court at Tholing in Nari. These facts throw a good deal of light on the dates of the Pala kings.[2] It is further stated that the death of Mahi Pala is exactly synchronous with that of the Tibetan king Khri-sral. Now Khri-sral (or Ral-pa-can) died in 899 A.D.[3] This fixes the date of the death of Mahi Pala. As the period of reign of each of the kings that preceded and succeeded Mahi Pala is definitely stated by Lama Taranatha, and also by the author of the Pagsam jon zang, there is no difficulty in ascertaining the dates of the Pala kings. Proceeding in this way, we can fix the dates as follows:—

1.	Go Pala	.. 690—705 A.D.
2.	Deva Pala	.. 705—753 A.D.

[1] *Vide* Tärānāth's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 202—252, and Pagsam jon zang, edited by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., pp. 112—121.

[2] *Vide* the 16th volume of Kiu-ri-gyal-rabs-bum, and Sarat Chandra Das's "Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow," pp. 50—76.

[3] *Vide* the Chronological Table extracted from the Vaidurya-karpo in Csoma de Koros's Tibetan Grammar, p. 183.

3.	Rasa Pāla	.. ..	753—765 A.D.
4.	Dharma Pāla	..	765—829 A.D.
5.	Masu Rakshita	.. ..	829—837 A.D.
6.	Vana Pāla	.	837—847 A.D.
7.	Mahī Pāla	.. ..	847—899 A.D.
8.*	Mahā Pāla	.. ..	899—940 A.D.
9.	Sāmu Pāla [1]	.. ..	940—952 A.D.
10.	Sreetha Pāla or Praistha Pāla	.	952—955 A.D.
11.	Canaka	.. ..	955—983 A.D.
12.	Bhava Pāla		983—1015 A.D.
13.	Naya Pāla		1015—1050 A.D.
14.	Āmra Pāla	.. ..	1050—1063 A.D.
15.	Hasti Pāla	.. ..	1063—1078 A.D.
16.	Kshanti Pāla	.. .	1078—1092 A.D.
17.	Rāma Pāla		1092—1138 A.D.
18.	Yaksa Pāla	..	1138—1139 A.D.

The researches on the Pāla kings by the late Dr. Rājendra Lāl Mitra arrived at a conclusion which is somewhat different from mine. Dr. Mitra's list of Pāla kings[2] is given below:—

1.	Go Pāla ..	.. ..	855—875 A.D.
2.	Dharma Pāla		875—895 A.D.
3.	Deva Pāla	.. ..	895—915 A.D.
4.	Vigraha Pāla I		915—935 A.D.
5.	Nārāyana Pāla		935—955 A.D.
6.	Rāja Pāla	.. ..	955—975 A.D.
7.	.... Pāla	.. ..	975—995 A.D.
8.	Vigraha Pāla II	.	995—1015 A.D.
9.	Mahī Pāla		1015—1040 A.D.
10.	Naya Pāla	.. .	1040—1060 A.D.
11.	Vigraha Pāla III	.. .	1060—1080 A.D.

[1] Probably the same as Nārāyana Pāla who, in the Bhagalpur plate, is styled "the lord of Aōga."

[2] *Vide* Dr. Rājendra Lāl Mitra's "Indo-Aryans," vol. ii, p. 232.

APPENDIX C.

THE ROYAL UNIVERSITY OF VIKRAMAŚĪLĀ

(About 800—1200 A.D.).

Vikramaśilā[1] mentioned in Sanskrit Sragdharāstotra tīkā[2] Vajrasvayambhū purāṇa[3] Tibetan Tangyur[4] etc. was a great collegiate monastery or rather University founded by king Dharma Pāla at the close of the 8th century A.D. It was situated on a precipitous hill[5] in Behar at the right bank of the Ganges passing at Silā Sindhu and now called Patharghaṭā, near Colgong in the Bhagalpur district. Dharmapāla endowed

1 *Vide* Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner pp. 234, 242, 259-261; Pagsam jon zang pp. 116, 117, 118 and Sarat Chandra Das's article in the "Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, vol. i, part I, pp. 10—12; and his "Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow," pp. 50—76.

2 The colophon of the Sragdharā stotra tīkā runs as follows:

श्रीमद्विक्रमशीलदेवमहाविहारीय राजकुलपण्डितश्रीमज्जेतारिविरचिता वज्रार्कस्तुतिटीका परिसमाप्ता (Sragdharā stotra edited in the Bibliotheca Indica series by Satya Chandra Vidyabhūṣaṇa p. 60)

3 वाराणसी नगर्यां च विहारे च महाश्रमे ।
तदा विक्रमशीलस्य विहारे नगरुत्तमे ॥
धर्मपालो नृपो राजा राष्ट्रं पालयति स्म च ।
धर्मे हि तत्प्रभावात् सामन्तानि च कर्षयेत् ॥ (Vajrasvayambhū purāṇa, edited by M. M. Hara Prasad Sastri, chap. vi, pp. 320—321)

4 Numerous Sanskrit works such as वज्रार्कविक्रमशीलकृते तन्त्रे, वज्रा चित्र लोचन etc., were translated into Tibetan in the monastery of Vikramaśilā as is evident from the Tangyur Bstan, La, Folios 11—26, 54 etc.

5 At the distance of a few miles and below Sultanganj there is a steep hill called Pātharghaṭā overhanging the Ganges, which here is *uttaravāhinī* (or flows towards the north). This corresponds exactly with the account of Vikramaśilā given in Tibetan books. There are also ruins of Buddhistic images at Pātharghaṭā. For the old name Somasangama *vide* Francis's "Bhagalpur Gazetteer" pp. 4—5. Appendix p. xiii. General Cunningham identifies Vikramaśilā with modern Silao, which is a small village two miles to the south of Bargaon, about Nālandā and six miles to the north of Rajgir in the subdivision of Behar. *vide* Report of the Archæological Survey vol. xxi p. 53. But this identification does not tally with the description found in Tibetan books, for the Ganges never passed by Silao, nor is there any hill near to it.

the university with rich grants sufficing for the maintenance of 108 resident monks besides numerous non-resident monks and pilgrims. At the head of the university was always a most learned and gentle sage. Thus at the time of Dharma Pala, Ācārya Buddha-jñāna-pāda directed the affairs of the university, and during 1034–1038 A.D. Dīpaṁkara or Śrījñāna Atīśa was at its head, and Śīla or Ratnākara was the superior of the monasteries. The famous Tibetan scholar Nag-tsi of Khrims-royal was better known as Nag-tsho Lotsava, who came to take Dīpaṁkara Śrījñāna *alias* Atīśa to Tibet, resided in the monasteries of Vikramaśilā for three years 1035—1038 A.D. Kumārakalaśa, Narendraśrī-pādā, Dharma Rakṣita, Abhayākara Gupta, Śubhākara Gupta, Sūryakīrti, Dharmākara Śānti and Śākyaśrī Paṇḍita also belonged to the university of Vikramaśilā. Provision was made specially for the study of grammar, metaphysics (including logic) and ritualistic books. On the walls of the university were painted images of pandits famous for their learning and character. The distinguished scholars of the university received additional titles of "Paṇḍita" from the kings themselves. For instance, the distinguished logicians Ācārya Jetari of Vāreṇdra and Ratnavajra of Kāśmīra, were granted such a diploma. The most erudite sages were appointed to guard the gates of the university. These were six in number, each of which had to be guarded by scholars designated "Gate-keepers" (called in Tibetan Gosum corresponding perhaps, to our Dvāra-paṇḍita). During the reign of Canda (955—983 A.D.) the undermentioned eminent logicians acted as gate-keepers :—

(i)—At the eastern gate ..	Ācārya Ratnākara Śānti.
(ii) At the western gate	Vāgīśvarakīrti of Benares.
(iii)—At the northern gate	The famous Naropa
(iv)—At the southern gate	Prajñākaramati
(v)—At the first central gate .	Ratnavajra of Kāśmīra.
(vi) At the second central gate	Jñāna-śrī-mitra of Gauḍa.

The university of Vikramaśilā is said to have been destroyed by the Mahomedan invader Bakhtiar Khilji[1] about 1203 A.D when Śākya-śrī paṇḍita, of Kāśmīra, was at its head

1 *Vide* Khoh-ṭdal-gsuh ḥbum, vol. xvi

2 Vide the Tibetan English Dictionary compiled by Rai Sarat Chandra Das p. 869, Waddell's Lamaism p. 10

The Turuskas or Muhammadans attacked Magadha several times. Thus Tāranātha speaking of Ācārya Kamala Rakṣita who was at the head of the Vikramaśilā University at the end of the 8th century A.D. observes "A minister of the Turuska king out of the Karna land in the west, together with 500 Turuskas, drew to Magadha to plunder. They plundered

the essential materials, but when they began to walk all in a body to the Ācārya Kamala Rakṣita the Ācārya got into a rage and walked up along throwing a jug filled with water over which he had spoken the mantras. On the spot a great and indescribable storm collected out of the wind came forth many black monsters with swords who fell upon the Tarukas the minister himself perished spitting blood and various contagious diseases repeated the others in such a way that none of them could reach their native country and a great terror came over the Tirthika and Tarukas. Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 200, 201.

GENERAL INDEX.

A

	Page
Abbot	125
Abhāva	28, 40, 42
Abhāva ..	10, 24, 42
Abhayadeva	16, 17
Abhayagiravāsin	65
Abhayakara Gupta	151
Abhaṃntrabakupādhyāya	53
Abhidharmapiṭaka	58, 59, 60, 63, 64
Abhidharmatthasaṃgaha	59
Abhidhānacintāmaṇi	15
Abhidharma	121, 145
Abhidharma jñāna prasthāna sāstra	64, 66
Abhidharma mahāvibhāṣā	64
Abhidharma mahāvibhāṣā śāstra	63, 66
Abhidharma vibhāṣā	63
Abhinibodha	4
Abhrānta	109
Absence of connection ..	97
Absence of disconnection	93
Absence of inverse connection	98
Absolute	42
Absolute knowledge ..	2, 10
Absolutely	109
Absolute non existence	24, 25
Absolute reality	68
Acandra	112
Ācārya	71, 80
Ācārya-dinakara	3
Ācārāṅga-sūtra	6
Ācārya's monastery	80
Ācārya	70, 80, 83, 102, 103, 121, 131, 136, 139, 151, 152
Ācārya Bodhisattva ..	125
Ācārya Śānti	140
Acā	29
Action	8, 32, 93
Activity	44
Adināthā	34
Adiparāṇa	14, 24, 28, 14
Adrikalpa	81
Advaita	23, 27
Advaitavādin	23
Affirmation	30
Affirmative	30, 31, 32
Āgama	3, 4, 10, 13, 20, 42, 49
Agnibhāsa	33
Ahmedabad	44
Ain i Akbari	40, 41
Ajātaśatru	58
Ajīva	8
Akalaṅka	23, 26, 27, 28, 33, 37, 40
Akalaṅkadeva	25, 54
Akalaṅkacandra	25
Akalaṅkastotra	29
Ākāśa	74
Akbar	55
Akevalajñāna	4
Akṣa Candra	69
Akṣapāda	xvii, 11, 46, 51, 53
Akṣapāda Gautama	xvii
Ālambana	131
Ālambana parīkṣā	101, 120
Ālambana parīkṣā ṭīkā	120, 121
Ālambana-parīkṣā-vṛtti	101

	Page
Ālambana-pratyaya-dhyāna-śāstra	101
Ālambana-pratyaya-dhyāna-śāstra-vyākhyā	102
Ābhāsa-vijñāna	73
Alberuni	14
Āloka	xxiii
Āloka-darpaṇa	xxiv
Āloka-kaṇṭakoddhāra	xxiv
Āloka-rahasya	xxiv
Āloka-sāra-manjarī	xxiii
All pervading	112
Alwis, Dr.	[illegible]
Amarachandra	47, 48
Amaraviśuddhi-carita	40
Amarāvatī	68
Ambiguous	[illegible], 111
Ambrosia	[illegible]
Anadi	137
Anga-Pāla	140
Anadhyavasāya	40
Anaikāntika-viruddhāsiddha	28, [illegible]
Anaikāntika	19, [illegible]
Analysis	[illegible]
Analysis of a word	100
Analogy	74, 75
Ānanda Sūri	47, 48
Anantavīrya	[illegible]
Anantavīrya	[illegible], 47, 48
Anānvaya	[illegible], 97, 110
Ancient	xxiv
Ancient school	xvii
Andhra	[illegible], 78, 81, 82
Anecdota Oxoniensia	76
Anekānta-Jaya-patākā-vyavasthā	[illegible]
Anekārthasaṃgraha	[illegible]
Aṅga	[illegible], 140
Aṅguttara Nikāya	[illegible]
Anhilwad	[illegible]
Anhilwad Patan	35
Aniścita	93
Antar	42
Antar-vyāpti ..	16, 42, 76, 140
Antarvyāpti-samarthana	141
Antecedent	42
Antecedent non-existence	24, 25
Antiquary, Indian	3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 13, 14, 38, 39, 46, 49, 53, 123
Antiquities ..	68
Anumāna	4, 5, 10, 15, 16, 20, 40, 41, 49, 54, 74, 99, 109
Anumānābhāsa	99
Anupalabdhi	30, 42, 110, 111, 117, 134
Anuṣṭubh ..	84
Anuyoga-dvāra-sūtra	4
Anvayi	31
Anvīkṣikī	xxii
Anyāpoha	[illegible]
Anyāpoha-vicāra-kārikā	130
Anyonyābhāva	24
Aparāntaka	[illegible]
Apasarpa	[illegible]
Aparamelya	[illegible]
Apoha	143
Apoha-nāma-prakaraṇa	132
Apohasiddhi	140, 144
Apparent	[illegible]
Appendix	145, 148, 150
Application	10, 31, 32, 42
Application of reason	61
Apprehend	95
Apprehension	10
Aprādhānyavāda	[illegible], 119
Aprādhānyavyavahāra	21
Āpta-mīmāṃsā	23, 24, 26, 27
Āpta-mīmāṃsālaṅkṛti	26
Āpta-mīmāṃsāṭīkā	23
Āpta-mīmāṃsā-vivaraṇa	54
Āpta-parīkṣā	27
Arāsana	[illegible]

	Page
Arcata	[illegible]
Arcata-tarka-vikā	53
Archar	xxi
Ardha-Māgadh	7
Argument	44
Argumentation	[illegible]
Arhat	7, 41, 49
Arithmetic	62
Aristotle	66
Art	62, 103
Art of healing	103
Artha-pati	10
Ārya	[illegible], 84, 122, 142
Ārya Asaṅga	73, 74
Ārya Deva ..	67, 70, 72, 148
Arya-kosa	124
Arya Mahāsāṅghika	[illegible]
Ārya Nāgārjuna	88
Ārya Sammitiya	[illegible]
Ārya Sarvāstivāda	65
Arya Sthavira	[illegible], 67
Ārya Tārā [illegible]	[illegible]
Asādhārana	94
Asaṅga	xix, 71, 74, 78, [illegible], 96, 122, 146
Āsaṅkā	7
Āsaṅkā-pratibodha	7
Ascetic	18
Ascetic Society	xii, [illegible], 40, 52, 72, 125, 143
Asiddha	18, 94, 112
Aśoka	58, 61, 121
Aspect	92
Āśrava	8
Assertion .	44
Astasāhasrī	23, 26, 27, 37, 54
Astasāhasrikā ..	[illegible]
Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā	64
Astasāhasrī vyākhyāna-tātparya-vikā	26, 37
Astasāhasrī vrtti	37
Asuras	25, 27
Asti	24
Astronomy	62, [illegible]
Asvaghosa	67
Asvavabodhatarka	[illegible]
Atīta	139, 148, 151
Ātmaka .	[illegible]
Ātman	10, 13, 127, 128
Atom	90, 98, [illegible]
Attribute	[illegible]
Attributeless	[illegible]
Atyantābhāva	[illegible]
Auditory	[illegible]
Aulukya	[illegible]
Authority	4, [illegible]
Avadātanāmalingā	15
Avadhi ..	4, 10, 41
Avadhi-jñāna	41
Avagraha	40
Avalokiteśvara	124, [illegible]
Āvantika	[illegible]
Avasarpiṇī	.. 1
Āvaśyakaniryukti	2
Āvaśyaka-sūtra	6
Avāya	41
Avayava	12
Avidyā	59
Avinābhāva	[illegible]
Avyatireki	21
Avodhyā	xix, 67, 73, 74, 75

B

Bactria	61
Bahir	42
Bahir-vyāpti	18, 42
Bahuśrutīya .	[illegible]
Bāhulika . .	[illegible]
Bakhtise Khilji	151
Bālāditya	xix, 145, 146
Bālāvatāra-tarka ..	137

Page

Bāra 34
Bandha 8
Baragaon 145 150
Barisal 122
Baroda 56
Basket 8
Bauddha 46 49 54
Bauddhadarśana 49 50 67, 68, 82, 105, 107, 133, 138
Bdag 127, 128
Bdag-gi-don-gyi rjes-su-dpag-pa 100
Bhabvel lgal wa 142
Beal, Rev xix, 14 62, 64 66 67 68 69, 71, 72, 74, 7 80 82 145
Bedā vṛtti 102
Behar xx, 57 103 145 148 150
Belief 91
Benares xiii, xiv, 6 8 39 50 51 52, 55, 133, 151
Benediction 141
Bengal xiii, xv xx 102 117 121 122, 124, 131 134, 136 141 148
Berar .. 68
Beum 3, 37
Bhadrabāhu 5 6 8
Bhadrabāhucarita 2
Bhadra Pāla 80
Bhadreśvara 50
Bhagalpur 149 150
Bhagavān 137
Bhagavān Upavarṣa 33
Bhagavatī-sūtra 4
Bhāgya-śya 132, 137 144
Bhāmatī .. 23, 105
Bhāmatī ṭīkā 23
Bhamsa Candra 69
Bhandarkar, Dr R G 2 5, 6 14 24, 25, 26, 37 38, 41, 46 47, 53, 63, 68
Bharata .. 30
Bharsa .. 123, 124
Bhartṛhari 26, 27, 28, 34, 102, 105, 110
Bhāṣarvajña 53
Bhāṣavāmin 22
Bhāṣya 9, 10, 12, 129
Bhasma 34 81
Bhāsa 54
Bhasmapāla 51
Bhattāraka 54
Bhāva 14 24
Bhavamagaca 13 16
Bhavārandā xviii
Bhavānand vyākhyā xviii
Bhaya Pāla 140
Bhikṣu 61, 63, 90
Bhikṣusūtra 61
Bhim Sing 8
Bhoja Deva 68
Bhoramdā 80
Bhota 50
Bhrama pramatham yukti hetu siddhi 71
Bhṛkuṭa .. 81
Bhṛkuṭi .. 81
Bhum 71
Bibliotheca Indica xx, 9, 14, 23, 65 70, 109, 113, 114, 124, 131, 140 150
Bibliothek zu Berlin 37
Bimba .. 30
Bi wa i jug pa ji tog go 137
Bias 21
Bio gdan-sos rab 108, 131, 132, 136, 142, 143, 144
Blunders 81
Bodhisattva 65, 82, 83, 90 101 124
Bodhisattva-caryāvatāra 72 73
Bombay xii, 6, 8 13, 34, 46, 54, 95

	Page
Bombay Gazette	44
Bompas, Mr. C. H.	xx
Bondage	.. 3, 44
Bonn	xiv
Bos gévaous	29
Brahma	104, 107
Brahmajālasutta	59, 60
Brāhmaṇa	2, 49, 50, 60, 83, 102, 103, 104, 142, 145
Brahma nemidatta	28
Brāhmaṇ	2
Brāhmaṇic	10
Brāhmaṇic Logic	xiv
Brahmavādī	46
Bṛhadāraṇyaka vārtika	105
Bṛhat-jātaka kośa	122
Bṛhat-kathā	35
British Government	xxi
British Mission	xv, 120, 129, 131, 134
Broach	50
Brtag pa	129
Brten-pahi	128
Bsam yas	125
Bsgrub par bya	90
Bsgrub par byed	90
Bsrub	130
Buddha	1, 20, 21, 27, 57, 58, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 80, 99, 101, 104, 120, 129, 145
Buddha Gautama	57, 65
Buddha Gayā	139, 141
Buddhaghoṣa	76
Buddha Gupta	145
Buddha-jñāna-pāda	151
Buddhism	57, 64, 67, 71, 73
Buddhist	xiii, xviii, xix, 50, 54, 59, 91
Buddhist India	64, 67
Buddhist Logic	xiv, xv, 57
Buddhist Records	xix, 14, 62, 66, 67, 68, 71, 72, 75, 82, 102, 145
Buddhist Text Society	68, 70, 71, 72
Bühler, Dr. George	44, 48, 50, 125, 128, 129
Bull in Discussion ..	60, 61
Bunyiu Nanjio	61, 64, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 80, 89, 101, 102
Burmah	93
Burton	78
Byan chub sems dpah	137
Byed-brag	128
Byo-brag-pha	127

C

	Page
Caitya	10, 137
Cakra-saṃvara	139
Calcutta	1, xiii, xv, xxi, xx, xxi, 2, 4, 9, 11, 14, 63, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 76, 109, 120, 121, 124, 126, 131, 133, 136, 140, 147, 150
Calcutta University	xxi
Cambay	xx, 22, 109, 141
Canaka	135, 138, 139, 140, 149, 151
Candra	122
Candra-dvipa	122
Candra Gomin	xx, 121, 122, 123, 124
Candra Gupta	3, 69, 70, 71
Candra Keti	70, 122, 123
Cakkhu viññāṇa	59
Candrak-pa	121
Candra Nārāyaṇa ..	xxiii
Candrapāla	140
Candraprabha	46, 46
Candra-sena	4
Candra vyākaraṇa	122
Candra's well	121

	Page
Candrapatrika	xviii
Candrodaya	11
Canon	3, 64
Canonical	[illegible]
Canonical scripture	3
Canonised	8
Cap	78, 79
Capital	[illegible]
Carpenter, J. E.	60
Cavaka	43, 46, 51
[illegible]	10, 11
Central	62
[illegible]	[illegible]
Catalogue	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
Categories	x
[illegible]	21
[illegible]	[illegible]
Causation	62
Cause	11, 20, 10, [illegible], 11, 117
	[illegible]
[illegible]	104
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible], 2, 140
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible], 51
Chanda	10
[illegible]	4
[illegible]	140
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	40, 41, 91, 12, [illegible], 100, 101, 110, 117, 116
Characteristic of the [illegible] term	41
Chos	xix, 63, 71, 74, 71, 7[illegible], 7[illegible], 80, 101
Chottore	69
Chula	64
[illegible]	69
[illegible]	148

	Page
Chos-can	90
Chos-dan chos-can ston la [illegible]	
pa	106
[illegible]	101
[illegible]	150
[illegible]	141
Chos-mngon-pa-thun-po [illegible]	97
Chos-mngon-pa-thun-pa	90
Chos-mngon	90
Chos-mngon-pa-[illegible]	96
Chos-mngon-pa	90
Chowkhamba	[illegible], 51, 52
Christian	145
[illegible]	50
Class	[illegible], 100
Classification	19
[illegible]	103
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
Cognition	40
[illegible]	71
[illegible]	[illegible]
Collective	11
[illegible]	xvii, xix, 10
[illegible]	4, 10, 74, [illegible], 86
Comparison	4, [illegible], 81
[illegible]	10
Conception	112
[illegible]	141
Conclusion	8, 10, 1, 42, 42, [illegible], 94
Conditional	98
[illegible]	109
Conjunction	80, 10[illegible]
Connection	42, 65, 87, 92, 96, [illegible], 111, 116, 119, 144
Connection unknown	20, 115
Consciousness	61, 45, 59
Consequence	40
Constituent	41

	Page
Contained	[illegible]
Container ..	**29, 111**
Contemplation	[illegible]
Contemplative	[illegible]
Contemplative system ..	**71**
Continuity	[illegible]
Contradiction	**94, 95, 113, 114**
Contradictory ..	**19, 94, 95, 112, 113**
Contradistinction	**62**
Contrarety	17
Contrary separation	[illegible]
Controversialist	[illegible]
Controversy	[illegible]
Conventional	[illegible]
Conviction	111
Convincing	[illegible]
Cordier, Dr. Palmer	[illegible]
Corea	**63**
Cosmic Kindness	[illegible]
Council	[illegible] **63, 64, 67**
Council of disciples	44
Counter argument	44
Counter assertion	44
Counterpart	[illegible]
Counter proposition	
Cowell, Mr. E. B.	[illegible]
Crawford, Mr.	**xv**
Credible	[illegible]
Credible word ..	**83, 88, 89**
Cremation	101
Crest-jewel of Logicians	[illegible]
Cunningham, Kanu	100, 124, **135, 148**
Cushing	[illegible]
Culla Vagga	**57**
Cunningham, General	[illegible]
Curpika	[illegible]
Cycle.	**57**

D

	Page
Dabhoi	**56**
Dai pari-sergale	[illegible]
Dai pa[illegible]gal	[illegible]
Dakpina ..	**81**
Dāna Rakshita	[illegible]
Dānaśīla	[illegible]
Dāna-śīla	[illegible]
Darjeeling	[illegible]
Darma grage	[illegible]
Darsana-siddhi	[illegible]
Dasahikanikaya	[illegible]
Daśavata-skandha-sūtra	[illegible]
Daśavaikika nirukti	[illegible]
Daśavaikika-nirukti-tika	[illegible]
Daśavaikika sūtra	[illegible]
Daśavaikālikasūtra	[illegible]
Daśavaikalika sūtra	[illegible]
Daśāvayava-vākya ..	**6**
Das, Sarat Chandra ..	[illegible] **7, 75, 82, 84, 119, 121, 124, 126, 129, 147, 148, 150, 151**
Death	[illegible]
Debate	[illegible]
Debater	[illegible]
Debator	74
Deccan	[illegible]
Deccan College	[illegible]
Declaration	[illegible]
Defeat	**61, 74**
Defect	21
Defective	**41**
Deductive knowledge	[illegible]
Dehinde	[illegible]
Dehinden	[illegible]
Degree	**1**
Dekho ne-ñiñ-tadu [illegible] **dkah-bgrol**	**130**
Dekhona [illegible]	125
Delhi	**63, 148**

Page

Demonstration 89
Derivation 12
Deva .. 67 70 71, 72
Devacandra 44
Devadatta 28 32
Devāgamastotra 23
Deva Pāla 148 149
Devardhi Gaṇi .. 13, 22
Devasundara 53
Deva Sūri .. 38, 39, 50
Devendra Bhadra 140
Devendrabodhi xvii, 118 119
Devotee .. 103 122 123 135 136 139

Dgah wahi-rdo-rje 143
Dge-barun 130
Dge-ses-rab gyan 100
Dge-wahi-blo-gros 106 117, 118 119

Dgra-las-ruyal-wa 136
Dhammagutika 8
Dhammasaṅgaṇi 50
Dhammuttariya 67
Dhampat Sing 3, 4 6 8 11

Dhandhuka 44
Dhanesvara 37
Dhānyakataka xx
Dhārmaṅ 41
Dhārmoi 103
Dharma 29 30 90, 101 141

Dharmabhūṣaṇa 54, 82
Dharmābhyudaya-mahākāvya . 47, 48
Dharma-dharmi-viniscaya . 136
Dharmagañja 147
Dharmaghoṣa 48
Dharma-guptiya 65
Dharmākara Datta 151
Dharmākara Śānti 151

Page

Dharmakīrti xvii xix, 24 26, 27, 34 41 48 49, 57, 62 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 109 113 114, 116, 116, 117, 118 119, 120, 121, 124, 125 129, 131 132, 133, 134, 135, 138 139, 140 143

Dharmāloka .. . 131
Dharmapāla 102 103 105 124, 130 140, 148 149 150 151
Dharmapāla, A H 61
Dharmaputra 48
Dharmasāgaragaṇi 5
Dharmasaṃgraha 71
Dharmāśoka 60
Dharmavijaya, Muni xix 2 6, 13, 22, 46, 49, 50 52, 54
Dharmavinicaya 140
Dharman 29, 90
Dharmottara xix, 35, 46, 50, 53, 67, 131, 133
Dharmottarāśrya xx, 130, 131, 133
Dharmottaratippanaka 34, 131
Dialectic 106
Dialectician 72, 80, 100, 107, 123, 129
Dialectics 63
Dialogue of Buddha .. 60
Didhiti xviii
Didhiti-sāra-mañjarī .. xviii
Didhiti-ṭīkā .. xviii
Didhitiṭippanī xviii
Didhiti-vyākhyā-vivecana xviii
Digambara xviii, 1, 2, 5, 9 22 25 26, 24, 33, 36 37 38 54, 62, 105, 127
Dīgha Nikāya .. 59 60
Dignāga xvi, xix 27, 34, 49 52 53, 54, 70, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 95, 96, 99, 100,

Page

101, 102, 105, 108, 113, 114, 124
Dinna Gaṇi 22
Dipaṅkara xv n
Dipaṅkara 117, 136, 137, 138, 148, 151
Diploma.. .. 139, 141, 151
Direct 112
Direct apprehension 28
Direct knowledge 4, 9, 10, 15 21, 29, 40
Discipline Basket .. 58
Disconnection 98
Discuss .. 42
Dis cussion 44, 62 64
Disputant 40, 44, 62, 113
Disputation .. 62, 114
Dispute 70
Dissenter 67
Distinction 62
Dittha 86
Dittheivão 4
Dmigs-pa brtag pa 101
Dmigs-pa brtag-pahi bgrel 101
Dmigs-pa brtag-pahi bgrel ṭīkā 120
Dhos po 128
Dō 127 130 140
Doctor of Philosophy 4
Doctrine 91, 104
Dogma 44 71
Dogmatik xiii
Door of Entrance to Logic 89
Dorje 80
Doubt .. 18 19, 40 116
Dpal-brtsegs Rakṣita .. 130
Dpal-ldan-blo-gros .. 124
Dpal-ldan-blo-gros-brtan-pa 139
Dpal-mchog dan pohi-rdo-rje 137
Dpal-rtsegs Rakṣita 121, 130
Dpe-brjod 90
Dpe-dan-dpe-ltar 65
Dpe-ltar-snan-wa 96
D. P. L. xv
Dravali 104
Drāvida xviii, xix, xx, 102, 104
Dravya 11, 128
Drop of Logic 100
Drop of Reason 117
Dṛṣṭānta 7, 16, 17, 18, 21, 42, 74, 76, 90,
Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa .. 19, 20, 23 96, 97
Dṛṣṭivāda .. 3, 4, 5
Dul-ba 119
Dug 129
Dusan 21, 98, 110
Dūṣaṇābhāsa .. 21, 99
Dus-gsum-brtag pa 101
Dvāra-paṇḍita 154
Dvātraya-mahā-kāvya 15
Dvātriṁśikā 51
Dwah-phyug-brtag-pa .. 127
Dwah phyug bjig pahi-tshig lehur-byas-pa 130
Dwah-po 129

E

Ear 16, 87
Earle, Mr. A. xv
Early history of the Deccan 20
Earth .. 22
Effect 29, 30, 31, 110, 111 117, 126, 128, 134 138
Efficiency 110
Ego 72
Ekabbohārika .. 58
Emancipation .. 21, 41, 44
Enlightened One 57
Enlightenment 15
Entire knowledge 4
Entity 11, 128

	Page
Entrance to the Science of Logic	100
Epaminondas	21
Era	51
Era of tradition	1
Error	51
Error	82
Ethic	21 [illegible] 91
Etymological	12
Example	[illegible]
Examples	4 [illegible] 21
Examples [illegible]	43
Exclusion	129
Exemption	129
Examples [illegible]	12
[illegible]	114, 115, 116
Excluded	90
Excluded [illegible]	98
Excluded middle	90
Excluded middle and major term	[illegible]
Experience	24 [illegible] 68
Experience	99, [illegible]
External	42
External	42
External [illegible]	42
Extreme	68
Extreme	18
Eye	[illegible] 87 [illegible]

F

Fact	74
Facts	[illegible] 31, [illegible]
Fallacy	62 [illegible] 99 145
Fallacies	90 [illegible] 112
Fallacy	21, 28, 32 41, 42 [illegible] 7 [illegible] 94 96, 98 [illegible] 113 115 114 116 116
Fallacy of absence of connection	97
Fallacy of absence of [illegible]	98
Fallacy of argumentation	42
Fallacy of [illegible]	43
Fallacy of example	19, 33, 98
Fallacy of [illegible] and major terms	97
Fallacy of heterogeneous example	24, 31, 97
Fallacy of homogeneous example	[illegible]
Fallacy of included major term	98
Fallacy of included middle and major terms	98
Fallacy of included middle term	98
Fallacy of inference	99
Fallacy of inverted [illegible]	98
Fallacy of middle term	18, 33 [illegible] 96 112
Fallacy of minor term	[illegible] 42
Fallacy of [illegible]	41
Fallacy of perception	32 [illegible]
Fallacy of [illegible] practical	41
Fallacy of reason	33
Fallacy of reasoning	98
Fallacy of recognition	32
Fallacy of [illegible]	12
Fallacy of refutation	98 116
Fallacy of [illegible]	43
Fallacy of [illegible]	43
Fallacy of straight expression	43
Fallacy of [illegible]	90, 98 112
Fallacy of verbal testimony	93
Familiar	95
Feeling	91
Fine Art	103 121

	Page
First Council	54
Fitness	32
Fleet, Dr. J. F ..	57 63
Form	110
Formal syllogism ..	90
Formula	6
Franklin	150
Fraud	61
Futility	110

G

Gacchotpatti-prakrapaka ..	48
Gaḍādhara	xviii
Gaṇadhara	2
Gaṇadhara-adrdha-śataka ..	2
Gandavyūha	64
Gandha hasti-mahābhāṣya ..	23
Gandhāra	xx 74 7.
Gangā	121, 122, 150
Gangeśa Upādhyāya	xvii, xviii, 48
Garbhapāda	130
Gate-keeper	138, 139, 140, 151
Gāthākośakārī	48
Gauḍa ..	137, 138, 151
Gautama	xvii, 2, 3, 11, 57
Genus ..	6, 14, 15
Genealogy	8
General	11, 17, 32, 80, 93, 94, 113, 115
Generality	82, 95, 121, 128
General knowledge ..	109
General property	11
General property	11, 44
Genus	85 88 99
Gerry	7.
Germany	122
Ghāṭāyajñeśvara	59
Ghata	12
Gloss	xix, 131
Gnosiologist	128
Goal	128 131

	Page
Gokulika	48
Go Pāla	124, 148, 149
Gorakhpura	57
Gotama	3
Go-śrin . ..	151
Gosvāmi, Dāmodara Lal ..	51
Gotama	2
Gotra ..	3
Gotta	5
Gough, Mr	8, 20, 66 67, 68
Govi Candra	119
Govind	20
Grag-thbor-[illegible]-rab	159 159
Gra-pa rgyal-mtsan-gyi-[illegible]-bzah	80
Grammar	103, 121, 122, 140, 141, 151
Great Britain	57, 58, 63, 64, 66, 72, 76
Great Vehicle	63
Gdagg-bam bklag-pahi-thabs	134
Gcer-gyi-go-cha ..	84, 100
Gchan-gyi-don-gyi-gjo-dpag ..	85
Gchan-gyi-don-gyi-tshig ..	100
Gchan-gyi-don-rtsa-ba-dpag pa	100
Gcham-la-brtag-pahi-tshig-bcur byas-pa .	130
Gcham-[illegible]-wa	112
Gtan tshigs	85 90 91
Gtan-tshigs-kyi-de-kho-na-ñid bstan-pa	130
Gtan tshigs-[illegible] khor-[illegible] gtan la-dpyad-pa	99
Gtan-tshigs-kyi-thigs-pa	117
Gtan-tshigs-kyi-thigs-pa-rgya cher bgrel-wa ..	120
Gtan tshigs [illegible] ..	93
Gtan-tshigs-thigs-pahi-bgrel-wa	133
Guge	125
Guna	128

Page

Guṇākara-śrī-bhadra .. 125
Guṇamati 146
Guṇaratna 48 52 53, 133
Guṇava 3
Gupta 49 130
Gupta era 70
Gupta samvat 49
Guru 129
Guṇāvalī 6, 39, 51
Guṇāvalī-sūtra 8
Gustatory 59
Gujarat .. xviii, 38 44 45, 46 47
Gyantse xx

H

Haimavata 45
Haiman .. 48, 50
Hamsaraja, Hira Lal 51
Han .. 64
Handschriften verzeichnisse 1
Hanoi 70
Hardy, Roy 57
Haribhadra 3, 46 47, 48, 49 50 139
Harivamśa Purāṇa 2
Harṣa .. . xx, 123
Harṣa Deva 142
Harṣa Vardhana 123
Hasti Lila 149
Hbras-bu 110, 134
Hbras-bu'i gtan tshigs 117
Hbrel-pa-'brtag pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa .. 123
Hbrel-pa-'brtag pa'i rgyas-su bshad-pa 142
Hbrel-pa-grub-pa 144
Hbrel-wa-'brtag-pa 118
Hbrel-wa-'brtag pa'i 'grel-wa 118
Hbro .. 125, 136, 140
Hbro-sun-'byin 125
Hdir-wa .. 129
Hema 45
Hemacandra 2, 26 35 44 45 51, 123
Hema Varma .. Karaṇa Varma 84 100
Heresy 77
Heretic .. 91, 102
Heretical .. 58, 65
Heterodox 103
Heterogeneous 17 19 20 41 42, 90, 91 94, 95 98, 110 112 115, 116 117
Heterogeneous example 20 21, 97, 98
Hetu 4, 5, 7, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 30, 33, 41, 42, 62, 74, 76, 77 85 90, 91 117
Hetubindu 53 120 133
Hetubindu-ṭīkā 120
Hetubindu-vivaraṇa 117 118
Hetu-cakra-hamaru 90
Hetu-dvāra-śāstra 90
Hetu-prayoga 42
Hetu-tattva-upadeśa 116
Hetu-vabhakti 7
Hetuvidyā xxii 65 82
Hetuvidyā-śāstra .. 82, 83
Hetvābhāsa 18, 31, 33 112
Hgal-wa 94
Hgro-wa-rab-'byam-du-'gro-wa-'brtag-pa 127
Hgyur-war-'gyur-wa 121
Himalaya 103
Himavata 58
Hinayāna 63, 65, 66 74, 80
Hindu Logic xiv 73 74 75, 76, 80, 101
Hira Lal Hamsarāja 13
Hirapa 37
Hiravijaya 55
Historical period 13

	Page
Historical Records	39
Hjamalpalvtas [illegible]	69
Hodgson	120
Hodgson-stupa photographs	132
Hodgson, Mr	xv 61
Hoernle, Dr	9 23
Holy saying	74
Homogeneous 17, 19, 31, 42, 90, 91, 94, 98, 110, 112, 113, 115	
Homogeneous example 19, 97, 115	
Hornell, Mr. W. W	xvi
Hoshang	123
Householder	7
Humiliation	61
Hun .. .. xix 14	146
Huskapura ..	xx
Hwen-thsang 14, 62, 66 67, 68 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 82, 101, 102, 103, 105, 123, 145,	146

I

I	142
Identification	41
Identity 31, 110, 111, 117, 134	
Ignorance ..	21, 22
Ihā	41
Illumination	43
Illusion	59
Illusory .. 43, 85, 99, 109	
Image	14, 109
Immediate	43
Imperceptible	30 31
Implied	95, 113
Implied major term	113
Imputation	5
Impressions	29
Included major term	98
Included middle and major terms	98
Included middle term	98
Incompatible	90 91 112
Inconsistent	95
Indescribable	25
Indra xix xx xxi xxii xix xx, 50, 61 62 63 64, 65 67 69 7 70 78 81, 96 101 102, 103, 105 108 120 122 134 135, 145, 146	
Indian Logic	xxii
India Office xv 84 89 100 101 106, 107, 108, 109, 117, 118, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144	
Indirect	112
Indirect apprehension ..	26
Indirect knowledge 4, 9, 10, 15, 21, 29, 40, 41, 54	
Individual knowledge ..	109
Indra	11, 43
Indrabhūti	2, 3
Indra Goma	123
Indravijaya, Muni xix 2 9 13, 22 49 49 54	
Indriya	40, 129
Indriya-parikṣā	127
Induction	90
Inference 4 5, 10, 15, 16, 19, 29, 30, 31, 40, 41, 42, 54, 74, 76, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 99, 100, 111, 112, 114, 129	
Inference for one's self 16, 31, 41, 85, 106, 108 109, 110, 137, 139	
Inference for others	41
Inference for the sake of others 16 17, 31, 85 88 109, 111, 112, 137 139	
Infinite knowledge	15
Inquiring	41
Inseparable	90
Inseparable connection 18, 20, 29, 42, 92, 116	
Instance	7

Page

Instrument 29
Intelligence 5,
Intercourse 10
Internal 42
Internal inseparable connection 43 76 141
Interpretation 43
Intrinsic 18
Introduction xvi
Intuition 41
Invalid .. 19, 106
Invariable accompaniment 18
Invariable separation 24
Inverse connection 97
Inverse disconnection 98
Inversion 40
Inverted 97 98
Inverted connection 20 116
Inverted negation 98
Ireland 67, 68, 69 [illegible] 70, 72, 74
Istavighātakṛt .. 118
Īśvara-bhaṭṭāraka 130
Īśvara Kṛṣṇa 83, 96
Īśvara Sena .. 106
Itaretar bhāva 42
Ithāva 62
Iṭṭaṅg 64 66 84 89 90 101 102, 103, 105, 119, 123, 140

J

Jacobi Dr Hermann xiii xiv, 1 [illegible] 11 49
Jagadīśa xviii
Jagat sanbhāvanā vada parikṣa 127
Jaimini 81
Jaiminīya 13, 49, 51
Jaina xiii xvii 2, 3, 10 40 59 82 104, 125
Jaina darśana 8, 78
Jaināgama List 46, 64

Page

Jaina Logic xiii xvi xix 1
Jaina system xviii
Jaiminīya [illegible] 54
Jain Vartiya, Mr 24 25, 28 33
Jaipur 24 25, 28 33
Jalandhara 64 138
Jamanagara 61
Jambudvīpa 1 4
Jambudvīpasamāsa 9
Japan xix 63 73 74 75, 76, 80, 101
Jarrett [illegible] 10
J A S B xi 70, 71 80, 122 124 125 138 140
Jaṭā 54 114
Jaya Candra 63
Jayadeva Miśra xxiii
Jayādityā 121
Jayanta [illegible]
Jayasiṁha 18 [illegible] 44 47
Jayasoma 6
J B B R A S 21 26 27 8 24, 63, 82, 105, 114
J. B. T. S. 63, 65, 66, 67, 68 71, 73, 126 129 130 150
Jesuits [illegible]
Jetāri [illegible] 144 151
Jetavanīya 65
Jina xviii 1 [illegible] 80 82 137
Jina Bhadra 137
Jinalāpta 50
Jinadatta 54
Jinadattasūri 5
Jina Mitra 120, 130, 134, 136 146
Jinaprabha 1 3, 4 64
Jina Sena 14 24, 28 34
Jinendrabuddhi xvii, 124
Jineśvara 37
Jitari 44
Jiva [illegible] 22
Jñānaviśārada 60

	Page
Jñāna	4
Jñānabindu-prakaraṇa ..	54
Jñāna Candra ..	51, 52, 146
Jñānagarbha	118, 120, 131
Jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra ..	60
Jñāna-śrī	137, 138
Jñāna-śrī Bhadra	117, 137, 138
Jñāna-śrī Mitra	137, 138, 151
J. P. T. S. ..	58, 68
J. R. A. S.	xix, 57, 59, 63, 64, 66, 72, 76, 103, 140
Jyotirvidābharaṇa ..	15
Jyotiskāvatāra	15

K

Kabul	139
Kādambarī	34
Kāla	129
Kalaśa	12
Kālāśoka	58
Kālidāsa	61
Kaliktin Gautama	48
Kalikula Sarvajña	44
Kalinga ..	98, 104
Kālisaṅkara	xviii
Kālisaṅkarī patrikā	xviii
Kalpanā	100
Kalpasūtra	1, 5, 6, 11
Kalyāṇa-kāṇḍa	140
Kalyāṇa-mandira-stava ..	14
Kalyāṇa Rakṣita ..	130, 131
Kamalakulīśa	151
Kamala Rakṣita ..	151, 152
Kamalaśīla	53, 120, 129, 140
Kamala-śīla-tarka	125
Kamala-śrīla	129
Kaṇabhakṣa	40
Kaṇāda .	40, 104
Kaṇāda Gupta ..	101
Kaṇāda Tarkāvāgīśa .	xxii
Kāṇa Deva .	71
Kanaka Muni	57
Kanaka Varma, *Vide* Hema Varma	
Kāñcī ..	xx, 80, 94
Kāñcīpura ..	xx, 102
Kangyur .	72, 73
Kaniṣka	62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 78
Kaṇva	69
Kapila	20, 21, 127, 128
Kapilavāstu	7
Kārṣṇa ..	29, 30, 31
Kāraṇāṇupalabdhi	111
Kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi ..	111
Karma ..	44, 128
Karṇa	131
Karparipa	70
Karṇāṭa	xix
Kārya 29, 30, 31, 110, 111, 117, 131	
Kāryahetu	117
Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-siddhi ..	138
Kāryānupalabdhi	111
Kāryaviruddhopalabdhi ..	111
Kāśikā vṛtti	123
Kāśmīra xx, 62, 67, 108, 123, 125, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 142, 143, 146, 151	
Kāśmīrian	89, 104
Kassapiya .	98
Kāṭhāsaṅgha	9
Kaśyapa ..	57, 58
Kāśyapīya	65
Kathākośa	98
Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa	60, 61
Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa aṭṭha kathā	61
Kathiwar ..	12, 34, 51
Kātyāyanīputra ..	64, 66
Kaubhasaṅgha	9
Kauśāmbī	74, 75, 102
Kauṣika .	71
Kavi	21, 25, 34, 47

Page

Kāvyamālā 3
Kāvyānuśāsanavṛtti 44
Kāvya prakāśa-saṅketa 47
Kāyavijñāna 69
Kern, Prof. 63
Kevala 10, 15
Kevalajñāna 2, 4
Kevalin 2
Khaṇḍa 32
Kharatara-gaccha 3, 4, 11, 14
44, 53
Kharatara-gaccha pattāvalī 48
Khro-rol xx, 145, 148
Khro-ston dgu-lam 124, 129
Khuddaka Nikāya 60
Khyab 92
Kielhorn, Prof. F. 123
King 62
Kirti 105
Klatt, Dr. J. 3, 6, 13, 14, 35, 38
39, 45, 48, 49, 53
Klog-skyes-śes-rab-kyi-rtsegs 140
Kloṅ-rdol-gsum-ldan 148, 151
knowledge 4, 10, 22, 40, 59
100, 112
Kolhāpura 54
Konkana 137
Koṇḍanda 103
Korur 14
Koṣa-kāraka-śāstra 66
Krakucchanda 57
Kratu 43
Kṛishṇā 68
Kriyā-ratna-samuccaya 62, 63
Kṛṇakāsta xxiii
Kṛṇarāja 30
Kṛtikā 30, 31
Kṣamāśramaṇa 17, 22
Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi 132, 133, 140
Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi vyākhyā 173

Page

Kṣānti Pāla 149
Kṣapaṇaka 15
Kṣatriya 121
Kubja 81
Kukutasiddha 147
Kumārajīva 70, 71, 76
Kumārakalasa 136, 138, 141
Kumārālāpa 67
Kumārālasiha 67
Kumāra Nandi 54
Kumāra Pāla 44
Kumāraśrī 136
Kumāraśrī bhadra 125
Kumārila 24, 26, 27, 28, 44, 81
104, 106
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa 81
Kumbha 12
Kumuda-candra 14
Kumuda-candrācārya 48
Kundakunda 9
Kuruṇḍaka 65
Kusinagara 57
Kusumā 57
Kusumapura 9
Kuṭāraka 81
Kwei-ki 76

L

Lalitang xv, xvi, 89, 99, 118, 119, 125, 130, 136, 138, 142
Laghīyastraya 26, 31
Laghīyasmantabhadra 26, 37
Laghuṭīkā 50
Laghuvṛtti 52
Lakṣaṇa 54, 109, 129
Lalita Candra 119
Lalitāditya xx, 125
Lalitavistara 64, 65
Lama xx, 125, 148
Lamaism 78, 124, 130, 151
Laṅkāvatāra 64, 72

Page

Laṅkāvatāra sūtra 71, 72, 73
Leg 128
Lesson, Mr. 63
Laukāyatika 33
Laukika 10
Law .. 62, 75, 80, 104
Leipzig xiii
Leumann, Dr E .. n
Lévi, Sylvain .. 63
Lexicography .. 142 140
Lha-bla-ma-chi-wa-bod 12
Lha-dwah-bla 118
Lha-lama ye-ses-bod 148
Lhan-cig-drnigs-pa-ñes-pa 139
Lhasa 142
Lha-tsun-byah-chub .. 148
Library 117
Liechavi 1
Life . 48
Lucknow 78
Limitation 7
Liṅga 14, 16, 29, 80, 91
Lion-cub 47
Literature 57, 9, 121 123, 141
Little Vehicle 63
Locus 29
Logic xii, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, xix, xx, xxi, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 51, 52, 54, 57, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 67, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 89, 99, 101, 105, 107, 109, 117, 118, 119, 121, 123, 124, 125, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 151
Logician .. 59, 72
Lokāchārya 8
Lokāyata 62
Lokottaravādin 65
London xiv, xv, 58, 59, 60, 61, 68, 84, 89, 100, 101, 106, 107, 108, 109, 112, 117, 118, 120, 125, 130, 133, 139, 139, 140, 141, 143
Luna 112

M

Mādhavāchārya 9, 26, 38, 60, 67, 68, 82, 103, 107, 138
Madhusūdana Thakkura xviii
Madhyadesa 103
Madhyama 68
Madhyamakāvatāra .. 140
Mādhyamika 51, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 122, 124
Mādhyamika kārikā 70
Mādhyamikā Vṛtti 68, 70
Madhyanta vibhāga sūtra 71
Madras xv, 68, 78, 80, 81, 82, 102
Magadha 3, 20, 57, 61, 69, 97, 103, 124, 125, 136, 138, 139, 144, 147, 148, 151
Māgadhī 1, 57
Magic 62
Magrab 61
Mahābhadra kalpa 67
Mahādeva Pandita xvii
Mahākāla 14
Mahākarunā 68, 73
Mahāmati 72
Mahā Pāla 135, 136, 149
Maharaja xx
Mahārāja-Kanika-lekha 62
Maharani xv
Mahārāṣṭra 80, 81
Mahāsamaya sūtra 72, 73
Mahāsāṃghika 58, 65, 67
Mahāvagga 59
Mahāvaṃsa 57, 58, 61, 66, 67
Mahāvibhāṣā 64
Mahāvihāra 67
Mahāvīra 1, 2, 3, 6, 13, 14, 22,

Page

Mahāvīracarita .. . 2
Mahāvīracaritra 45
Mahāyāna 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 74, 75, 78, 80, 129, 138, 145
Mahāyāna-saṃparigraha-śāstra 74
Mahendra Sūri 47
Mahesa Thakkura xviii
Mahinda 54
Mahī Pāla 134, 135, 148, 149
Mahī Śaka 65, 74
Mahomedan xx, 151
Mahopādhyāya .. 5
Maitreya xix, 57, 73, 74, 75, 78
Major term 16, 18, 29, 30, 31, 41, 56, 76, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 110, 112, 113, 130
Malla 54
Mallisūri 38, 51
Mallavādin xix, 31, 33, 131
Mallinātha 81
Malliseṇa 51
Malwa xviii, 14, 119
Manah paryāya . 4, 10, 41
Manak . 8
Manas 15, 40, 86, 87
Manorathapa 93
Maṅgala 126
Manibhadra 2
Māṇikya Candra 35, 36, 47
Māṇikya Nandi 26, 28, 33, 34, 37, 40, 64
Mañjunātha 100
Mañjuśrī 80, 82, 83, 84, 123, 125, 136, 142
Mañjuśrī-mūla tantra 69
Manoratha 75, 143
Manovijñāna 59
Mantra 130
Manu 101
Page

Manual of Buddhism .. 57
Manusmṛti 103
Māra 116
Mark .. 29, 49, 90, 91
Mati Rakṣita 149
Mathurānātha xviii
Mati 4, 10
Matiketra 62
Matter .. 126
Max Muller 71, 75
Māyādevī 26
Mediaeval . xvii
Medieval Logic xiii, xviii, xix
Medieval school i xii, xvii
Mediate 43
Medicine 62, 131
Meditation .. 71, 104
Meghadūta 91
Members .. 44
Menander 61
Mental 59
Meruṭuṅga 1
Metaphysical Basket 58
Metaphysics xviii, 13, 151
Method of discussion 117
Metre 84
Middle Age xix, xx
Middle Country 103
Middle Path 68
Middle term 16, 17, 29, 30, 31, 33, 41, 55, 76, 77, 85, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 117, 130
Mi-ḍmigs-pa 110, 134
Mi-ḍmigs-pahi gsan-tshigs 117
Miharakula xix, 146
Milinda 61, 62
Milinda-pañha . 61, 62
Mīmāṃsaka 27, 32, 46, 54, 91, 93, 94, 105, 127

	Page
Mīmāṁsā	60
Mind 10, 15, 40, 86, 87, 102	
Mine	143
Mingr'term 16, 17, 18, 29, 30, 33, 41, 76 90, 91, 93, 95, 110, 112, 136	
Miroh	72
Misconception	18
Mithilā	xxi
Mitra, Dr. R. L. ..	36, 65, 149
Mhon-sum 65, 99, 106, 108, 109, 129	
Mhon-sum ltar-nad	99
Modern	xvii
Modern school ..	xviii
Mody Keshabhai	9
Moggaliputta	60, 61
Mokṣa .	8 21
Momentaneous	132
Momentary .	17
Monastery xx, 89, 100, 118 119, 124, 125, 151	
Mongolia	63
Morris Dr.	59
Mtshan ñid	129, 134
Muruk ..	74
Mudita Bhadra ..	147
Mukhopadhyaya Justice Asutosh	91
Muktākumbha	133
Muktāpīḍa	xx
Mūla Sarvāstivāda	65
Mumbha .	32
Muni Candra	38, 50
Muniratna .	49
Munisundara	6, 39, 53
Muñja	37
Music	62 104, 121
Muṣṭiharītakī,	80
Mu tig-bum pa	133
Mutual	42
Mutual non-existence	24, 25
Myrobalan	80
Mythical	57

N

	Page
Nadia ..	xxi
Nāgadatta ..	80
Nāga Rakṣita ..	137
Nāgarvāraka	8
Nāgārjuna 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 122, 145	
Nāga Sena	61, 62
Nāgasena-Bhikṣu-sūtra ..	61
Nāga Sena	122
Nāgendra gaccha	47, 48, 61
Ñag-ḥbaḥ	143
Ñag-tsho-lotsava	149
Naigama ..	4, 11, 21
Naigamābhāsa	43
Naiyāyika	40 49 54, 72
Nālandā xx, 69, 71, 74, 79, 80, 81, 101, 102, 103, 119, 122, 123, 124, 129, 145, 146, 147, 150	
Nālandra	121
Nālo ..	60 145
Nāma	11
Nāmarūpa ..	45
Name ..	11, 85, 86, 90
Nam-mkhaḥi-goṅ-can	127
Nāmbhā ..	17
Nanda	3
Nandi Sūtra	3 4
Nan gi khyab pa	140
Nārāyaṇa Pāla	149
Narendra-śrī jñāna	151
Nārī	148
Naropa	151
Nāsti	24
Nature	120, 127
Nava Dharma	64 72

Page

Naya 4, 8, 11, 15, 21, 22, 40, 43, 51, 54, 55
Nayābhāsa 43
Naya Pāla 141, 142, 148, 149
Negation .. 30, 96, 117
Negative .. 20, 31, 32, 92
Nemionatra 46, 47, 60, 70
Nemnātha 79
Nepal .. 57, 63, 71, 121, 141
[illegible] 40
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] 42
Niggaha 61
Niggaha-asatakka 61
Nigbanhisna 45
Nigiva 57
Nigraha 61
Nigrahasthāna 51
Nikesga [illegible]
Nila sutra 71
Ni-sam-sāra 123
Nirgrantha 104
Nirjarā 8
Nirnaya .. [illegible] 40
Nirnayasāgara 6, 8
Nirvāṇa 1, 2, 3, 8, 39, 57, 58, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 73, 75, 82, 142, 145
Nirvikalpaka 20
Nirvikṛti 6
Nir 44, 62
Nis[illegible] truths 20
Nomenclature 12
Non-conception 19
Non-distinguished 11
Non-entity 11
Non-[illegible] 91 114
Non-[illegible] contradict[illegible] 91 114
Non-existence 19, 24, 25, 42
Non-perception 110 111, 134
Non-reflective 20
Non-self 15
Nose 92
Nota[illegible] 1[illegible] 87
Nota[illegible] 32
Nya[illegible] 62
Nyagrodhaka 9
Nyāsa 124
Nyāya 14 40 52, 61 62 127
Nyāya-bhāsya [illegible] 80 85
Nyāya-bhūsana 53
Nyāyabindu xix, 41, 53, 54, 109, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 129, 131, 135
Nyāyabindupūrvārtha 117
Nyāya-bindu pūrva pakṣa sankṣepa 129
Nyāyabindutīkā xix, 34, 35, 113, 114, 120, 131
Nyāya-dīpikā .. 81 82
Nyāya-dvāra-sūtra .. 89
Nyāya-kalikā 63
Nyāya-kandali 51
Nyāya-khaṇḍa-khādya .. 54
Nyāya-kumudacandrodaya 39
Nyāya-kusumāñjali [illegible]
Nyāyāṅkāra xvii 53
Nyāyāṅkāra-vṛtti [illegible]
Nyāyāl-kasidhi 124
Nyāyāmṛta-taraṅgiṇī [illegible]
Nyāyāmukha-sūtra 99
Nyāyapradīpa 51
Nyāya-praveśa 80 80 95 102 111 114
Nyāya-praveśaka 53
Nyāya-praveśaka-sūtra 48
Nyāya-praveśa-tarka-sūtra 80 102
Nyāya-praveśa-sūtra-pramāṇa-prakaraṇa 80 102
Nyāya-rahasya 54
Nyāya-sara 53
Nyāya-sāstra [illegible] xvii
Nyāya sutra xvii 31, 63 86 87 88, 116

Page

Nyāya vārtika [illegible] 81, 95
88, 89
Nyāyavārtika tātparyaṭīkā [illegible]
86, 81, 86, 88
Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyaṭīkā-parisuddhi [illegible]
Nyāyāvatāra [illegible] 13, 15, 41, 46
48, 76, 133
Nyāyāvatāra vivṛti [illegible] 14, 21,
46, 133
Nyāyāvatāra vṛtti 48, 49
Nyāyayama [illegible]
Nyāyavinicaya [illegible] 17, 40, [illegible]
Nyāya vinicaya vṛtti 17
Nyāya-vṛtti [illegible]
Nyāyaṭīkā [illegible]

O

Object [illegible] 99, 100, [illegible] 20
Object of knowledge 10
Objects of [illegible] 10
Ocean of discourses 10
Ocular [illegible]
Odantapura 121, 140
Odantapuri [illegible]
Oldenberg, Dr [illegible] 71
Olfactory [illegible]
Omniscient 141
Oneness 11
Oneness of knowledge 10
Opponent 40, 44, 68, 101, 112, 114
Opposition 113
Ordination 14
Organs of senses 10
Orissa 80, 81
Orthodox 65, 103
Others [illegible] 143
Oudh [illegible]

P

Padārtha [illegible] 128
Padmā [illegible] 100
Padmacarita [illegible] 35
Paksa-sandhāna [illegible]
Pag-sam jon-zang 80, 82,
84, 110, 121, 122, 123, 124
129, 130, 131, 134, 135, 136,
137, 140, 142, 147, 148, 150
Paksa 16, 17, 18, 20, 39, 41, 42,
70, 90, 91, 112
Pakṣābhāsa 17, 32, 90, 112
Pakṣa-prayoga 42
Pala [illegible] 116, 118, 119
Palhana 63
Pramāṇa [illegible] 58, [illegible] 60, 61, 64,
64, 67, 146
Pali literature 159
Pali Buddhist literature [illegible] 57
Palasa [illegible] 81
Pamsugula [illegible]
Pancadandacchattra 64
Pancadramidaka 38
Pāndusopuṭaka [illegible] 25, 26
Pandita [illegible] 43, 62, [illegible] 78, [illegible] 80
101, 108, [illegible] 121, 130
138, 140, 141, 143, 144, [illegible]
Pandita's Copy 30
Pāṇḍu 102, 122, 124
Pāṇḍuka 48, 51
Pārāsatti [illegible]
Paradārā 133
Paradārā Dhātra 108, 132, 134
Paralogism [illegible] 5, 43
Pāralokasiddhi [illegible] xx, 132
Paramabhuma 48, 60
Paramārtha [illegible] 70, 109, 140
Paramārthasat 100
Paramārthika 14, 41, 43, 43
Paramārthika satyaka 21
Paramātha 41
Paramārthānumāna 10, 31, 85, 109,
111

Page

Parārtha-vākya 100
Par[illegible] bheda 24 30
Parīkṣā 129
Parīkṣāmukha 28 37 54
Parīkṣāmukha-paṅjikā 28 37
Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra 28
Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra 26 28 29 33 40
Par[illegible]stoparvan 1 45
Parivrajaka 103
Parokṣa 4 9 10 15 28 29 40 41 54
Pārśva 63
Pārśvanātha 1 14 126
Pārśvanātha-caritra 35, 36, 47
Pārtha Sārathi 81
Pārtha Sārathi Miśra 81
Partially 92
Particle 93
Particular 11, 17 32, 86 115
Particularity 128
Particular property 11
Parts of a syllogism 42, 85 89
Party .. 93
Pāṭaliputra xxiv 9 26 28 58
Patan .. 35
Patañjali 122
Pathak, K. B. 26, 28, 34, 105, 114
Pāṭhaghāṭī .. 150
Paṭiccasamuppāda 59
Pāṭimokkha 78
Paṭṭikā 61
Patna 9
Pātra Kesari 28
Pātra Kesari Svāmī 28
Patta 98
Pattadhara 5
Pattāvalī 1, 3 5 6 9, 13, 14, 49, 53, 55
Pattāva Lakṣaṇā 3
Poodgalika 17
Pāvā 1
Pearl oyster 40
Perceptible 30
Perception 4 10 15, 16, 19, 20, 40 54, 85, 86, 88 89 94, 99 105 106 108 109 110 111 112 129 137, 139
Perfect 41
Perfection 71 140
Perfect knowledge 109
Permanence 124
Permanent 128
Personal Testimony 16
Pervaded 29 30 41
Pervader .. 29 111
Pervasion .. 29
Peshwar xix, 74 75
Peterson, Professor xiii, xx, 2 3 5 9, 13, 14, 22, 23, 24 26, 28 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51 52 54, 109, 113, 114 131
Petitio Principii .. 70
Phakkikā Sūtra xvii
Phala 28, 128
Phalavardhagrāma 39
Phaṇi Candra 69
Phasa 31
Philosophy 78
Phodang xv xvi
Phyi rol gyi don 129
Phyi rol gyi don grub pa ces bya-wahi tshig-mdzod 130
Phyogs 90
Phyogs glan 89
Phyogs-lhar-sran 90
Piety Mart 147
Piṅgala-netra 71
Piṭaka 80 103 121
Piṭakatraya 58
Piṭakattaya 58

Page

Place 29
Post 23, 123
Poetry 62
Pole 32
Politics 77
Polity 62
Poona 34
Positive 92
Posterior .. 30, 31
Pothi 125
Poussin, Louis De La Vallee 70, 106, 108
Prabandha-cintāmani 14 34
Prabhācandra 23, 24, 29, 33, 34, 48, 82
Prabhākara .. 27, 34
Prābhākara .. 33, 54
Prabhāmitra 140
Prabhāvakacaritra 14, 35, 38, 39, 45, 48
Prācīna .. . 6
Prācīna Gutra .. 5
Practical .. 11 15, 40
Practical efficiency 110
Practice 71
Pradhāna 125
Pradhvaṃsābhāva 24, 42
Pradyumna 14 35, 38 45
Prāgabhāva .. 24, 42
Praigha Pāla 149
Prajñākara .. 27, 63
Prajñākara Gupta xviii, 135, 141
Prajñākara Mati .. 135, 151
Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra .. 147
Prajñaptivādin 65
Prajñāvarma 120
Prakaraṇa .. 9, 46
Prakāśa 54
Prākṛta .. 3, 4, 14
Pramāṇa 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15 21, 22, 29, 40, 43, 51, 54, 55, 64, 106, 108, 129, 132, 134
Pramāṇasamuccaya 26, 45
Pramāṇa-naya-tattvā-lokā-laṅkāra 38, 39, 41, 42, 50, 51
Pramāṇa-nirṇaya .. 54
Pramāṇa parīkṣā 27, 54, 132
Pramāṇa-samuccaya xvii, 80, 82 83, 84, 85 86, 87 88 100, 103
Pramāṇa samuccaya-ṭīkā xvii, 124
Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti xvii, 100
Pramāṇa-śāstra xvii
Pramāṇa śāstra pravēśa 100
Pramāṇa-siddhi 106
Pramāṇa-sūtra-samuccaya 84
Pramāṇa svarūpa 28 30
Pramāṇa-vārtika .. 53, 106, 118, 124, 133, 142
Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā xvii, 103, 105, 106, 107
Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra xviii, 135, 141
Pramāṇa vārtikālaṅkāra-ṭīkā xviii, 137, 141
Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā xvii, 118, 119
Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā-ṭīkā xvii, 119
Pramāṇa-vārtika-ṭīkā xviii, 142
Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti xvii, 107, 124
Pramāṇa viniścaya 107, 108, 132, 138
Pramāṇa-viniścaya-ṭīkā 132, 138
Prameya kamala-mārtaṇḍa 28, 33, 34 54
Prameya-ratna-mālā 26, 37, 45
Prasannarati 0
Pratibandhasiddhi .. 144

	Page
Pratijñā	7, 42, 61, 74
Pratijñā-vibhakti	7
Pratisedha	30
Pratisṭhāna	[illegible]
Pratisandhi	40, 44
Pratyabhijñāna	28, 40, 43, [illegible]
Pratyabhijñānābhāsa	32
Pratyakṣa	4, 9, 19, 25, 28, 29, 49, 54, 74, 85, 99, 105, 106, 109, 129
Pratyakṣābhāsa	32, 99
Pratyakṣa-svarūpa	49
Pratyakṣa-vyavasthā	108
Pratyayana-sārvabhauma-yātrā	37
Pravāda	71, 101
Praśnottara	26
Presidents	93
Problems	1, 29, 90, 91, 92
Preface	xxv
Prometheus	[illegible]
Promise	96
Presidency College	xxi
President	44
Presumption	10, 87
Priestcraft	65, 101
Principle of parts	81
Principles	13
Prior	10, 31
Probability	10
Procedure	40
Professor	xiii, 124, 129, 146
Proof	44, 90, 91, 112, 118
Proportion	 11
Prophecy	 62
Proposition	7, 16, 21, 42, 44, 61, 70, 90, 95, 96, 132
Prosody	140
Proximity	1, 9
Pṛthvī	2
P. T. S.	xxi, 54, 60, 61
Pubbaseliya	58
Public opinion	99
Pūjāprakarana ..	9
Pūrvatarkavidhana	148
Punah	xx, 67
Puṇya	2
Purandara	41
Pure Logic	74, 78
Pūrṇaka	13
Pūrṇamāgacha	15
Puruṣa	127
Puruṣa-parīkṣā	127
Pūrva	5, 11, 41
Pūrva-pāla	66
Pustakasūtra-pāṭha	134
Puṣya	11

Q

Quality	43, 93, 95, 129
Questions of King Menander	61, 62
Quibble	9
Quibbler	81, 113

R

Raghunātha Śiromaṇi	xvii
Rahasya	xxiii
Rāhusvatta	104
Rāhugacha	1, 46
Rāhugriva	59
Rajagṛha	1, 58
Raja Pāla	149
Rajaśekhara	38, 48, 1, 52
Rājataraṅgiṇī	xx
Rajavartika	74
Rajgir	3, 145, 150
Rajputana	28
Rajshahye	121, 122
Rakṣita	130
Rāl pacan	xx, 115, 148
Rāma	43
Rāmacandra	54
Rāma Pāla	149

Page

Raṅ-bahin .. 110, 134
Raṅ-bahin-ḥdzag-pa 127
Raṅ-bahin-gyi-gtan-tshig 117
Raṅ-don-gyi-rjes-ḥjug 8
Raṅ-don-gyi-rjes-su-ḥpag-pa 108
Raṅ-gi-don-rjes-su-ḥpag-pa . 106
Raṅ-la-tshaḥ-ma 129
Rasa Pāla 140
Rāṣṭrakūṭa 27
Ratbavrapura . 2
Ratnākara .. . 151
Ratnakaranḍaka 23, 24
Ratnākara Śānti .. 140, 151
Ratnakirti 140
Ratnaprabha 38, 46, 50, 131, 133
Ratnarāja 147
Ratnaraśmi xx
Ratnasāgara 147
Ratna-sokhara 52
Ratnavajra .. 139, 151
Ratnāvali .. . 66
Ratnāvatārikā . .. 51
Ratnāvatārikā-pañjikā 51
Ratnāvatārikā-ṭippana 51, 52
Ratnodadhi 147
Raudrī patrikā xviii
Ravi Gupta xvii, xx, 123, 124
Rdo-rje rgyal-mtshan .. 124
Rdzas 128
Real 11 109
Reality 60
Reason 4, 7, 16, 30, 41, 51, 61, 74, 90, 91, 92, 94, 99, 100, 110, 111
Reasoning 10, 17, 59, 60, 73, 74, 75, 77, 90, 91, 94, 95, 98, 110, 112, 114, 116, 121, 139
Recluse 80
Recognition 21, 40, 41, 58
Recognition of similarity 88
Recollection 20, 40, 41, 44
Records 1[illegible], 60
References .. 7
Reflective .. 20
Refutation 21, 89, 90, 110, 131
Relation 96
Relative extension . 93
Release . 8
Reliable authority .. 4, 10
Religion . xviii, 13, 78
Remoteness .. . 109
Research Society 70, 137
Resident .. . xxi
Respondent 44
Restraint 8
Result 43
Rgyal-dbaṅ-blo-gros . 124
Rgyal-wa-can .. . 137
Rgyu-daṅ ḥbras-buḥi-ṅo-wo grub-pa 138
Rgyud-gsaṅ grub-pa .. 118
Rgyud-gsaṅ grub-pahi ḥgrel-ḥjug 121
Rgyud-pa .. . 120
Rhetoric 122, 140
Rhys Davids, Dr. 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 103
Right-hand 145
Rigs-ldan-rgyal-po . 140
Rigs-pa-can .. 127
Rigs-pa-grub-pahi-sgron-me 123
Rigs-pa-ṅes-par-ṅo-wo 1[illegible]
Rigs-pa-thugs-po 109
Rigs-pahi-thugs-pahi-don-bsdus-pa .. . 135
Rigs-pahi-thugs-pa-[illegible]-ṅa-ma-ḥdor-bsdus-pa 129
Rigs-pahi-thugs-pahi-rgya-cher-ḥgrel-wa 111
Rigs-pahi-thugs-pa rgya-cher ḥgrel-wa 130
Rigs-pahi-yan-lag .. 85, 89

	Page
Rin-chen sdo rje	139
Rjes-ḥjug-ltar-snon	99
Rjes-su-ḥjug	99
Rjes-su-ḥjug-pa	129
Rjes su ḥgro-wa-snol	97
Rjes-su-ḥgro-wa-phyin-ci-log pa	97
Rjes-ston	4 11 21
Rj mdzāllbhāsa	43
Rnam-par-rig-pa-tsam-ñid-du-grub-pa	140
R k	81
Rockhill Mr	66, 124
Rolani	30, 31
Ronki	76
Rongbuk	76
Rongdun	76
Rṣabhadeva	4
Rṣibhāṣita-sūtra	6
Rṣimaṇḍala prakaraṇa-vṛtti	6
Rtogs	99
Rtog-gel-skaḥ	134
Rtsoḥ-pahi-khyu-mchog ..	80
Rtsoḥ pahi rigs-pa	117
Rtsoḥ pahi rigs-pa-ñ-khrel-pa -don-rnam-par-bhyeḥ-pa	125
Rtsoḥ-pahi-rigs-pahi-bgrel-wa	120
Ruegdatta ..	xviii
Rudra	14
Rudra Nārāyaṇa	xviii
Rudra Nyāyavāchaspati	xviii
Ruggeri Land	81
Rules of debate	44
Rusta	131

S

Sabalā	32
Sabarasvāmi	27 34
Sabhāsthāna	58 66
Sabda	4 12 13 16, 21
Sabdābhidhāna	43
Sabda-Brahma-parīkṣā	127
Sabdānumāna	85
Sabdānuśāsana	35
Sabhāpati	44
Sabhya	44
Sacrifice	43 147
Saddarśana ..	49
Saddarśanasamuccaya	48, 49 50 52 53
Saddarśana samuccaya vṛtti	52, 53, 173
Saddharma-puṇḍarīka	64
Sādhana ..	20 90
Sādhāraṇa	93
Sādharmya ..	17, 31, 90, 98
Sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa	19 98
Sādharmyavat	112
Sādhu	7
Sādhya	13 18, 19, 20, 70 90
Sādhyasama	70
Sadlakṣaṇa	134
Sadvāda	88
Sāgaracandra	47
Sāgarendu	47
Sahacara	90 91
Sahāvalambha niyama	136
Saint	80 93 109
Saka 1, 14 20 28 34 51 63, 131	
Sakābda	63
Sākhā	8
Sakala	41
Sākala	75, 146
Sakra	12, 43
Sakrāditya	141 146
Sakti	12
Sākya	69 125
Sākyabodhi	xvii, 119
Sākya-blo	136, 138, 146 141
Sākya Muni	57 146
Sākya-siṃha	121
Sakya-śrī Paṇḍita	151

Page

Śīla Candra 69
Śīlikā Nātha 54
Salvation 8 21, 35 39, 83
Sambhirādha .. 4, 12, 21
Sambhirādhābhāsa .. 43
Sambhūtavijaya 5
Samādhirāja 64
Samāja-guhya 147
Samana .. 13
Samantabhadra .. 22 23, 24 27, 54
Samantapāsādikā 74
Sāmānya 17, 32, 54, 82, 95, 109, 128
Sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dik-prakāśikā 121
Sāmānya lakṣaṇa 109
Samarasaukalikā 40
Samāropa 40
Samatata 102
Samavāya .. 129
Samavāyābhāva .. 24
Samayabhedoparacana-cakra 119
Sambandha .. . 128
Sambandha-parīkṣā 118, 120, 143
Sambandha-parīkṣānusāra .. 142
Sambandha-parīkṣā ṭīkā .. 120
Sambandha-parīkṣā-vṛtti .. 118
Sambhava 10
Samgraha 4 11 21
Saṅgrahābhāsa 43
Sāṅkhya xix, 27, 33, 46, 49, 51, 62, 63, 91, 95, 126
Sāṅkhya-kārikā .. 83 95
Sammati-tarka-sūtra 14 36
Sammitīya . 65 66
Sāmprata 12
Saṃsārā .. 129
Samsaya 40
Sāmi Pāla . 149
Samvara 8

Page

Samvat 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 44, 46, 48, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 131
Saṃvṛti 43
Sāṃvyavahārika 40
Samyaktvaprakarana 40
Samyaktvaprakāśa 28
Samyo 124, 125
Sanātana 136
Sangha 103
Saṅghabhadra .. 66, 76
Saṅgharama .. 67, 74, 145
Saṅkantika 68
Śaṅkara 23
Śaṅkarācārya .. xx, 23
Śaṅkarānanda .. xviii, 142
Śaṅkara Svāmin 89, 101, 102
Sanskrit 3, 15
Sanskrit Buddhist Literature 63, 64
Śāntakara Gupta 101
Santānāntara-siddhi 117, 121
Santānāntara-siddhi ṭīkā .. 121
Śānta Rakṣita 79, 124, 125, 126, 129, 130, 148
Santati 109
Śānti Bhadra .. 136, 140
Śāntinātha xx 22, 109, 131
Śāntipa 140
Śānti-pāda 37
Śānti Śūri 37
Śāntyācārya 37
Saptabhaṅgī 51
Saptabhaṅgī-naya 8, 24, 43, 61
Sapta-bhaṅgī-taraṅgiṇī .. 8
Saptadaśa-bhūmi-śāstra-yogācārya .. 72, 73
Sarabha 68
Sarasvatī .. iii, 102
Sarasvatīgaccha 6, 9
Śāriputra 146

Page

Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha 8, 26, 36, 66, 67, 68, 82, 105, 107, 138
Sarvajña Deva 1 4 115
Sarvajña Mitra 124
Sarvajña sobhu sarika 141
Sarvajña-śrī Rakṣita 80
Sarvarājagaṇi 3
Sarvāstivāda 65 66 75 110
Sat 112
Saskya 89, 100
Sāstra 82, 83, 84, 89, 100, 103, 106, 139
Sāstraja 16
Sāstra on the grouped inferences 84
Sāstrī Gaṅgādhara 81
Sāstrī, Hara Prasad 140, 141, 150
Sat 100
Sataka sāstra 71
Sata-sāstra-vaipulya-vyākhyā 102
Sātavāhana 68
Sātavāhana 68
Satra 12
Satrunjaya 14
Saudhodani 19 83
Saugata 17 27 34 46 54
Sautrāntika 65 66 67
Sāvaka 60
Savant .. 68
Savikalpaka 20
Sbas .. 13
S. B. E. series .. 58, 59, 61 62
Schoefner, A. .. 66, 67 68 69 70, 71, 72, 74, 80, 81, 82, 103 106, 118, 119, 121, 123 130, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 148, 150, 152
Scholar .. 62
School xvii xviii, 66, 104 140
School of thought 62
Science 13 53 62 146
Schlagintweit, Dr 71, 73
Scripture 4 15 16, 29, 32 40, 41 58, 114, 121, 129
Scriptural method 22
Scriptural testimony 1
Sculptor 145
Scythian 62
Second Council 58
Sect 2 58 65 66, 67, 74, 75
Seeth 77
Self 22 141
Self-awareness 52
Self-consciousness 100
Self existence 125 129
Sel wa grub pa 144
Semblance 17 28 116
Semblance of reason 18
Semblance of refutation 24 146
Sen dkar 150
Sensation 111
Sense 10, 29 85, 95, 99 109 120
Sense organ 40 86 87 127
Sense perception 19
Separation 19
Separation unknown 21
Sermon Basket 68
Ser skya pa 127
Serviceable 95
Sesa 122
Ses pahi dge gro 84
Sesrab 25
Sesrab bhyun gnas-bo 115
Sesrab-don-bo 60
Sewell Mr 48 58 81
Sgra 129
Sgrahi tshans pa rtag pa 127
Sgra rje dpag 85
Shalu 78
Sha ma kun la [illegible] pa grol wa 180

Page

Shah-chuk 137
Shawl 79
Sherbatski, F. I 109, 114, 131
Shi wa-tsho 124
Shu-chen 120, 121, 130, 131, 135, 141
Shu-ven-tsho-ba 68
Siam 61
Siamese edition 61
Siddha 35
Sida 44
Siddha Hema śabdānuśāsana bṛhat ṭīkā 15
Siddhajayanti caritra-ṭīkā 1
Siddhānta 1
Siddhārṇava 17
Siddhartha 40, 49
Siddhasena 15, 21, 37
Siddhasena Divākara xix, 13, 14, 15, 22, 40, 46, 76
Siddhasena divākara vyākhyānaka 40
Siddhasena Gaṇi .. 9, 22
Siddhatthika 58
Siddha vyākhyānaka .. 40
Siga 10, 29
Sikkim xv, xvi, 89, 90, 115, 119, 125, 130, 133, 138, 142
Sīla 123
Sīlabhadra 101, 102, 103, 140
Silādītya 11
Silao 150
Silasangama 150
Silver 40
Simha 123, 124
Siṁhagiri 22
Siṁhagiri 22
Siṁhasūka 47
Siṁhavaktra 90
Siṁha-Vyāghrī lakṣaṇa 48
Simlar 88
Simsapā 31, 43, 141
Simultaneity 29
Simultaneous 30, 31
Sinapalitha 124
Sinhalese-grammar 100
skaj-cig-ma-bjig pa-grub-pa 132
skaj-cig-ma-bjig-grub - pahi - rnam-bgrol 133
Skyo-ba 127
Skyes-bu-dpag-pa 127
Skyes-ston 18
Sloka-vārtika 27, 54
Sloka vārtika bhāṣya 54
Smarana 40, 41
Smaranavādin 12
Smith, Vincent A 38, 41, 63
Smṛti 29, 54
Sōmadeva 142
Sophism 60
Sophist 59, 60, 62
Sophistry 60
Sorrow 49, 50
Sotavadāna 59
Soul 8, 10, 15, 22, 41, 43, 44, 60, 72, 91, 95, 112, 127, 128, 129
Soul-less 8
Sound 127, 129
Source of knowledge 106, 108, 112
Specific property .. 11, 43
Spell 62
Spyi 128
Śrāddha-pratikramaṇa-sūtra-vṛtti 52
Śragdharā-stotra 70, 121, 124, 150
Śragdharā-stotra ṭīkā 150
Śramaṇa 60
Śrāvaka 137
Śreṣṭha Pāla 149
Sri . 100, 130, 140
Sri Dhānyakataka xx
Śrīdhara 51

	Page
Sri Harsa	xx 123
Sri Harsa Deva	xx, 132
Sri-jñāna	135, 148, 151
Srikantha	xx 53
Srilabdha	67
Sriparvata	68
Sri sala	68
Sron-tsan gam-po	104 105
Srughna	71
Sruta	4 10 22
Srutakevalin	5
Sruti	120 130
Sruti-parikṣā	130
Statement	91 112
Stcin Dr	xx
Steinthal Paul	60
Sthānanga-sūtra	4 8 11
Sthāpanā	11
Sthavira	65 67 151
Sthira	128
Sthira-dīpana	140
Sthiramati	121 140
Sthūlabhadra	3
Sthūlakusta	81
Stimuli	95
Stoe gsum	100
St Petersburg	131
Straight expression	11
Study	1
Stūpa	xx 64
Suali, Dr	40 52 143
Subhakara Gupta	141
Subhatunga	26
Subhūti-ānta	140
Subhūti-sri	118
Subhūti-sri-śānti	100
Subject	29, 90, 91
Subsequent	42
Subsequent non-existence	24, 25
Substance	43, 93, 95, 128
Subtle	12
Succession	29 118
Such like	12
Sudhākara Dvivedi	14
Sudharma Svāmi	
Sudarsaya	80
Sugata	51 131
Suggestiveness	32
Sugiura, Dr	xiv 73 74 75, 76, 80 101
Suhrllekha	58
Suitable	12
Sukhabodhikā ṭīkā	11
Sukrtasamkīrtana	48
Sultanganj	150
Sumati	131 141
Sumati-kīrti	131
Sum-pa	157
Sum-pal-chos-byung	63
Sun	64
Sunāvakarī	151
Sunnyasri Mitra	130
Sung-yun	67, 69
Sunchoyin	98
Sunchoyin-Jtarsnan wa	99
Superimposition	40
Superior	151
Surendrabodhi	135
Sureśvara	105
Sureśvarācārya	105
Sūri	39, 45, 53, 65
Surname	46, 48
Sūrya-prajñapti-sūtra	6
Sūtra 8 10 46 103, 121 139 140	
Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-niryukti	8
Sūtra kṛtāṅga-sūtra	6
Sūtrālaṅkāratīkā	73
Sūtrānta	67
Sūtra upadeśa	63
Sutta	58
Suttanta	67
Sutta pitaka	58, 59 60, 63

Page

Suvarṇa-prabhāsa 64
Suṣupti 145
Svabhāva 31, 110, 111, 117, 134
Svabhāva hetu 117
Svabhāvānupalabdhi 110
Svabhāva-parīkṣā 127
Svabhāvavirudhopalabdhi 111
Svalakṣaṇa 109
Svārtha 41
Svārthānumāna 10 31 85 106 108, 109 110
Svarūpa 10
Svarūpasambodhana 20
Svataḥ-prāmāṇya 120
Svatantra 121
Svatantra Mādhyamika school 121
Svāti 9
Svāti-tanaya 9
Svayambhūstotra 23
Svetāmbara xvii, 1 2, 5, 6 9 14, 22, 44, 35 36, 38, 48 50 51, 62 54
Syādasti 24
Syād nāsti 24
Syādvāda 8 22 23 24
Syādvāda-kalikā . 51
Syādvāda-mañjarī 51
Syādvāda-ratnākarāvatārikā 38, 50 131, 133
Syādvādaratnākarāvatārikā-pañjikā 38
Syādvāda-śruta 22
Syādvāda-vidyāpati 54
Syāt 8
Syllogism 6, 7 10, 29, 42 77, 85 89, 92, 114 139
Syllogistic 76
Synonyms 12
System . xiii 49
Systematic 13
Systems of philosophy 33

T

Page

Tactual 59
Takkikas xix, 63 64 66 70 84 89 99 101 102 103 105, 119 124 140
Takka 10
Takki 59 60
Takkika 59 60
Takṣa-śīla . 67
Tāmra-śāsana 65
Tangyur xx, 62, 70 72 78 84 85, 89, 99, 100, 101, 106, 107, 108, 109, 117, 118 119 120 121, 123, 124, 126 129 130 131, 132 134, 135 136, 137, 138, 139, 140 141 142, 143 144 150
Tantra 70, 124, 129 140, 146 147
Tāntric 124
Tapāgaccha .. 1, 3, 52, 55
Tapāgacchapaṭṭāvalī .. 48
Tārā 121, 122
Tārārātha, Lama xv 66 67 68 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 80 81, 82, 103, 106, 118 119 121 123 130 131, 134, 135 136 137 139, 140, 141 142 145, 148, 150, 151 152
Tarka 29, 40 41 54
Tarkabhāṣā 53, 54 55 138 139
Tarkābhāsa 32
Tarka-nyāya 117 129
Tarka-prāgalva 80 81
Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā 62
Tarkasaṃgraha 126 128
Tarka-śāstra xvii, 76, 77
Tarka-ṭīkā 133
Tarkī 60
Tārkika 26, 59, 72, 73
Tārkika-cakra-cūḍāmaṇi 26
Tarku . 59
Tashilhunpo 78

Page

Tathāgata 67
Tathāgata [illegible] 54
Tathāgata-guhyaka [illegible] 64
Tathāgata Gupta 145
Tatpurusha [illegible]
Tatpurusha-sūtra [illegible]
Tattva [illegible]
Tattva-Ślokā [illegible]
Tattvacintāmaṇi [illegible]
Tattvacintāmaṇi-prakāśa [illegible] xvii
Tattvārthādhigama [illegible]
Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra [illegible] 8
9, 10, 11, 12, [illegible] 23
Tattvārthabodha-vidhāyinī 36
Tattvārthaślokavārtika [illegible]
Tattvārthasūtra [illegible]
Tattvārthaṭīkā 22
Tattvasaṃgraha 125
Tattvasaṃgraha 51, 1.5 [illegible] 128
130
Tattvasaṃgraha-kārikā 125
Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā 130
Tattvaṭīkā xvii
Tawney, Mr 11
Tayāla 67
Technical [illegible] 71 [illegible] 1[illegible]
Telingana 38 [illegible]
Tepitaka 58, 59 63
Terai 67
Testimony 4, 10 13 32 40, 41 43
85 88 89 139
Text xvi [illegible]
Thama [illegible] 141
[illegible] 61
Thamantam 160
Theory of exemption 114
Thera 58 65, 67
Therāvādin 58
Thesis xiii xv xx 71 76 [illegible] 91
94 98 112

Page

Thibaut, Dr G xv 11
Third [illegible] 68
Three [illegible] 148
Tholing 118
Thomas, Mr F W xv 84
Thonpa 120
Thonpa [illegible]
[illegible] 130
Three Baskets 68
Three-formed 111
Thunderbolt 80
Tibet [illegible]
Tibetan [illegible] 74
Tibet xv, xx 50 53 60, 71 78, [illegible]
89, 100, 120, 122, 124, 125,
129, 131, 134, 135, 137, 140
149 148, 161
Tibetan Dictionary 78
Tibet Mission xx
Tigerwalla 47
Tika 28
Tikkāśrava 40
Tīrtha 194
Tirtha 101 129
Tirthe [illegible] 140
Tippanaka 36
Tirtha 80, 83, 103 104, 152
Tirthakalpa 1 9
Tīrthankara 1
Tirthika 71 114, 121 140 147
Tirvak 32
Tissa 60, 61
Tongue 1, 87
Total unreality 68
Touch 15 87
Tower 145
Tradition 1 64, 68, 62
Traditional 19
Trairāśika 91
Transcendental 15 40, 41
Transcendental perception 34
Treatise .. 9

Page

Trikāla-parīkṣā 101
Trilokasāra 1
Trimalaya 103
Tripiṭaka .. 58, 61, 64, 80
Tri-rūpa-hetu 88
Triṣaṣṭiśalākapuruṣa-caritra 45
Truth 44
Tsandrabi-khron-pa .. 123
Tshab-ñi-ma-grags 132
Tshad-ma 129
Tshaj-ma-brtag-pa .. 132
Tshaj-ma-grub-pa 106
Tshaj-mabi-ḥṭan-ḥcop-rig-pa-la-ḥjug-pa 100
Tshaj-mabi-ḥdo-kun-las-ḥtoṭ-pa 84
Tshaj-ma kun-las-ḥtuṭ-pa .. 84
Tshaj-ma-rigs-par-ḥjug-pabi-ṅgo 89
Tshaj-ma-rnam-ḥgrel-gyi-ḥkab-ḥgrel 118
Tshaj-ma-rnam-ḥgrel-gyi-ḥgrel-ḥbaj 119, 142
Tshaj-ma-rnam-ḥgrel-gyi-ḥgrel-pa 124
Tshaj-ma-rnam-ḥgrel-gyi-ḥgrel-wa 107
Tshaj-ma-rnam-ḥgrel-gyi-rgyan 135
Tshaj-ma-rnam-ḥgrel-gyi-rgyan-gyi-ḥgrel-ḥbad .. 137
Tshaj-ma-rnam-ḥgrel-gyi-tshig 106
Tshaj-ma-rnam-ḥgrel-rgyan-gyi-ḥgrel-ḥbad 141
Tshaj-ma-rnam-ñes-kyi-ṭīkā 132
Tshad-ma-rnam-par-ñes-pa .. 108
Tshad-ma-rnam-par-ñes-pabi-ḥgrel-ḥbad 138
Tshig-gi-don 128
Tsin .. 61, 64
Tshul-gsum 91
Tshul-ḥkhrims-rgyal-mtshan 101

Page

Turuṣka .. 62, 147, 151, 152
Tutelary 121
Type 5, 16, 40

U

Udāharaṇa 31
Udāna 60
Udayana 53, 54
Udayanācārya .. xvii, 49
Udayaprabha .. 47, 48, 51
Udyāna 130
Udyotakara xvii, 27, 34, 53, 81, 85, 88, 89, 105
Uha 29
Ujjaini .. .. xviii, 14, 15
Umā 9
Umeśvānin 9
Umeśvāti xiii, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 22, 23
Uncertain 19, 93, 94, 100, 112, 113
Uncertainty 40
Unconnected 19, 116
Unfamiliar 91
Universal .. 95, 96, 97
Universal connection 55, 92, 96
Universal proposition 95, 97
University i, xvi, xx, xxi, 79, 101, 102, 103, 135, 138, 139, 140, 141, 145, 146, 147, 150, 151
University studies .. 1
Unproved 18, 93, 112
Unravelling 52
Unseparated 21
Upadeśamālā-ṭīkā 38
Upadeśamālā-viśeṣa-vṛtti .. 46
Upadeśamālā-vṛtti .. 50
Upalabdhi 30
Upamāna .. 4, 10, 74, 85
Upanaya .. 16, 31, 42, 61
Upanaya-catukka .. 61
Upāṅga 3

Page

Upaniṣad .. 127, 128
U-pa-ni-ṣa-di-kas 128
Upāsaka 103, 122, 123, 139
Upāsakādhyayana 23, 24
Upavarṣa 33
Ūrdhvatā 32
Utpādasiddhi-prakaraṇa .. 45
Utsarpiṇī 1
Uttara 20, 31
Uttaradharma 67
Uttarādhyayana-bṛhad-vṛtti 37
Uttarādhyayana-sūtra .. 6
Uttaravāhinī 150
Ūvāsagadasāo 23

V

Vādakārya 8
Vādaka śramaṇa 8
Vācaspati .. 53, 105
Vācaspati Miśra xvii, 23, 49, 66, 81, 86, 88, 105
Vāda 8, 44
Vāda-mahārṇava .. 36, 37
Vāda-nyāya .. 117, 120, 125
Vāda-nyāya-vṛtti-vipañcitārtha 125
Vāda-nyāya-vyākhyā .. 120
Vādi 40, 44
Vādin 34
Vādipravara 38
Vāgbhaṭa: *vide* Vāḍpraja.
Vāgīśvarakīrti .. 137, 141, 151
Vāhyārtha 129
Vāhyārtha-siddhi-kārikā .. 130
Vaibhāṣika 65, 66, 67, 74, 75, 78, 130
Vaidharmya .. 17, 20, 31, 90
Vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa 20, 21-97
Vaidharmyavat 112
Vaidāryaskarpo 148
Vairasvāmi 47

Page

Vairocana 123
Vaiśālī 58, 71
Vaiśeṣika 27, 46, 49, 62, 65, 82, 91 94, 127
Vaiṣṇava.. xx
Vajiriya 58
Vajra 80, 145
Vajracchedikā 75
Vajraśākhā 44
Vajrāsana .. 139, 141
Vajravarāhī 139
Vāk-praja or Vāgbhaṭa .. 141
Vākyapadīya 27
Valabhī .. .. xviii, 13
Valid 94, 100
Validity 74
Valid knowledge 4, 10, 15, 16, 19, 21, 28, 29, 32, 40, 43, 54, 55, 84, 99, 109, 110, 129, 132
Vana Pāla 131, 149
Vande-dpal-brtsegs .. 121
Vande-nam-mkhaḥ .. 118, 120
Vande-ye-śes-sde .. 120, 135
Varāhamihira 6, 14
Vararuci 122
Vardhamāna 1, 54
Vardhamāna-sūri 3
Vārendra 121, 122, 123, 134, 136, 148, 151
Vasubandhu xix, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81, 146
Vasubhūti 2
Vasudāsa 141
Vasudhara Rakṣita .. 100
Vasu Mitra 63
Vatsagotra 9
Vātsīputra 66, 128
Vātsīputrīya .. 65, 66, 80
Vātsī-sūta 9
Vātsyāyana xvii, 53, 86, 87
Vaṭṭagāmaṇi 58

Page

Veda 62, 103
Vedāṅga 103
Vedānta 51
Vedāntadūra .. 23, 105
Vedāntin.. 82
Vehgi 81, 82
Vehkapaṭṭa 36
Verbal 12, 42
Verbal fallacy 43
Verbal testimony 4, 10, 15, 32, 40, 41, 85, 88, 89, 130
Vibhāṣā 66
Vibhāṣā-śāstra 67
Vibhāṣā-vinaya 76
Vicārāmṛta-saṁgraha .. 48
Vicāra-ratna-saṁgraha .. 5
Vicāra-sāra-prakaraṇa 1, 14, 48
Vicāraśreṇi 1
Viciteādvaitasiddhi .. 140
Victory 44
Vidarbha 68
Vidhi 30
Vidyabhusana, Satis Chandra 1, xvi, xxi, 63, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 76, 80, 121, 122, 124, 133, 138, 140, 150
Vidyādhara 131
Vidyā-mātra-siddhi-śāstra-vyākhyā 102
Vidyānanda 23, 26, 27, 28, 34, 37, 82, 105
Vienna 35
Vienna Oriental Journal .. 35
Vigraha Pāla 149
Vigraha-vyavartanī-kārikā .. 70
Vigrahavyavartanī vṛtti .. 70
Vihāra* .. .. xx, 104, 125
Vijaya 37
Vijayasena .. 47, 50
Vijñāpa 59
Vijñapti-mātra-siddhi .. 140

Page

Vikala 41
Vikrama 1, 2, 35, 62, 131
Vikramāditya xix, xx, 6, 14, 15, 22, 81, 146
Vikramaśilpura 117
Vikrama saṁvat 49
Vikramaśilā xx, xxi, 79, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 146, 148, 150, 151
Vimala Candra .. 119, 140
Vimala Dāsa 8
Vimaśaś 60
Vimaśel 60
Vinaya 146
Vinayāditya xx
Vināyaka 133
Vinaya Piṭaka 57, 58, 59, 63, 78
Vinaya Vibhāṣā 63
Vinaya Vijaya Gaṇi .. 13
Vindhya .. 103, 104, 148
Vinīta Deva .. 119, 121, 140
Viññāṇa 59
Vipakṣa 7
Vipakṣa-pratiṣedha .. 7
Viparītānvaya ..20, 21, 97, 116
Viparyaya 40
Vira .. 13, 35
Viraha .. 49, 50
Viroddha 18, 94, 111, 113
Viroddhakāryopalabdhi .. 111
Viroddhāvyabhicāri .. 114
Viroddhavyāptopalabdhi .. 111
Viśālāmalavatī .. xvii, 124
Viśālāmalavatī-nāma-pramāṇa-samuccaya-ṭīkā xvii, 124
Viṣaya .. 28, 40
Viśeṣa .. 17, 32, 128
Viṣṇuvardhana 81
Visual 10
Viśuddha-siṁha .. 121, 130
Viśvanātha xvii

Page

Vitaṇḍa 62
Vītarāgastuti 51
Vivartavāda 129
Vivṛti 13, 133
Vow 5, 45
Vrata 5, 45
Vṛddhavādi 14
Vṛhadgacchа 50
Vṛhat-svayambhū-purāṇa .. 150
Vyāghra-śiśuka 47
Vyāpaka .. 29, 111
Vyāpakānupalabdhi .. 111
Vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi .. 111
Vyāpti .. 18, 20, 29, 42, 48, 92
Vyāptigraha 55
Vyāpya 29, 30, 31
Vyatireka 32
Vyatireki 31
Vyavahāra .. 4, 11, 21
Vyavahārābhāsa 43
Vyavahāra-sūtra 6
Vyāvahārika 18

W

Waddell, Col. 78, 124, 129, 151
Wassiliel .. 67, 105
Wassiljew 88
War 62
Water 22
Watters, Mr. 63, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 80, 146
Weber, Dr. 3, 4, 5, 37, 50, 51, 53
Weir Smyth 4
Wenzel, Dr. 71
Wheel 100
Wheel of Reasons .. 99, 100
White, Mr. Claude .. xvi
Wijesimha .. 58, 61, 66, 67
Williams, Monier 63
Winding up 62
Word .. 85, 88, 89, 106, 111
Word for the sake of others 106
Wordsworth, Mr. W. C. .. xvi
Wordy 62
World 60, 129
World-renowned 37

X

Xylograph xv, 72, 100, 101, 108, 109, 121, 125

Y

Yajña 147
Yākinī 48
Yakṣa Pāla 140
Yamāri .. .. xviii, 141
Yaśodharma Deva .. 14
Yaśovijaya 39, 50, 51, 52, 54, 131, 133
Yaśovijaya Gaṇi 54
Yaśovijaya-granthamālā 6, 39, 52, 53, 55
Yaśovijaya Pāṭhaśālā .. 55
Yauga 34
Yoga 10, 27, 33, 62, 65, 71, 73, 83
Yogācāra xix, 51, 66, 67, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 102, 122
Yogācārya 71
Yogācārya-bhūmi-śāstra .. 83
Yogaśāstra 45
Yogin 141
Yuan Chwang 63, 67, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 80, 146
Yuga-pradhāna 5
Yuga-pravara 5
Yuka Ron 73
Yukti-prayoga 139
Yuktiṣaṣṭikā kārikā .. 70
Yuktyanuśāsana 23
Yul-lho-phyog 107

Z

Za-hor 99, 124
Zaschuh 75
Zla-wa-dge-bśes 121